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This project aims to examine whether music has an emotional nature. I use the ancient Chinese 
text Music Has No Grief or Joy to construct three arguments for the illusion view, according to 
which music has no emotional nature and the emotional appearances of music are illusory. These 
arguments highlight representational inconstancy, expressive incapability, and evocative 
underdetermination as three ways to problematize the idea that music has an emotional nature. I 
draw on the Confucian tradition to formulate three responses to the illusion view from 
representational reliability, expressive sincerity, and evocative appropriateness. These responses 
are shown to be inadequate. To examine the illusion view in detail, I adopt a comparative approach 
to structure a dialogue between ancient Eastern philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. 
Nine arguments are constructed from three prominent approaches in contemporary Western 
musical aesthetics on the evocation, expression, and representation of emotion. I argue that each 
of these arguments reads emotion into music. Nevertheless, three insights emerge from the 
comparative discussion. The autonomy of emotional enjoyment, the possibility of emotional 
communication, and the function of emotional language in musical experiences call for 
explanations. I argue that the illusion view are amenable to these insights. The illusion view allows 
us to claim full ownership of emotional responses, have emotional communication by recognizing 
 v 
intended emotional meanings in music, and appreciate the practical value of emotional language 
in music industry and education. I formulate a possible objection on the basis of Charles Swann’s 
musical experience in Marcel Proust’s novel, according to which music has emotional agency in 
the formation of an emotion. This objection can be met and Swann’s musical experience can be 
integrated into the illusion view. The illusion view turns out to be experientially richer than it 
might appear at first. This project liberates musical listening and philosophical thinking from 





The Graduate Center community has been my enduring source of inspiration. In particular, 
I owe three persons my deepest gratitude for their care, support, presence throughout this project. 
Thomas Teufel, holding a slim white chalk while interpreting the concept of aesthetic idea, 
carried a purposive joy that led me to see a number of abstruse passages in Kant illuminated. In 
Thomas’s course Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, my habit of transparency about 
meaning, in which I had taken textual analyses to yield the totality of textual meanings, was 
shattered. Thomas revealed the multiple layers of meanings from the textual surface to the textual 
substance in relation to philosophical issues for which analysis is only the beginning. Thomas 
nurtured my attentiveness to the philosophical potential in historical texts. Reading across 
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transformation that is sweetly philosophical. In Noël’s course Classics in the Philosophy of Art, 
my habit of tangentiality about art, in which I had taken the descriptive details of artworks to have 
little philosophical import, was shaken. Noël showed me how description, interpretation, 
evaluation are mutually saturated in art criticism, which got me to study philosophical descriptions 
of music as informed by emotional interpretations. It is also through Noël that I learned to 
appreciate the historical and institutional dimensions of art, which initiated my experiential 
openness towards art history and practice, without which I would have been discouraged by the 
emergence of confusing and sometimes frustrating experiences with music so that I would not 
have tried to embrace art as it is, recognize artistic intentions in styling emotional expressions, or 
make emotions in musical experiences philosophically significant. The enlightening conversations 
rendered possible by Noël’s hospitality have pointed me to theories of musical expression at the 
formative stage of this project. Thinking philosophically has become more communicative, 
constructive, comprehensive thanks to Noël. 
Jesse Prinz, raising a heartfelt question in simple words after drawing a beautiful head 
during a labyrinthine talk, constituted a model of creativity that bridges philosophy and art. In 
Jesse’s course Aesthetic Psychology, my habit of transcendence about philosophy, in which I had 
taken the philosophical ideal to consist in abstract speculation, was smashed. The exercises of 
using artistic examples to test aesthetic theories motivated me to discern the philosophical potential 
in aesthetic experiences and embody philosophical ideas which had previously lived in my mind 
alone. In supervising my Second Qualifying Paper on the peak shift effect in aesthetic responses, 
Jesse inspired me to do an empirically informed philosophy by drawing on art and science, which 
opened philosophical horizons otherwise closed to me. It is also through Jesse that I enjoyed a 
personal space to grow at my own pace. At all stages of this project, Jesse was committed to 
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mentoring, which involved an availability that was nothing less than magical. Jesse vetted multiple 
revisions and, with extraordinary care and realistic hope, provided encyclopedic counsel: a more 
effective phrase for an idea, a more precise statement of a premise, a more poignant 
counterexample to an argument, a more charitable formulation of a theory, a more sensible 
organization of a chapter, a more profound vision of my thesis, and a more self-caring pace of 
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Chapter One. Introduction 
It rains outside. I say to you “The rain is sad.” I might mean many things by this sentence. 
It is possible that I feel sad and the rain is part of the atmosphere where I feel sad. But I do not 
mean that sadness is in the nature of rain. The rain is a natural phenomenon whereby condensed 
water droplets become heavy enough to fall from the sky. Even if the rain reminds me of a sad 
story, it would be sentimental, if not downright superstitious, to attribute an emotional nature to 
the rain. 
Many believe that the way music is sad is different from the way the rain is sad. It seems 
that there is something sad in the nature of music. If we attend a concert today, the program will 
probably contain some descriptions of the music in emotional terms. We are encouraged to 
experience the fourth movement “allegro con brio” in Beethoven’s Symphony No.7 in A major 
op.92 as happy. Its bright melody seems to contain a magnificent high spirit that uplifts listeners 
to happiness. Similarly, we are encouraged to experience Erik Satie’s Gnossienne No.3 as sad. Its 
slow tempo seems to contain a solitary dejection that makes listeners quiet and downcast. Music 
has an emotional appearance recognizable for listeners. In this project, I will examine whether the 
emotional appearances of music are illusory. 
 
Philosophical Disputes 
Musicians have analyzed the emotional appearances of music by examining technical 
elements such as rhythm, pitch, tempo, movement, phrasing, volume, etc. British musician Deryck 
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Cooke, in The Language of Music, advocates for an emotional nature of music. Cooke draws on 
technical devices to explain how musical phrases in different scales might represent emotions such 
as joy and sadness.1 According to Cooke, it is the emotional nature of music that grounds a musical 
vocabulary used by musicians to convey emotions. Such thoughts from musicians strengthen the 
belief that the emotional appearances of music are rooted in something like the emotional nature 
of music. 
Not all musicians agree. Some musicians see the emotional appearances of music as our 
projection of emotions upon sounds. Thinking that there is emotion in music would be like thinking 
that there is tenderness in roses. Roses onto which lovers project tenderness have thorns which are 
anything but tender. Austrian pianist and music critic Eduard Hanslick, in Vom musikalisch-
Schönen, advances an aesthetic theory called “musical formalism,” according to which music 
exists for itself and does not serve as sign for anything outside the music.2 According to Hanslick, 
the thought that music symbolizes emotion only reveals that people lacking the aesthetic capacity 
to appreciate the beauty of music settle for thinking in place of listening. For Hanslick, the aesthetic 
value of music exists on the sensory level alone. To illustrate, Hanslick describes a live arabesque 
decorative painting that is constantly expanding “in perpetual self-formation.”3 Imagine the curve 
of the line in one part of the painting arising and unfolding. The “animated arabesque” can 
“surprise the eye ever anew” with the delicacy in the texture of lines and the proportion each line 
has with each other.4 Since it is a live painting, it unfolds in time like the flow of musical notes in 
 
1 Deryck Cooke, The Language of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 18. 
2  Eduard Hanslick, Eduard Hanslick’s on the Musically Beautiful: A New Translation, trans. Lee Rothfarb and 
Christoph Landerer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 60. 
3 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 41. 
4 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 41. 
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time. The experience of musical beauty is delicate. According to Hanslick, “the alteration of two 
notes” would deprive a musical piece of its beauty, making the music “dull.”5 
The disagreements among musicians tend to become polemic. While a follower of Hanslick 
might dismiss people who project emotions into music as lacking aesthetic sensibility, a follower 
of Cooke might call for a worshipful stance from the audience on the emotional power of music. 
This clash among experts on such a fundamental aspect of human life has attracted philosophical 
attention. Philosophers of music have puzzled over the emotional appearances of music. 
Philosophers sympathetic to Cooke’s perspective attempt to find out what it is about music that 
allows for the alleged representation of emotions. Representation is one possible way to establish 
an emotional nature of music: for music to be emotional is for music to represent emotions. 
Not all philosophers approach the emotional appearances through representation. Some 
philosophers wonder at our tendency to hear music as expressing happiness or sadness. It seems 
that music is not the kind of beings capable of expressing emotions, which only sentient beings 
like humans can do. Stephen Davies, in Themes in the Philosophy of Music, voices this puzzle: 
 
Only sentient creatures can express emotions. Musical works are not sentient, so 
emotions cannot be expressed in them. Yet many of them do express emotions 
such as sadness and happiness. How could that be?6 
 
Here the focus is how to make sense of emotional expression in music. Philosophers have proposed 
expression theories, according to which for music to be emotional is for music to express emotions. 
Emotional expression is different from emotional representation. An email that reads “Happy New 
 
5 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 47. 
6 Stephen Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 173. 
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Year!” may express my wishes without representing anything. Expression is another possible way 
to establish an emotional nature of music. 
Still, some philosophers approach the emotional appearances of music by focusing on what 
it is in the music that causes emotional responses in listeners. Jenefer Robinson, in Deeper than 
Reason, makes this observation: 
 
It just does not seem possible that the state of extreme excitement that the music 
produces should be merely a physiological effect; surely something more powerful 
and profound must have caused it! When we experience structural high points, we 
are intensely stirred physiologically, but we cannot account for the way we feel. 
We interpret our emotional state in a way that seems to us commensurate with its 
power and its intensity.7 
 
Here the focus is on the causal influence between what it is in the music and what it is in the 
listeners. Emotional responses to music are well known. Philosophers have proposed arousal 
theories, according to which for music to be emotional is for music to arouse emotions. Emotional 
evocation is yet another possible way to establish an emotional nature of music. 
The emotional appearance of music has assumed the status of an explanandum in 
contemporary philosophical discussions. For most philosophers of music, the mystery is not 
whether music is emotional, but how music is emotional. The philosophical approaches -- 
representation, expression, evocation -- can be seen as different ways of putting emotion into music. 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. One of the three approaches can be put into the 
 
7  Jenefer Robinson, Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 407. 
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driver’s seat to shed light on the other two perspectives. For example, an expression theory can be 
developed to explain arousal such that listeners are aroused by what music expresses. Philosophers 
vary in preferences over which approach is the most informative one. Together these philosophical 
theories are united by the belief that the emotional appearance of music has something real behind 
it, that music is indeed emotional in nature. 
One problem for these philosophical approaches would be the view that music is not 
emotional in nature and the emotional appearances of music are illusory. Call this the “illusion 
view.” If the illusion view is right, the efforts to establish an emotional nature of music will be 
guilty of reading emotion into music. I will defend the illusion view in this project. 
 
Historical Reboots 
In search of a spokesperson for the illusion view, an ancient Chinese philosopher and 
musician comes into view. Ji Kang (嵇康), one of the “seven sages of the bamboo grove” 
(竹林七贤), lived in the 3rd-century China. His time was part of a period when “qingtan” (清谈idle 
talk) was popular in ancient China. Despite the name, “qingtan” is nothing but idle. It was a way 
for thinkers at the time to discuss philosophical issues -- “xuanxue” (玄学studies of profound 
mysteries). Ji Kang was one of the best “idle talkers” in his time. In a text titled Sheng Wu Ai Le 
Lun (声无哀乐论), Ji Kang attempts to undermine a traditional Confucian position, according to 
which music is emotional in nature. I will revive the dialectics in Ji Kang’s text and examine more 
closely what he has achieved. 
One challenge in this project consists in traversing the linguistic barriers from ancient 
Chinese to contemporary English. Although the surface meaning can be translated, the 
6 
philosophical thinking is not always obvious. Robert Henricks has translated the text in Philosophy 
and Argumentation in Third-Century. Henricks provides a smooth translation for English readers. 
But Henricks’ translation sometimes unintentionally obscures Ji Kang’s philosophical point. To 
take one example, in the Guest’s opening statement, there is a sentence “ai si zhi qing biao yu jin 
shi” (哀思之情表于金石). Henricks translates it thus: “feelings of grief and melancholy are 
expressed in metal and stone.”8 This translation makes sense until the part “metal and stone.” 
Although “metal” is an accurate translation of “jin” and “stone” is an accurate translation of “shi,” 
“jin shi金石” put together is a phrase that means “musical instrument” in ancient Chinese. Later 
in the dialogue the Host says, “harmonious music is fulfilled by musical instruments” 
(克谐之音成于金石). That is another sentence where “jin shi” means musical instrument. But 
Henricks translated it as “harmonious tones are produced from the metal and stone.”9 A minor 
issue is the way Henricks deals with “si” in “ai si zhi qing.” To translate “si” as “melancholy” is 
stretching the meaning of “si” which literally means “thought.” Because of the contrast with “an 
le” (peace and happiness), it is reasonable to treat “si” as a distinct element to be juxtaposed with 
“ai” (sadness). Henricks is right to not translate “ai si zhi qing” merely as “the feeling of a sad 
thought.” But perhaps “mournfulness” is better in this context, because “mournfulness” suggests 
an object in mind, which would be true to “thought.” A further observation is that when the word 
“qing” (情) shows up in Ji Kang’s text, Henricks translates it as “feelings” rather than “emotions.” 
Henricks might have chosen “feeling” to highlight the affective component of “qing.” I think that 
both “feeling” and “emotion” can be adequate insofar as we focus on the emotional nature of music. 
“Emotion” might be better, because it makes sense grammatically to say listeners have an 
 
8 Robert Henricks, Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China: The Essays of Hsi K’ang (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 72. 
9 Henricks, Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China, 85. 
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emotional response to an emotional piece of music. I would translate “qing” as “emotion” and 
interpret the text as saying something about the emotional nature of music. 
One might push for more terminological precision. Contemporary psychologists hold that 
it takes more for something to constitute an “emotion” rather than a “feeling.”10 According to 
Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, terminological confusion is a major obstacle towards 
meaningful synthesis in studies of music and emotion. They propose that “feeling” should refer to 
the “subjective experience of emotions or moods,” whereas “emotion” should refer to “a quite 
brief but intense affective reaction that usually involves several sub-components -- subjective 
feelings, physiological arousal, expression, action tendency, and regulation” with a focus on some 
“specific objects.” 11  Further nuances are believed to exist among “moods,” “feelings,” and 
“arousal.” 
The distinction between emotion and feeling is not merely a verbal issue, but motivates a 
philosophical move made by Hanslick. Although Hanslick argues against “feelings” in music, the 
way Hanslick distinguishes “feelings” from other affective states suggests that Hanslick would 
argue against “emotions” in the sense explained by contemporary psychologists. According to 
Hanslick, specificity is what makes emotions different from other affective states.12 What gives 
specificity to an emotion is not how the emotion feels inside, for the “interior movement” of an 
emotion varies across different individuals and across different times for the same individual.13 
According to Hanslick, the specificity of an emotion is anchored by its “conceptual core,” which 
consists of mental images and concepts.14 For example, “hope is inseparable from the mental 
 
10 For a useful summary of the literature on emotion, see Saam Trivedi, Imagination, Music, and the Emotions: A 
Philosophical Study (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017), 9-14. 
11 Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, eds., Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, Applications 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 10. 
12 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 15. 
13 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 15. 
14 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
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image of an expected, happier condition and is compared with the present one.”15 The “cognitive 
mechanism” of specific images and concepts “transforms” affective states into an emotion such as 
hope. 16  Without the conceptual core, affective states cannot “coalesce” into an emotion. 17 
Likewise, “love cannot be conceived without the thought of a beloved person.” 18  With the 
conceptual core in place, the affective profiles can vary without losing the emotion. One can love 
more or less passionately, more or less happily.19 Hanslick suggests that music can at most portray 
the “dynamic properties” of emotions by sounding “slow, fast, strong, weak, ascending, 
descending.”20 But these dynamic properties of motion are inessential because they can be shared 
by different emotions.21 Music cannot have an emotional nature because of its incapacity to hold 
concepts. 
Hanslick’s philosophical move remains an insightful strategy that informs this discussion. 
I will examine whether the attribution of emotion in each argument involves a conceptual core, 
and if so, whether it is music itself that generates the conceptual core. Hanslick’s move is 
anticipated and illustrated in Ji Kang’s text. While Hanslick specifically argues against music’s 
capacity to represent emotions, Ji Kang comprehensively argues against music’s capacity to 
represent, express, and evoke emotions. This comprehensiveness makes Sheng Wu Ai Le Lun a 
good starting point to examine the emotional nature of music. 
The title Sheng Wu Ai Le Lun (声无哀乐论) can be translated in at least two ways. Literally, 
the title means “sounds have no grief or joy.” Since music is the topic of the text, a straightforward 
 
15 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
16 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
17 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
18 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
19 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 16. 
20 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 18. 
21 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, 18. 
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translation of the title would be “music has no sadness or happiness.” Translated this way, “ai” 
(哀sadness) and “le” (乐happiness) are read as two emotions that music does not have. The text 
would be interpreted as an attempt to show that emotions, specifically sadness and happiness, do 
not belong to music. In other words, wherever these emotions exist, they cannot reside in the music. 
On this translation, Ji Kang would be arguing against the claim that music has emotion in it. A less 
straightforward, but entirely sensical translation of the title would be “music is not sad or happy.” 
Translated this way, “ai” and “le” are read as two emotional properties that music does not have. 
Ji Kang would be arguing against the claim that music is emotional. These two translations differ 
more in letters than in spirit. I would adopt the translation that treats “ai” and “le” as emotional 
properties that music does not have. A vague yet functional translation can be “On the Emotional 
Properties of Music” or even “On the Emotional Nature of Music.” 
It is worth pointing out that the Chinese word “乐” means “happiness” or “joy” only when 
pronounced as “le”. The same word, when pronounced as “yue,” has a narrow sense that is “music” 
and a broader sense that is an artform that integrates music, dance, and poetry. In Ji Kang’s text, 
the word “sheng” (声sound) is also used to highlight that it is the narrow sense of music. Since Ji 
Kang is dealing with the emotional nature of music, to interpret “yue” as music would not be 
problematic in our discussion of Ji Kang.22 
 
 
22 One might worry that the ancient Chinese music tradition does not justify reading Ji Kang’s discussion of music in 
the narrow sense of pure music. It seems that Ji Kang’s conception of music would not be close enough to the concept 
of music in contemporary analytic philosophy, which centers on pure music as a result of the development in Western 
music in the 18th century, when orchestral music became prominent. In reply, Ji Kang’s text can be interpreted as 
centering on pure music. Apart from the fact that Ji Kang was a musician and the examples in the text (to be discussed 
in Chapter 2), there are broader philosophical concerns on Ji Kang’s part (to be discussed at the beginning of Chapter 
3) that will make this interpretation less wishful than it might appear at first. Noël Carroll, personal communication, 
March 5, 2021. 
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Dialectical Moves 
Here is the order in which this discussion unfolds. I will start by reconstructing Ji Kang’s 
text into three philosophical arguments for the illusion view. In a nutshell, music is not emotional, 
argues Ji Kang, because music cannot represent emotions with constancy, or express emotions 
with capable means, or evoke emotions in determinate directions.  
Having reconstructed Ji Kang’s arguments, I will formulate possible responses to Ji Kang’s 
arguments from the Confucian tradition. Record of Music (乐记), a section in the Confucian classic 
Book of Rites (礼记), and Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s essay On Music (乐论) will serve as the 
conceptual basis. I shall draw on ideas from neo-Confucian philosophers in China and Western 
philosophers working on Confucian aesthetics. A Confucian thinker might respond to the illusion 
view by arguing for representational reliability, expressive sincerity, and evocative 
appropriateness. James Harold, for example, argues that music can bring about changes in moral 
character by influencing emotional dispositions. I will defend the illusion view against these 
responses and leave the debate open. 
Having formulated possible responses from the Confucian tradition, I will consider arousal 
theories. Arousal theories put forward the idea that the emotions that music arouses in us reveal 
the emotional nature of music. Peter Kivy argues that the profundity of music can arouse an 
intellectual enjoyment in us. Robert Jourdain argues that listening to music can enact emotions in 
us. Tim Cochrane argues that music hijacks the simulation mechanism in our brains to cause 
emotions. I will examine whether arousal theories can be used to challenge the illusion view, by 
constructing arguments for evocative determination from enjoyment, enaction, and simulation. I 
will defend the illusion view against these arguments. 
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Having considered arousal theories, I will consider expression theories. Expression 
theories put forward the idea that emotions expressed by music reveal the emotional nature of 
music. Stephen Davies argues that music expresses emotions when composers carefully organize 
musical appearances with emotion characteristics. Peter Kivy argues that music expresses emotion 
through expressive qualities recognizable through cognitive inquiry. Jenefer Robinson argues that 
music expresses emotion by means of a persona in the music. I will examine whether expression 
theories can be used to challenge the illusion view, by constructing arguments for expressive 
capability from arrangement, quality, and persona. I will defend the illusion view against these 
arguments. 
Having considered expression theories, I will consider representation theories. 
Representation theories put forward the idea that emotions represented by music reveal the 
emotional nature of music. James O. Young argues that music represents emotions by resembling 
human expressive behaviors. Malcolm Budd argues that music represents emotions by having 
aesthetic properties whose recognition calls for emotional terms as metaphors. Susanne Langer 
argues that music represents emotion by symbolizing emotions through temporal features that 
indicate permanence and change. I will examine whether representation theories can be used to 
challenge the illusion view, by constructing arguments for representational constancy from 
resemblance, metaphor, and semblance. I will defend the illusion view against these arguments. 
The arguments to be constructed out of contemporary musical aesthetics are representative, 
though they are not meant to exhaust the potential in each theoretical approach. Each chapter can 
benefit from incorporating more sophisticated theories in the future. Having considered specific 
arguments, I will consider broader objections that can be marshalled against the illusion view from 
12 
the three approaches. I will defend the illusion view against three objections from emotional 
enjoyment, communication, and language in musical experiences. 
Having defended the illusion view against these broader objections, I will consider a 
possible objection, which I call “the objection from sole cause as partial nature.” Drawing on 
Marcel Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time, I will formulate the objection based on Charles 
Swann’s musical experience. It seems that emotional agency can be attributed to a music phrase, 
which alone is able to cause the affective components of Swann’s emotion. I will examine the 
philosophical significance of this emotional agency and argue that Swann’s musical experience 
can be integrated into the illusion view. The illusion view turns out to be experientially richer than 
it might appear at first. 
It is time to start with Ji Kang’s arguments.  
13 
Chapter Two. Subversion 
In this chapter I will present how Ji Kang subverts the view that music is emotional. Ji 
Kang wrote Sheng Wu Ai Le Lun in the form of a dialogue between “the Guest from Qin” and “the 
Host at Eastern Wilds.” The Guest takes a traditional Confucian perspective and the Host 
represents Ji Kang’s position. It seems that Sheng Wu Ai Le Lun records a historical debate that 
happened between Ji Kang and someone, although there is no consensus on this. Whether the 
dialogue reflects a historical debate, the interpretive task to reconstruct the dialogue remains. In 
the dialogue, the Guest claims that music is emotional in nature, because music can represent, 
express, or arouse emotions. The Host contends that music cannot do any of these. 
Two clarifications are in order. Firstly, the Host adopts an epistemic strategy to argue 
against the Guest’s metaphysical position. The dialogue centers on whether it is possible to know, 
through the Guest’s examples and reasons, that music is emotional. The Host’s approach is not to 
argue directly for the metaphysical claim that music is not emotional, but to erode the Guest’s 
confidence that music is emotional. For example, at the beginning of the dialogue, the Guest says, 
“Confucius could know the virtue of Emperor Shun by listening to the music of Shao; Ji Zha could 
know the ethos of many countries by listening to the string music.”23 One might treat this sentence 
as giving two examples and get distracted by who Emperor Shun was, whether Emperor Shun 
composed or commissioned the music of Shao (a kind of classical music performed at royal court 
that combines poetry, dance, and music), where Ji Zha came from, etc. But the syntactical form 
highlights knowledge, even if the Guest uses two different verbs, “shi” and “zhi,” to say that both 
Confucius and Ji Zha know something. In response, the Host dismisses the two records as 
 
23 My translation of the Chinese text: 仲尼闻韶，识虞舜之德；季札听弦，知众国之风 
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fabrications, even if earlier sages have not doubted them according to the Guest. In subsequent 
exchanges, the Guest uses different verbs to claim knowledge: “shen” (审 to check, to appreciate), 
“ming” (明 to apprehend, to understand), “shi” (识 to recognize, to detect), “zhi” (知 to know), 
“wu” (悟 to realize, to learn, to enlighten), “jue” (觉 to awaken). These verbs mean slightly 
different things in ancient Chinese, but all have the sense of knowing. The Host’s skepticism 
towards the Guest’s knowledge claims runs throughout the dialogue. This is most evident in the 
sixth round, where the Host repeats the challenge “how to know it?” for each proposed ground for 
an emotional nature of music. Nonetheless, the debate is about whether music is emotional, not 
just about whether it is possible to know whether music is emotional. The epistemic approach is a 
strategy the Host uses to argue against the Guest’s metaphysical claim. The Host does not end up 
with an agnostic position. Rather, the Host has a metaphysical position that music is not emotional. 
Secondly, there is a difference between being emotional in a clear way and being emotional 
in an ambiguous way. Looking at a picture of Serena Williams’s face, people agree that she is 
emotional but disagree over whether it is anger or happiness. If all the information comes from the 
picture, the ambiguity might not be cleared. But this ambiguity can be cleared if we are able to 
observe Serena Williams’s bodily expressions and the celebratory context where the picture is 
taken. For music to be emotional, it must not be ambiguous in the sense that extra-musical 
information is needed to determine the emotional nature. Even if there is emotional ambiguity, it 
should be of the kind that can be clearly identified as a combination of multiple emotions. If there 
is reasonable disagreement over the emotional nature of music, it means that music has no 
emotional nature. 
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The Argument from Representational Inconstancy 
The Host’s first attempt to argue against the Guest may pass unnoticed. It happened in a 
brief exchange as they greeted each other. The episode apparently contains only three components: 
one statement from the Host, one rhetorical question from the Guest, and one repetition from the 
Host confirming that the Guest has understood the point.24 Despite the argumentative minimalism, 
the Host delivers a strong point. Here is how the episode plays out. In the first round, the Host 
states 
 
Musical sounds exist like scents. They can be good or bad. Even if they are affected 
externally, their substance remains the same, which does not change as a result of 
their being loved or hated, or as a result of our being sad or happy.25 
 
In the second round, the Guest asks rhetorically 
 
Could it be that ideal listeners rely on information about regularities and rules of 
music to know the emotional nature of music?26 
 
In the second round, the Host confirms 
 
24 The Host’s argumentative minimalism is thought-provoking, although this type of argumentative minimalism is not 
unique in Chinese philosophy. It happened in Mencius’ text and Zhuangzi’s text with even shorter exchanges. What 
is unique here is that the components are not organized into a back-and-forth exchange, but need to be identified in 
their remarks. Since the text is a complete writing by Ji Kang, the argumentative minimalism seems to be intentional 
omission. Ji Kang might have seen little point in belaboring what seems to him an obvious point. 
25 My translation of the Chinese text: 音声之作，其犹臭味在于天地之间。其善与不善，虽遭遇浊乱，其体自
若而不变也。岂以爱憎易操、哀乐改度哉？ 
26 My translation of the Chinese text: 夫数子者，岂复假智于常者，借验于曲度哉？ 
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Ideal listeners should not rely on information about regularities and rules of music 
to know the emotional nature of music.27 
 
One challenge in understanding this episode is to see why the Guest agrees with the Host 
that regularities and rules of music must not be relied upon to know the nature of music. The 
regularities and rules of music refer to the aspects that remain conventional in music. As such, they 
seem to be helpful for knowing the emotional nature of music. Ji Kang seems to suggest that 
conventionality only masks the skepticism about the nature of music. The fact that we have agreed 
on the emotional vocabulary of a musical convention does not tell us anything about the nature of 
music. 
One might object that the correlation between the nature of music and our emotions can be 
more robust than the Host indicates. Indeed, the Guest suggests that emotions can be grounded in 
qualities, as wise people are loved more. It seems that emotions can be similarly justified by the 
nature of music. In reply, the Host compares the kind of emotions such as love with the kind of 
emotions such as happiness. Emotions such as love have intentional objects and “come into being 
through contact with things.” Love implies some object of love.28 The intentionality of an emotion 
such as love makes appraisal based on qualities possible. Nonetheless, the emotions of the lover 
do not transfer into nature of the beloved. A wise person does not become essentially “lovely” by 
being loved. Likewise, the emotion of happiness does not transfer into the nature of music. 
According to the Host, it is wrong to believe that music can be just happy. Rather, emotions 
attributed to music are collected inside our hearts, only to be manifested and released upon 
 
27 My translation of the Chinese text: 善听察者要自觉之，不假智于常音，不借验于曲度 
28 To love everything is to generalize the object of love rather than to eliminate the object of love. 
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listening to music. The Host draws an analogy with wine. The wine makes someone drunk, who 
in drunkenness feels delightful or angry, but the wine does not contain emotions, nor can the nature 
of the wine justify having certain emotions. There is no constant correlation between the nature of 
music and the emotion to be released. In other words, any piece of music can correspond to a 
plethora of emotions, and any emotion can correspond to a plethora of music. Music cannot 
represent emotion, because the correlation between music and emotion cannot be fixed by the 
nature of music. The following argument can be constructed from Ji Kang’s text: 
 
(P1) No constant representation holds between music and emotion. 
(P2) If no constant representation holds between music and emotion, music is not 
emotional. 
(C) Music is not emotional. 
 
Two central words in P1 derive from different words in the text. The word “representation” 
derives from “ying” (应), which literally means “correspondence.” 29  The word “constancy” 
derives from “chang” (常), which in contemporary Chinese means “regular” or “normal” as an 
adjective, but in ancient Chinese has a meaning stronger than mere regularity or normality. That 
stronger meaning is something unchanging. For example, Laozi wrote in Daodejing, “to be 
enlightened is to know the unchanging (chang).”30 This is the sense in which the Host claims that 
music has no constancy: “The same emotion gives rise to ten thousand music: is this not the 
 
29 The distinction between “ming” (name/label) and “shi” (reality/substance) is one of the most debated philosophical 
topics in Ji Kang’s time. The idea that emotions do not correspond to music is a manifestation of the idea that some 
names given to a thing do not match what is inside that thing. 
30 My translation of the Chinese text: 知常曰明 
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inconstancy of music?”31 If the correspondence between music and emotion is not a one-one 
relation, music is inconstant with respect to emotion. Happiness can correspond to many musical 
works as a result of cultural diversity. P1 highlights the one-many phenomenon of correspondence. 
P2 turns the one-many phenomenon into a one-many problem. If many musical works 
represent one emotion, the Host argues, music does not have an emotional nature. But this 
apparently does not make sense. If many musical works represent one emotion, what follows is 
that an emotional nature of music can be revealed in many ways, as all roads lead to Rome. But 
P2 cannot be refuted in this manner. Imagine how ten thousand musical works associated with 
happiness in one culture might partly overlap with ten thousand musical works associated with 
sadness in another culture. The overlapping works do not have one emotional nature. If aesthetic 
convention is the arbitrator, the nature of music is irrelevant. Since any musical work can be 
emotionally overlapping, the one-many problem implies a many-many problem, which will 
discredit the emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Expressive Incapability 
The Guest proposes that the emotional nature of music can be established through musical 
expression. According to the Guest, it is generally agreed that facial expressions can betray inner 
feelings. Mild sadness gets expressed in a droopy face. Happiness gets expressed in a smile. If 
what we see can express emotions, presumably what we hear can express emotions as well. Even 
if it might be difficult for ordinary listeners to discern what music expresses, ideal listeners can 
recognize it. The Guest says, “a person’s body changes with inner distress, a person’s voice turns 
 
31 My translation of the Chinese text: 今用均同之情，而发万殊之声，斯非音声之无常哉 
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sad with inner grief. This natural manifestation cannot escape those who are excellent at 
knowing.” 32  The Host contends, however, that this would imply that happiness cannot be 
concealed from ideal listeners.33 But apparently ideal listeners can be deceived. Whatever external 
criteria that ideal listeners rely on for emotional discernment can be manipulated to deceive them. 
A person can fake a sad scream while feeling genuinely happy. Ideal listeners can be inaccurate in 
discerning the genuine emotion, even if they give honest reflections of the sounds they hear. 
Likewise, a composer can fake grief in a musical form while feeling happy through the 
composition. Even if there is something in the music that can betray the genuine happiness, ideal 
listeners would not always be able to tell from the music. The following argument can be 
constructed from Ji Kang’s text: 
 
(P1) Ideal listeners can be deceived. 
(P2) If ideal listeners can be deceived, expressive means are incapable of matching 
emotional content. 
(P3) If expressive means are incapable of matching emotional content, music is not 
emotional. 
(C) Music is not emotional. 
 
Among the three premises, only the first one is explicitly addressed in the text. Let us look 
at the implicit premises first. P2 is implicit in the dialogue. Ideal listeners are ideal because they 
are supposed to mirror the emotional nature of music. If ideal listeners are deceived, music will 
 
32 My translation of the Chinese text: 心戚者则形为之动，情悲者则声为之哀。此自然相应，不可得逃，唯神
明者能精之耳 
33 My translation of the Chinese text: 心悲者，虽谈笑鼓舞，情欢者，虽拊膺咨嗟，犹不能御外形以自匿，诳
察者于疑似也 
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not be emotional in the way reported by ideal listeners. One way to understand this is that 
emotional expression in music can be perverted by insincere expressions. If it is possible for 
musicians to manipulate ideal listeners into hearing music as emotional, it will become unclear 
whether the emotions heard in the music are genuine. The possibility of expressive insincerity 
suggests that music is merely an emotional tool without an emotional nature in itself. Expressive 
insincerity perverts emotional expression in music, because it makes it impossible to tell sincere 
expression from insincere expression. Whenever composers aim to sincerely express an emotion, 
they will have to avoid all the insincere ways of expressing that emotion, which is practically 
impossible. 
P3 is another implicit premise in the dialogue. If expressive means mismatch emotional 
content, expressive means will not reliably deliver emotional content. Music is not emotional even 
if expressive means are artificially fixed for emotional interpretations. For example, if the minor 
key is fixed as the expressive means for sadness when in fact sadness cannot be reduced to the 
minor key and the minor key cannot be restricted to sadness, the minor key as an expressive means 
would not be adequate. 
Given P2 and P3, one might expect the discussion of P1 to focus on sincere and insincere 
forms of expression. But that is not the direction taken by the Host and the Guest. Instead, they 
work through several examples to see if ideal listeners can discern the emotion in each case. Some 
examples the Guest raises in support of ideal listeners come from historical records which the Host 
dismisses as fabrications to mystify music. Some examples have to do with the way ideal listeners 
may rely on extra-musical factors such as language or personal acquaintance to discern subtle 
emotions in the music, which undermines the idea that it is music that expresses emotion. 
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I will discuss one example. The Guest observes an empirical principle that “when the 
feelings change on the inside, one’s expression corresponds on the outside.”34  We know the 
feelings of someone through face reading. Someone with a droopy face and a pensive look 
normally cannot be happy. Similarly, suggests the Guest, if ideal listeners attend to the tone, 
rhythm, and tempo of a person’s voice, they can tell the inner states of the person. The Guest says 
 
A visually impaired person can see nothing even facing a wall. Yet Li Lou can 
discern the tip of a hair even 800 feet away … You cannot doubt the visual 
perception of Li Lou based on average measurements, or distrust the auditory 
perception of Zhong Ziqi based on ordinary faculties.35 
 
In reply, the Host maintains that ideal listeners project emotional interpretations into the behavioral 
expressions when trying to discern the inner states of people. For example, tears may arise because 
we eat spicy food, or because our eyes hurt, or because we laugh too hard, or because we cry. 
There are different reasons why tears arise. An excellent taster will not be able to distinguish, based 
on the taste of tears, the different emotions underlying tears. The Host maintains that emotions are 
too varied and nuanced to be accurately reflected by ideal listeners. Even if Zhong Ziqi’s story is 
not fabricated, it could be explained away as an exception where best friends understand each 
other’s expressive habits, because what Zhong Ziqi understands perfectly is just his best friend 
Boya’s music. 
 
34 My translation of the Chinese text: 心变于内而色应于外 
35 My translation of the Chinese text: 今蒙瞽面墙而不悟，离娄照秋毫于百寻，以此言之，则明暗殊能矣。不
可守咫尺之度而疑离娄之察，执中庸之听而猜锺子之聪 
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The Host suggests that the test of ideal listeners is not to reflect the emotional character of 
music from a familiar friend, but to reflect the emotional character of music from an unfamiliar 
region. If we present many musical samples from a foreign land to ideal listeners, they have to rely 
on clues such as the ways in which musical instruments are “regulated” and test out tentative 
judgments. It is impractical to rely upon “unique perception” alone to discern all the manifestations 
of emotions in music. The Host proposes three options for an ideal listener in a foreign land: (i) to 
get “repeated contact and exchange” with local people who speak the language; (ii) to “blow the 
pipes” and “examine their music”; (iii) to observe their manners and examine their facial 
expressions. If it is (i), there is no point in being an ideal listener, because learning a language does 
not require one to be an ideal listener. If it is (ii), the listener is subject to deception, because there 
is no reliable system of reference on which the listener can base emotional attributions. If it is (iii), 
it is a case of knowing about people’s emotions “from air and appearance,” hence not a proper 
example for musical perception. 
At this point, one might protest that the way the second option is treated is question-
begging. What is at issue is precisely whether the ideal listener is able to tell the emotional 
character of music by listening to the music in the foreign land. It should not be assumed that the 
ideal listener cannot do that on the basis of musical perception. The Host can acknowledge that 
this point should not be subject to speculation alone. Still, the Host might maintain that what 
distinguishes ideal listeners from ordinary listeners is the former’s power to make perceptual 
distinctions to a fine degree. Yet apparently music might not be viewed as having parts that allow 
for perceptual distinctions. The Host says 
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It is true that a fine thread and a strand of hair each has its form that can be 
distinguished. Therefore, Li Lou and a blind man will have different results with 
their clear-sightedness and lack of vision. But if you simply ‘mix water with water’ 
who can tell the difference?36 
 
The Host seems to suggest that musical works should not be divided into parts of different nature. 
The perceptual acumen of ideal listeners to reflect fine distinctions in music would be irrelevant 
for discerning the nature of music. Further, the Host seems to suggest that the ideal listeners’ ability 
to make fine distinctions backfires. If the nature of music is like water mixed with water, the 
emotion that ideal listeners recognize by means of parsing the water into different parts will not 
be the emotion in the music. The ideal listeners will fail the recognition task where they are 
supposedly most advantaged. 
Let us think of an easier case where music does not have that misleading appearance of 
several emotional parts, each of which may be open to diverse emotional interpretations. It looks 
like the ideal listeners should be able to tell what emotion is in the music, simply by attending to 
the music. Even here the Host does not agree. Ideal listeners can still be deceived. To see how, let 
us focus on one passage in the dialogue. 
 
Suppose emotions in the mind can be known by making sounds. Suppose further 
someone concentrates on a mental image of a horse, wants to say the word “horse” 
out loud but accidentally say “deer.” Ideal listeners should be able to discern “horse” 
instead of “deer,” if they discern the mind through sounds alone. Therefore, inner 
 
36 Henricks, Philosophy and Argumentation in Third-Century China, 85. 
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emotions are not bound by words, and words are not enough to prove emotions in 
the mind.37  
 
The Host suggests that ideal listeners are unable to tell it is a horse that the speaker has in 
mind. One might protest that the verbal error likely happens as a result of the speaker being 
distracted the second before making the utterance. Perhaps the idea of a deer suddenly crosses the 
speaker’s mind. If the speaker keeps concentrating on a mental image of horse, both the distraction 
and the verbal error will not happen. But the possibility of distraction does not help alleviate the 
force of this case. The Host presents a scenario whereby it is possible for a sincere expression to 
conceal what is in the mind, perhaps even without the speaker’s awareness of the error being made. 
It does not matter for the Host whether the speaker makes this error because of a distraction. What 
matters is that ideal listeners fail to discern what is in the speaker’s mind. Although this case of 
verbal error involves language, by analogy it shows that ideal listeners are unable to discern 
emotions in music by means of music alone. This example grants as much as possible to the Guest. 
The utterance “deer” can mislead ideal listeners, not because of the speaker’s insincerity but 
because of an accident of verbal error. 
The problem cuts deeper than one may recognize at first. It breaks the assumption that 
expressive means, when sincerely used, convey mental content accurately. The linguistic example 
is simple, because there is a way to check the speaker with a simple claim: “I thought you meant 
a horse, not a deer.” The speaker will say either that “Sorry, I meant a horse.” or “Did I say ‘deer’?” 
Either way, there is a procedure to check whether the mental content and the word used to express 
that content match each other. Still, emotion can compound the case. For example, I may feel 
 
37 My translation of the Chinese text: 若吹律校音以知其心，假令心志于马而误言鹿，察者固当由鹿以知马也。
此为心不系于所言，言或不足以证心也 
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helpless and concentrate on this feeling. I do not know what words I can use to best express this 
“helpless” feeling. The way I end up expressing the feeling is “I feel threatened.” Feeling 
threatened is different from feeling helpless. Since my description of feeling threatened invites 
interpretation in the vicinity of my original mental state, ideal listeners will find the description of 
“feeling threatened” helpful to make sense of my other verbal reports and experiences. Ideal 
listeners would not be motivated to trace my mental content to a feeling of helplessness. But let us 
suppose that I do not feel threatened in fact. Feeling helpless is all there is in my mind. I would 
deceive both myself and ideal listeners sincerely and accidently. 
If emotional backtracking looks daunting in a linguistic case, it is next to impossible in a 
musical case. There are no fixed rules in music, semantic or syntactic, to guarantee a correct 
correspondence between music and the expressive means. Just as one can use a smile to express 
helplessness, all musical phrases can be used to express helplessness. It is impractical, if not utterly 
impossible, for ideal listeners to backtrack all expressions to the feeling of helplessness. One might 
hold that musicians are responsible for expressing emotions in the most transparent way. But this 
will not reveal the emotional nature of music, but only solidifies the gap between music and 
emotion by upholding conventional standards of transparency. Expressive means associated with 
emotions through conventions would suggest that music does not have an emotional nature. 
 
The Argument from Evocative Underdetermination 
The Guest proposes that the emotional nature of music can be established through the 
emotions aroused by music. Our emotional responses to music are apparently determined by the 
nature of music. If a piece of music makes us happy, it suggests that the music is happy. To know 
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the emotional nature of music, we need only attend to our emotional responses. If our mental states 
make our musical reception biased, we can appeal to ideal listeners who are not biased. According 
to the Guest, ideal listeners are accurate in their emotional responses. Ideal listeners do not have 
to be always right. Ideal listeners need only be unbiased in the sense that they harbor no definite 
emotions inside before musical listening. For the unbiased listeners, the emotions they have while 
listening to different music will reflect the nature of music. 
The Host replies that the Guest mistakes physiological responses for emotional responses. 
Musical instruments have different functions and properties. When instruments like pi-pa, zheng, 
and di are played, the intervals are close, the notes high, the shifts many, and the beats fast. This 
gives listeners high-level arousal. When the lute and the zither are played, the intervals are far, the 
notes low, the shifts few, and the sounds pure. If one does not first calm down to empty one’s mind, 
it would be hard to hear the sounds. This gives listeners low-level arousal. The songs from the Qi 
and Chu regions have many repetitive patterns and few changes such that listeners feel collected 
and concentrated. In contrast, ditties are “rich in substance and broad in effect,” which dispose 
listeners to feel jumpy and excited. The Host claims that these technical parameters make music 
relaxing or agitating. The corresponding physiological responses can be restful or restless. While 
these physiological responses might serve as the “incipient stages” of emotions, they are not full-
fledged to count as emotions,38 which are read into the music later through interpretations. To 
illustrate, the Host makes an analogy. Food can be delicious in various ways. A sweet dish and a 
bitter dish can both be delicious. But the different tastes do not give the food different emotional 
natures or any emotional nature at all. Likewise, music can be beautiful in various ways. But the 
physiological responses to music do not give music different emotional natures or any emotional 
 
38 My translation of the Chinese text: 人情以躁静容端 
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nature at all. The Host claims that music and emotion are in two different realms such that they 
are “orthogonal” to each other.39 
The Host argues that unbiased listeners may exhibit disparities in their emotional responses, 
even if they are physiologically aroused similarly by the same music. 
 
If music were emotionally one-sided and fixed, containing sounds all of one kind, 
the emotions released and manifested would in each case match the music. Then 
how can music simultaneously control different ideas and release many different 
emotions?40 
 
For music to have an emotional nature, it must reliably arouse a certain emotion in listeners. 
If different emotions arise in response to the same music, it is unclear which emotional response 
would establish an emotional nature of this music. If the Guest claims that different emotions are 
in the music as a result of different emotional responses, the emotional appearances of music will 
be illusory. What we know is not the emotion in the music, but the collection of emotional 
responses in listeners. The following argument can be constructed from Ji Kang’s text: 
 
 
39 My translation of the Chinese text: 声之与心，殊涂异轨,，不相经纬 
40 My translation of the Chinese text: 若资﹝偏﹞固之音，含一致之声，其所发明，各当其分，则焉能兼御群
理，总发众情耶? The Host’s reply will be echoed by empirical studies in musical psychology. Patrik N. Juslin et al. 
have differentiated various mechanisms of the interplay between musical perception and emotional induction. The 
precise mechanisms involved in musical perception will vary across individuals and induce various emotional 
responses. A “happy” song might remind us of a sad story, which shows that the mechanism of “episodic memory” 
can induce an emotion different from the emotion allegedly expressed in the music. In contrast, when the mechanism 
of “emotional contagion” is at work, listeners will experience the same emotion allegedly expressed in the music. Alf 
Gabrielsson, reviewing the studies of Strong Experiences with Music (the SEM Project), proposes a descriptive system 
for categorizing varieties of emotional reactions to music. According to the data analysis, a mixture of factors such as 
the music, the person, and the situation all have a significant bearing on how a piece of music will be emotionally 
experienced. See Alf Gabrielsson, “Strong Experiences with Music,” in Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, 
Research, Applications, eds. P. N. Juslin and J. A. Sloboda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 547-574. 
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(P1) Emotional responses to music are underdetermined. 
(P2) If emotional responses to music are underdetermined, music is not emotional. 
(C) Music is not emotional. 
 
The Guest objects to the Host’s observation in P1. Although different emotions arise in 
response to the same piece of music, each piece may still have an emotional nature, which will 
generate a definite emotional response in time. Evocative underdetermination might hold because 
it takes time for the emotional response to manifest. Since different listeners have different 
emotional temperament, the emotional effect is not equally obvious for all listeners. It might take 
longer for a carefree listener to feel despondent in response to sad music. Alternatively, it might 
take longer for a chronically depressed listener to feel any more depressed in response to sad music. 
Even if we do not know exactly how emotional temperament influences musical evocation, a 
certain emotional response can manifest quickly for some listeners and slowly for other listeners. 
“The transformation brought on by music is slow to take effect,”41 says the Guest. The slow 
manifestation may temporarily conceal, but never cancel, the emotional response. 
In reply, the Host considers a temperamentally sad listener as constantly exposed to 
“Bleating Deer” which is generally taken to be happy music. According to the Guest, the happy 
response will eventually become manifest, even if it may take longer for a temperamentally sad 
listener. The Host doubts that this is the case. According to the Host, it is possible that the listener 
will not only fail to feel happy, but also end up unhappier. The Host has not explained the 
psychological mechanism involved in this kind of reverse exacerbation. We might imagine that a 
sad listener feels unhappy about being aroused by “Bleating Deer” because the music appears to 
 
41 My translation of the Chinese text: 声化迟缓 
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diminish her sadness. To illustrate, the Host makes an analogy. If a fire is put into an extremely 
cold room, the warmth of the fire may not make a palpable difference in the temperature of the 
room. But the fire by its warm nature should not magnify the coldness by making the room colder. 
The problem with music such as “Bleating Deer” is not that its emotional effect takes longer to 
manifest, but that it evokes the opposite emotion by making some listeners unhappy. 
At this point, one might think the debate is over with the Host winning it. Yet the Guest 
raises a counterexample that seems to refute P2. According to the Guest, emotions can be generally 
categorized as either positive or negative. The positive emotions manifest mostly in laughs and the 
negative emotions manifest mostly in tears. When people listen to music from regions such as Qi 
and Chu, solemnity is the only response and no listener is ever seen to respond cheerfully. It seems 
that we have one solid case where there are no emotional disparities among listeners. 
The Host replies that emotional responses to music differ not only in the direction of 
emotional contagion, but also in the manners of manifestation at varying emotional intensity. The 
most intense emotions manifest in different ways. The Host says, “the extremes of joy and 
extremes of grief do not show in the same way.”42 Mild happiness manifests in a face lighting up, 
yet utmost happiness manifests in a “quiet, natural, self-attained” expression.43  The outward 
manifestation of joy decreases as the inner joy increases. Mild grief manifests in a crestfallen look, 
yet utmost grief manifests in weeping. The outward manifestation of grief increases as grief 
increases. Magnified sadness is crying, whereas magnified joy is serenity. The Host says, “self-
attainment results from a joyful response to music, whereas weeping results from a sorrowful 
 
42 My translation of the Chinese text: 哀乐之极，不必同致 
43 There are interpretive choices Henricks made in this passage, particularly regarding the precise word that denotes 
the expression of utmost joy. According to one version of the text, the Host says “smile” is the expression of utmost 
joy. Commentators like Dai Mingyang thinks this is correct. Even so, the Host’s main point comes afterwards: the 
expression of utmost joy is quiet, natural, self-attained contentedness. In order to highlight the Host’s argumentative 
flow, Henricks has restructured the sentence and adjusted the order of meanings in translation. Since these interpretive 
issues do not in any way diminish the main argument the Host makes, I will not enter into the details here. 
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response to music.”44 To illustrate, if I win the lottery, I might be clapping hands and dancing on 
feet. But if my family are doing well, I will be extremely happy, albeit in a self-contained way. 
Although no listener smiles in response to the music from Qi and Chu regions, that can be 
interpreted as outward signs of either mild sadness or utmost joy. Since mild sadness and utmost 
joy are opposite, the Guest’s observation does not count against P2. 
The Guest has no response to this thought. But the Guest could have argued that utmost 
sadness can be like utmost happiness in that both give little outward signs. When a person is 
extremely sad, a person can be mentally frozen so that not a tear is dropped. The Host might reply 
that people react to pain and pleasure differently. The more pain there is, the more we want to 
indicate the pain to others. The more pleasure there is, the more we want to remain within it, which 
would conceal the manifestation. In utmost happiness, people may not feel the need to signal it to 
anybody. In contrast, when we are in pain, we have a need to signal it to others in search of empathy. 
Nonetheless, I wonder if this is true. It is possible that people in sadness choose to conceal 
the feeling, although they feel the need to signal it to others. It is also possible that sadness has a 
numbing effect whereby people in great pain adapt to the pain so well that they become somewhat 
oblivious. People in extreme pain might put away the pain to live on in sanity rather than constantly 
feeling a signaling need and facing the potential of the signal being ignored. People might also 
choose to live at home with sadness, not manifesting it, even if they are acutely aware of it. This 
happens when remaining inside the emotional pain has some rewards, whether it is political, 
artistic, or spiritual. For all these cases, there might not be too much manifestation on the outside 
even if one is in extreme sadness. It is an open question whether emotional evocation by music 
can show that music is emotional. 
 




I have reconstructed philosophical moves in Ji Kang’s Music Has Neither Grief or Joy into 
three arguments against that the thought that music is emotional. Representation does not seem to 
work. Although it is unnecessary to insist on one-one correspondence, it is necessary for 
representation to be constant. Expression does not seem to work. Although it is unnecessary to 
insist on expressive sincerity, it is necessary for expressive means to match expressive content. 
Evocation does not seem to work. Although it is unnecessary to insist on absolute determination 
in the emotional responses, it is necessary for some responses to count as right. The Host maintains 
that music has no emotional nature.  
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Chapter Three. Reaction 
In this chapter I will consider objections to the illusion view that can be raised from the 
Confucian tradition. It is helpful to clarify a terminological point. I have mentioned that the 
Chinese word “乐”, when pronounced as “yue,” can mean music in a narrow sense. The Confucian 
tradition takes “yue” to include music, dance, and poetry. This did not become problematic in our 
discussion of Ji Kang. But it can raise interpretive worries now as we discuss Confucian ideas. 
One might worry how much of what Confucian philosophers say about “yue” applies strictly to 
music. Likewise, one might wonder how much of what Ji Kang criticizes about ideas of music 
reaches beyond music to “yue” conceived broadly as an integrated art form. In what follows I will 
set aside these worries and assume that it can be fruitful to interpret “yue” in Confucian texts 
narrowly as music and still move the debate forward. 
Ji Kang’s position undermines Confucianism. The collaboration between “li” (礼) and “yue” 
(乐) is central to Confucian thinking. According to Confucian philosopher Xunzi, people are social 
animals with individual desires.45 Society cannot function if all individuals are left to pursue 
desires to the extreme. The fight to obtain resources and the competition to fulfill desires will 
engender chaos. In order to balance individual interests and social interests, clear demarcations 
must be drawn to define individual needs and duties. This idea of demarcation is “fen” 
(分distinction). A Confucian society is marked by clearly defined roles for each individual. 
Confucian conceptions of personal and political progress hinge upon the role appropriate for each 
individual, which does not encourage members in the society to break the boundaries and ignore 
 
45 Scott Cook, “Xun Zi on Ritual and Music,” Monumenta Serica 45, No. 1 (1997): 1-38. 
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the distinctions. For example, it is inappropriate for a state governor to participate in talent shows, 
even if the governor can sing and dance better than anyone in the show. With each social role 
comes clear expectations of proper actions and words. 
The necessity to maintain divisions and distinctions is substantiated and summarized in the 
idea of “li” (礼). Scott Cook translates “li” as “ritual,” which is not wrong but reduces the idea of 
“li” to observable social customs. “Li” is more fundamentally about an inward acknowledgment 
of the divisions and distinctions in social life. Roger T. Ames’s translation of “li” as “propriety” 
captures that inwardness.46 Suppose that an Imperial Feast is only appropriate for a royal banquet 
and I hold an Imperial Feast to celebrate my graduation. I would be wrong not only to break, but 
also to disdain the distinction between the royal and the common. In the Analects, Confucius 
severely criticizes a local governor to use a group of 64 dancers, which is only appropriate for an 
emperor: “If someone has the heart to do even this, what can he not have the heart to do?”47 In 
Confucianism, the defiance of propriety is not only a crime, but also a character flaw. The spirit of 
“li” is to saturate distinctions in all people in a society and to safeguard social functioning by 
restraining individual desires. 
Nonetheless, propriety alone cannot achieve that social purpose. A society that runs on 
social distinctions without a sense of togetherness would be cold and cruel. People need to live in 
harmony with well-defined roles and responsibilities. The well-functioning of society depends on 
the collaboration between the spirit of distinction and the spirit of harmony. The spirit of harmony 
is indispensable both in the moral education aiming at personal goodness and in the political 
regulation aiming at social goodness. Remarkably, art as represented by music is thought to 
 
46 Roger T. Ames, Confucian Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 102. 
47 My translation of the Chinese text: 是可忍孰不可忍？ 
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instantiate the spirit of harmony. For Confucianism, music brings harmony. The Confucian ideal 
for society is a perfect collaboration between propriety and music. In order for music to balance 
propriety instead of breaking it, excessively emotional music is discouraged in Confucianism. 
Excessively emotional music is thought to put people at risk of emotional abandonment. Just like 
consuming strong liquors makes people act without bounds, excessively emotional music is 
believed to set people off. Good music, according to Confucianism, brings people together just 
enough without breaking the distinctions. 
The abstinence of emotional excessiveness as an artistic ideal is not uniquely Chinese. 
Music critic James Huneker commends Étude Op. 10, No. 3, which Chopin believed to be his most 
beautiful melody,48 as “simpler, less morbid, sultry and languorous, therefore saner, than the much 
bepraised study in C sharp minor.”49  Simpler melodies without excessive sentimentality are 
believed to be better. In the same spirit, Confucian aesthetics discourages excessive emotions in 
music, albeit for a social concern. Excessively emotional music poses a danger to society.50 
Ji Kang writes Music Has No Grief or Joy to argue against the Confucian tenet that music 
is emotional. The philosophical ambition in Ji Kang’s writing should be clear now. On the surface, 
the writing looks like an ancient text of musical aesthetics. But there is a subtext of social 
philosophy which would debunk Confucianism. In taking on the emotional nature of music, Ji 
Kang would be attacking the root of a Confucian tenet. But it is worth clarifying what is at stake 
for Confucianism. The social philosophy in Confucianism is not doomed, if the illusion view is 
right. It is possible to smooth the divisiveness of propriety by allowing for a multitude of 
 
48 Frederick Niecks, Frederick Chopin as a Man and Musician, vol. 2 (London & New York: Novello, Ewer & Co., 
1902), 253. 
49 James Huneker, Chopin: The Man and His Music (Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press, 2008), 138. 
50  Danto’s discussion on the “danger of art” in Platonic aesthetics echoes this perspective. Arthur Danto, The 
Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 4. 
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viewpoints. To devise rituals with this open-mindedness would not make rituals overbearing.51 
Confucianism does not have to rely on music to bring about harmony. 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to thoroughly examine the history of Confucian 
thinking on music. There are many schools of Confucianism and their views on music differ. Such 
differences among Confucian schools need not concern us here. One useful source for us is the 
Confucian classic Record of Music (乐记Yue Ji), which Ji Kang quotes in Music Has No Grief or 
Joy. Another useful source for us is Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s essay On Music (乐论Yue 
Lun), although it is debated whether Xunzi’s writing came before or after Record of Music. The 
Confucian perspective represented by the Guest can be found in both texts. I will develop potential 
Confucian responses by drawing on these texts. My main purpose is to formulate potential 
responses in spirit with Confucianism. 
 
The Objection from Representational Reliability 
Confucian thinkers hold that music represents emotions. According to Record of Music, 
music is used to imitate virtues (乐者，所以象德也).52 The word “象” (xiang) means “image” as 
 
51 The Qian (谦) hexagram from Book of Changes (Yi Jing) suggests that propriety are institutionalized by Qian. While 
“modesty” is a straightforward translation of Qian, it would miss the original meaning that comes from the two parts 
of this character. The left part is “word” (言) and the right part is to “harmonize” or “bring all together” or “coexist” 
(兼). The original meaning of this character is a mentality to make room for different voices to coexist. Neo-Confucian 
philosopher Lai Zhide (来知德 ) in the Ming Dynasty thus annotates the Qian hexagram understood as 
“institutionalizing propriety with different voices”: “If the institutionalized propriety is too strict, one section is 
completely segregated from another section. To hold different voices in the institution, harmony would ensue … 
Propriety, when too strictly devised and executed, falls short by being overbearing.” My translation of the Chinese 
text: “礼太严，截然不同犯，谦以制之，则和而至矣 … 人之行礼，若依其太严之礼，不免失之亢”，明来知
德《周易集注》卷十四, accessed March 1, 2021, https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=213736&remap=gb. 
52 Scott Cook, “‘Yue Ji’ 樂記 -- Record of Music: Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Commentary,” Asian Music 
26, No. 2 (1995): §4.6, 57. 
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a noun and “to symbolize” as a verb. But “to symbolize” would mask the sense of emulation in 
the word. 
 
The balance of small and large is put into the pitches [of the bells in the temples], 
and the order [of the five tones] is aligned from beginning to end, in order to 
represent the affairs and actions [of society]. The principles (li) of the close and 
distant, the noble and plebeian, the old and young, and male and female are all made 
to take shape and appear in Music (yue).53 
 
Virtues manifest in various social relations. Specifically, music can represent virtues by 
representing emotions that are proper for virtues in these social relations. 
The Host has objected that representation of this kind does not have constancy. A 
Confucian philosopher might reply that the debate takes the idea of representation too strongly. 
According to Record of Music, “the music of a well-governed age is peaceful … The music of a 
lost state is mournful.”54 It is too strong to interpret ideas like this as saying that peaceful and joyful 
music represents a secure and prosperous state. Rather, a Confucian philosopher can concede that 
there is no representative constancy, but insist upon a regular correlation between social mores and 
music popular in a society. For example, if the popular music in a state is tedious and repetitive, it 
is likely that people living in the state feel tired. The music is popular for its power to reflect the 
population’s lived experiences. 
 
53 Cook, “Record of Music,” §5.2, 58. 使亲疏、贵贱、长幼、男女之理皆形见于乐 
54 Cook, “Record of Music,” §1.3, 29. 治世之音安以乐，其政和。乱世之音怨以怒，其政乖。亡国之音哀以思，
其民困 
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In response, there are two points to consider. First, the idea that people in turbulent times 
prefer music with violent emotions is not empirically accurate. It is natural for people in turbulent 
times to long for peace. The musical preferences might come out as the opposite of the emotional 
tone of the ethos. The peaceful music in violent times can be therapeutic by counteracting the 
gloomy moods. Likewise, people in peaceful times may prefer violent music to release energy. 
Second, the way musical preferences reflect characters reaches beyond the scope of representation. 
People prefer music that seems to express or evoke emotions that are important to them. Even if 
the preference for peaceful music reflects a peaceful character, such reflection assumes some 
account of expression or evocation that explains the preference in the first place. If the Confucian 
reply boils down to reflection as such, it would collapse into an account of expression or evocation 
at the more basic explanatory level. It remains an open question whether emotional representation 
in music can challenge the illusion view. 
 
The Objection from Expressive Sincerity 
Confucian thinkers hold that music expresses emotions. “In all cases, the arising of music 
(yin) is born in the of hearts of men.”55 This is the opening sentence in Record of Music. As 
something originating from the mind, music is thought to express mental states. “Emotion is stirred 
within and thus takes shape in sound.”56 Different emotions have different manifestations in music. 
Record of Music lists manifestations of such emotions as sadness, serenity, joy, anger, awe, and 
 
55 Cook, “Record of Music,” §1.1, 24. 凡音之起，由人心生 
56 Cook, “Record of Music,” §1.3, 29. 情动于中，故形于声 
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love. Music has different formal features when expressing different emotions. For example, joyful 
music will be expansive and span a large range of notes.57 
Later development in Confucianism would confirm this idea of mental outflow. Neo-
Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai (张载) synthesizes an ontocosmology with the idea of “qi” 
(气air/energy). On this view, everything is made up of energy and things influence each other 
through this energy. The energy can be important for moral growth.58 This concept of energy can 
be applied to musical expression. When composers and performers make music, their mental 
energy will be dispersed in the composition and performance. A pianist who has just won the 
lottery will have a happy mood, which will come through the performance even if the performer 
tries to calm down. There is no way to hide the influence of “energy” for a keen observer, as the 
Guest has suggested. 
Recall that the Host charges that expressive means are incapable of matching the expressive 
content. For a Confucian thinker, this might sound bizarre. If what generates the music is a mental 
state, and if the outward manifestation of the mental state is not distorted or stunted by any force, 
the musician’s sincerity of expressing an emotion would suffice to guarantee a match between 
expressive means and emotional content. The match may not be perfect, but it should be 
recognizable. For example, a starting composer may try to express an emotion. Imagine that the 
composer has a rather limited set of resources. There are only three notes in C major for the 
composer to use. The Host might say that the expressive means are incapable of expressing any 
emotion. But the Confucian thinker would contend that the composer might use the three notes in 
 
57 Cook, “Record of Music,” §1.2, 27-8. Here is the complete original text for the different emotions and their 
expressions: 是故其哀心感者，其声噍以杀。其乐心感者，其声嘽以缓。其怒心感者，其声粗以厉。其敬心
感者，其声直以廉。其爱心感者，其声和以柔 
58 Mencius claims to be good at keeping the “noble energy” (吾善养吾浩然之气). 
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creative and exciting ways to express joy. One might even say that it is enviable that the starting 
composer can enjoy composition with simple notes. Rather than having a large set of resources at 
the disposal and suffer from a wide range of choices, the composer has a limited set of goals and 
resources to work with. 
The Host may rehearse the worry that there is no way to tell if the composer is expressing 
joy sincerely with just three notes in one key. But the Confucian thinker can resist such an 
unrealistic standard on what counts as sincere. In fact, there is reason to believe that the ideal of 
pure sincerity is all but a fantasy. In A Composer’s World, Paul Hindemith vividly details how 
everyday distractions make pure sincerity unrealistic: 
 
Let us suppose a composer is writing an extremely funereal piece, which may 
require three months of intensive work. Is he, during this three-months period, 
thinking of nothing but funerals? Or can he, in those hours that are not devoted to 
his work because of his desire to eat and sleep, put his grief on ice, so to speak, and 
be gay until the moment when he resumes his somber activity? If he really 
expressed his feelings accurately during the time of composing and writing, we 
would be presented with a horrible motley of expressions, among which the 
grievous part would necessarily occupy but a small space.59 
 
It would be absurd to think that in order to compose something sad, the composer fails to be sincere 
just because of having other mundane emotions at the time of composition. If expressive sincerity 
 
59 Paul Hindemith, A Composer’s World (New York: Schott, 1952), 35-6. 
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is unrealistic, to accuse a composer with limited compositional devices of expressive insincerity 
would be misplaced. 
The Confucian thinker can loosen the requirement on sincerity. The process of sincere 
expression might be conceived as a process of crystallization. The end product does not have to 
express exactly every psychological detail that was once in the composer’s mind. Rather, as long 
as the end product is affirmed as a crystallization of the composer’s emotion, the work succeeds 
in expressing an emotion. In fact, because the work crystallizes the emotion, it is fine to say that 
the work is emotional in that sense. In The Language of Music, Cooke speaks of the mental states 
in which Beethoven wrote “Eroica.” Beethoven was under the influence of liberal ideals in the 
French revolution. He would want to get into the composition a sense of grief for the heroes that 
would die in the revolution. There were many thoughts that got into this grief. It was impossible 
to detail all of them in the composition. As long as Beethoven succeeded in crystallizing the 
emotions in the C minor theme of the work, Eroica succeeded in expressing that sincerely.60 
Let us grant that crystallization yields a more realistic conception of sincerity. Still, the 
Host might point out the incapability of expressive means to match the emotions that musicians 
sincerely aim to express. The Confucian thinker needs something more objective than the sincerity 
of musicians. Otherwise, crystallization remains mysterious. The question is not whether 
musicians can sincerely express emotions, but whether music can successfully express emotions. 
Nonetheless, the Confucian thinker might contend that expressive sincerity is enough to 
differentiate an emotion from another. This might be sufficient to establish an emotional nature of 
music. The requirement for recognition of which emotions are expressed is not that each expressive 
means accurately matches each expressive content. Rather, it suffices that expressive means are 
 
60 Cooke, The Language of Music, 17. 
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different from each other to allow for emotional differentiation. Suppose the major key is used to 
express joy and a minor key is used to express sadness. It is not necessary that the major key 
matches joy in some essential way, or that the minor key matches sadness in some essential way. 
The problem with this reply is that the expressive means do not allow for such a 
straightforward differentiation of emotions. Happy music has been composed in minor keys and 
sad music has been composed in major keys. Even if emotional differentiation is made possible by 
expressive sincerity, that is not enough to put emotion into music. To establish an emotional nature 
of music, it is necessary for the expressive means to match specific emotional content. It remains 
an open question whether emotional expression in music can challenge the illusion view. 
 
The Objection from Evocative Appropriateness 
Confucian thinkers hold that music arouses emotions. According to Record of Music, “the 
root [of music] lies in the touching off of [human] hearts by [external] things.”61 The Host has 
challenged this position by raising the problem of evocative underdetermination. But the 
Confucian thinker can protest that not all emotional responses are appropriate. Even if different 
listeners might be aroused differently, that does not mean that music is not emotional. It might 
happen that some listeners are not well equipped to discern the emotional nature of music. Their 
aesthetic judgments will have to be dismissed. It means that the mere diversity of emotional 
responses is not sufficient to denounce the Guest’s view. Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Fuzhi 
has criticized Ji Kang’s view on emotional disparity: 
 
 
61 Cook, “Record of Music,” §1.2, 27. 其本在人心之感于物也 
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Those who sigh at a feast are not happy. Those who sing at a funeral are not sad … 
It often happens that an object mismatches an event and that an emotion mismatches 
an object. This mismatch does not diminish the object … the music of Huaishui is 
inherently happy. Some listeners feel sad by themselves after listening to it. The 
happiness in the music and the sadness in the listener have no contact. The 
happiness does not become manifest. But the sorrow in the listener’s heart does not 
diminish the music, nor does the happiness in the music diminish the sorrow in the 
listener’s heart … when the cloud moves to hide the sun, it is wrong to doubt that 
the sun is shining.62 
 
Recall that the Host claims that even if a fire may not make a room warmer, it should not 
make a room colder. Ji Kang argues that some allegedly happy music can make people sad, which 
is impossible. Wang Fuzhi’s point is that Ji Kang misreads the case. It is not a case where music 
makes people both happy and sad, but a case where people have inappropriate responses to happy 
music. The fact that emotional disparity arises in response to music does not deprive music of its 
emotional nature. Apparently, the Host gives undue credit to the inappropriate emotional responses. 
For example, if a piece of salsa music makes some listeners somber, their emotional responses 
 
62 My translation of the Chinese text from “On Drum and Bell” in On Poetry: “当飨而叹，非谓叹者之亦欢也；临
丧而歌，非谓歌者之亦戚也 … 事与物不相称，物与情不相准者多矣，未能如之何，而彼固不为之损 … 然
则，‘淮水’之乐，其音自乐，听其声者自悲，两无相与，而乐不见功。乐奚害于其心之忧，忧奚害于其乐之
和哉？…云移日蔽，而疑日之无固明也，非至愚者不能。”《诗广传》卷三《论鼓钟》In the second last 
sentence, I have translated “harmony” as “happy.” Harmony is the function of music according to Confucian classics. 
As a function of music, “harmony” covers happy music and sad music. But “harmony” can also refer to a peacefully 
joyful state of mind. In this context it means the function of music because of the syntactical contrast between “the 
sorrow of heart” and “the harmony of music.” But since it is happy music that Wang Fuzhi speaks of, it is not stretching 
the text too far to interpret the harmony of happy music, which brings people together in a happy way, as happiness. 
Translating it literally as “harmony” is not wrong, but might obscure the meaning of the passage. Ye Lang, An Outline 
of the History of Chinese Aesthetics (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1985), 197. 
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mismatch the jubilant rhythm.63 The Host would say that the salsa music is not jubilant, because 
emotional responses vary. But this sounds absurd. In the presence of salsa music, the somber 
responses would be inappropriate. 
But the Host might reply that things will be different if the salsa music is played at a 
community where tempo is heard as the predominant feature of music and fast tempo is heard as 
an indicator of anxiety. Upon listening to salsa, listeners in that community would immediately 
recognize anxiety. The listeners expect to be affected by the anxiety in the music. To prepare for 
the onset of anxiety, they listen through the anxiety to feel peacefully somber in the way Buddhist 
followers reach inner peace by seeing through the illusory appearances. Some listeners in that 
community would feel jubilant, but their responses would be locally discredited as failing to 
exhibit good taste. 
The Confucian thinker can reply that even if the emotional responses are different, the 
initial bodily responses are the same. Listeners from the somber community initially feel the 
rhythm of salsa. Some get carried away by it. The somber feeling is a higher-level emotional 
response to that universal bodily response. If the bodily responses are the same, they can refute the 
illusion view by sidestepping emotion in cases where emotional underdetermination arises. 
It can be doubted that bodily responses are the same across individuals. There is evidence 
that differences in brain states and sonic backgrounds make people hear different things and have 
different responses. A popular example is the “Yanny or Laurel” illusion, whereby some hear the 
name as “Yanny” while others hear it as “Laurel.” Still, some people hear both pronunciations, 
albeit at different times. The perception of sounds is not universal. Another example is our different 
responses to certain lullabies. The ancient Finnish lullaby “Nuku Nuku” and the Russian lullaby 
 
63 Jesse Prinz, personal communication, May 28, 2020. 
44 
“Tili tili bom” are two cases in point. While some people feel soothing and relaxing, others find it 
creepy and even fearful. Perhaps babies would have a more universal response. But adults exhibit 
different bodily responses to these lullabies. 
A deeper problem is that it fails to consider the ways emotion influences bodily perception. 
The influence between bodily perception and emotion is not one way. Emotion can frame bodily 
perception. Listeners in the somber community may have a different way of responding to fast 
tempo because of their emotional disposition towards somberness. Whenever anxiety is about to 
arise, listeners would normally experience an emotion like embarrassment. They may feel 
embarrassed about not being able to maintain mental composure. This high-level embarrassment 
would further structure the bodily responses in a way that minimizes agitation. For example, the 
listeners might readjust their breathing patterns. Even if they are somewhat excited, the bodily 
excitement is not enough to deliver joy. Since bodily responses are laden with emotions, bodily 
responses are not sufficiently neutral to establish an emotional nature of music. 
The Confucian thinker, like the Guest, can insist that it takes a long time for the genuine 
emotional response to manifest. The Host has treated this idea cursorily in the dialogue. To do 
justice to this point, we need to allow the listeners a longer period of time and see if time may 
solve the problem. Confucian aesthetics values the way art might transform the moral character. 
The transformative process can take a long time to accomplish and maintain.64 
One way that music can be thought to exert a long-lasting effect is by influencing the way 
people make moral judgments. Angelika Seidel and Jesse Prinz have used Japanese noise music 
 
64 The word in ancient Chinese to convey stimulation or arousal is “gan” (感). As a noun, it literally means feeling. 
As a verb, it means to arouse feelings. Etymologically, “gan” means to be hurt in the heart, although that dimension 
of vulnerability is obsured in contemporary usage. In contemporary Chinese, “gan” can be combined with other 
characters to convey a sense of emotion. “Gan-Dong” (感动) means to move or touch emotionally. “Gan-Hua” (感化) 
means to transform emotionally. “Gan-Zhao” (感召) means to awake or inspire emotionally. 
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and Edvard Grieg’s “Morning Mood” to show that musically induced affective states can amplify 
moral judgments. When irritated by music, people are more likely to judge actions as wrong. When 
uplifted by music, people are more likely to judge helping behaviors as good and obligatory.65 If 
music can affect moral choices in the empirically controlled environment in a short period of time, 
it is arguably possible for the musically induced affects to build up and gradually shift people’s 
moral character in a certain direction over time. Suppose I am exposed to uplifting music 
constantly, I might be much more likely to endorse helping behaviors than otherwise. My moral 
character may change as a result in the long term. As Cyril Scott writes, in Music and Its Secret 
Influence, about the spiritual effects that Indian music can have on the mind: 
 
It is true the effect wears off after a while, but the experience is repeated the next 
time we hear music of a similar kind. And suppose that we are constantly hearing 
music, day after day, week after week, year after year, will those constantly 
repeated emotions leave no imprint upon our character, our emotional nature?66 
 
It is important to note that the musically induced affective states may be morally significant 
without being full-fledged emotions. Although the pieces of music are described as angry and 
happy and the responses are described as anger and happiness in the experiments, the authors “take 
no strong stance on the mood/emotion distinction” insofar as the musically induced states “lack 
manifest moral content.” 67 Emotions can be sidestepped as long as music can be shown to impact 
moral judgments. To refute the illusion view, Confucian thinkers need to provide a causal story 
 
65 Angelika Seidel and Jesse Prinz, “Mad and Glad: Musically Induced Emotions Have Divergent Impact on Morals,” 
Motivation and Emotion 37, No. 3 (2013): 629-37. 
66 Cyril Scott, Music and Its Secret Influence: Throughout the Ages, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 156. 
67 Seidel and Prinz, “Mad and Glad,” 635. 
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about how musically induced affective states may have a causal impact on the emotions that are 
relevant for morality. Music must be shown to facilitate moral education by working on morally 
relevant emotions. 
One way to achieve this is to examine the emotions involved in the development of moral 
characters. In the article “On the Ancient Idea that Music Shapes Character,” James Harold draws 
on Confucian philosopher Xunzi to argue for a “causal link between exposure to art (or 
entertainment) and character development.” 68  Since music can temporarily induce affective 
changes, the question is whether those affective changes last long enough to be morally 
significant.69 According to Harold, whatever effects these affective changes might have on virtues 
will be “pre-reflective and autonomous,” giving us “proper models but give no precepts.”70 
Listeners need complementary beliefs to internalize transitory affective changes as morally 
significant dispositions. For example, Harold holds that a long-term effect of watching violent 
media is “the adoption of new beliefs,”71 which disposes people towards aggressive characters. 
But the adoption of new beliefs is probably due to the representational content in media. 
The parallel with music does not hold, because music lacks the representational content which can 
ground belief formation. Without a source for cognitive input, the affective changes generated by 
music is not enough to form new beliefs. The analogy with visual media is insufficient to show 
that music can shape moral character by forming new beliefs in listeners. 
 
68 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 349. 
69 This is not an exclusively Confucian concern. Plato writes in Book III of Republic, “The education in music and 
poetry is most important … because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, 
affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly educated in music and poetry, it makes 
him graceful, but if not, then the opposite.” Plato, Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), Republic, 401d. 
70 James Harold, “On the Ancient Idea that Music Shapes Character,” Dao 15, No.3 (2016): 346. 
71 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 349. 
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Harold proposes that repetition of certain “disconfirming experiences” can affect our 
stereotypical judgments in the long term.72 For example, if I hold the wrong view that introverts 
are not capable of public speaking, my stereotypical view will be changed by my repeated exposure 
to introverts who speak well in public. The repetition of disconfirming experiences will “mitigate 
the role of stereotypes in deliberation.”73 Likewise, Harold suggests that music can moderately 
affect the development of moral character by exposing us repeatedly to disconfirming experiences. 
When we find a piece of music pleasant, music can confirm our preferences. When we discover 
our enjoyment of a piece of music which we did not enjoy previously, music disconfirms our 
preferences. Insofar our aesthetic preferences can be stereotypical, music can change our aesthetic 
stereotypes. For example, constant exposure to peaceful music can make me gradually feel 
aversion to raucous music. Harold suggests that the dispositional changes induced by music does 
not happen positively but negatively. The value of music consists in its power to curb emotions 
rather than to form emotions. In the article “The Values of Music,” Eric L. Hutton and James 
Harold quote Xunzi: 
 
As for people’s dispositions, their eyes desire the utmost in sights, their ears desire 
the utmost in sounds, their mouths desire the utmost in flavors, their noses desire 
the utmost in smells, and their bodies desire the utmost in comfort. These “five 
utmosts” are something the dispositions of people cannot avoid [desiring].74 
 
Recall that the Host acknowledges this Confucian observation at the beginning of the dialogue: 
 
72 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 349. 
73 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 349. 
74 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 277. 
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It is known that emotions should not be unbridled and desires should not be 
exhausted. Music is limited according to its use such that sadness does not turn into 
harm and happiness does not turn into the licentiousness.75 
 
Hutton and Harold use this passage as evidence for the view that “people are unavoidably disposed 
toward desiring the ‘utmost in sounds.’”76 Consequently, it is necessary to restrain the pursuit of 
pleasure. Xunzi wrote: 
 
And so music is the means to guide one’s joy. The instruments made of metal, stone, 
silk string, and bamboo are the means to guide one’s virtue. When music proceeds, 
then the people will turn toward what is correct.77 
 
The authors point out that for Xunzi, “a crucial element of being virtuous is having the right 
dispositions in feelings and desires.”78  A major source of that disposition comes from being 
immersed in good music. Good music carries listeners through an audible shape of what good 
emotional temperament sounds like. One reason why moral confusion arises is that people have 
lost their sense of what proper emotional responses are. When one engages in self-harming 
behaviors, some feel concerned, some feel eager to help, some feel indifferent, and some feel 
contempt. An individual may feel a mixture of these emotions. It is unclear which one is the 
 
75 My translation of the Chinese text: 人知情不可恣，欲不可极故，因其所用，每为之节，使哀不至伤，乐不
至淫 
76 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 277. 
77 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 278. 
78 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 278. 
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extreme and which one is the moderate. People immersed in good music will have first-hand 
experiences of what virtuous emotions feel like. When these people are put into moral contexts, 
they can apply the emotional dispositions formed through aesthetic practice to moral challenges. 
The upshot is that “the right kind of music can improve individuals morally by influencing their 
dispositions.”79 Specifically, this moral influence from music works negatively by restraining 
people from pursuing extreme pleasures. 
Nonetheless, the Confucian view is psychologically inaccurate. It is unclear whether 
restraining people from pursuing the most pleasing music will have the intended benefit. 
Extremely pleasing music may relieve pain and restore health. Emotionally intense and deep 
experiences can help listeners regain emotional balance in chaotic times. Harold assumes that the 
long-lasting effects on people’s dispositions are operating in the same direction of dispositional 
traits that are beneficial for the listeners. But the opposite seems equally probable, at least for many 
people.80 The long-lasting effects of emotional restraint can be suffocating. Many people who are 
deprived of the means of emotional outlet may experience the deprivation as a loss of autonomy 
and suffer as a result. It remains an open question whether emotional evocation in music can 
challenge the illusion view. 
 
 
79 Harold, “Music Shapes Character,” 278. 
80 Compare this discussion to Aristotle’s concept of catharsis, which has been interpreted to be either homeopathic or 
allopathic as a therapeutic process. See Elizabeth S. Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 267. 
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Reflection 
In this section I have explored possible responses to the illusion view from the Confucian 
tradition. The objection from representational reliability does not deliver representational 
constancy. The objection from expressive sincerity does not explain expressive capability. The 
objection from evocative appropriateness does not determine emotions over time. These possible 
objections mitigate, yet ultimately fail to refute the illusion view. It remains to be seen whether 
representation, expression, and arousal theories in contemporary musical aesthetics might establish 
an emotional nature of music.  
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Chapter Four. Evocation 
In this chapter I will examine arousal theories. Various accounts have been given to explain 
how music arouses or evokes emotion. I will use evocation and arousal interchangeably. The fact 
that music can evoke emotion may be mobilized to debunk the illusion view. But the Host has 
raised the problem of evocative underdetermination. Different or even opposite emotions can be 
aroused by the same piece of music. To see whether this problem can be settled, I will examine 
three versions of arousal theories. They are not necessarily the most sophisticated versions. But 
they serve to foreground issues from various perspectives. More advanced arousal theories tend to 
synthesize elements from expression or representation. In this chapter I will focus just on the idea 
of evocation, leaving issues about expression and representation to later chapters. I will be paying 
attention particularly to the move in each version from the evocation to the attribution of emotion 
into music. The aim is not to criticize each theory, but to draw on these theories to answer the 
question whether music is emotional. 
 
The Argument from Profundity Enjoyment 
Peter Kivy, in Music Alone, argues that musical enjoyment is one aspect of musical 
cognition. The enjoyment derives not from sensory stimulation, but from musical understanding. 
The enjoyment derived from understanding is qualitatively different from the pleasure derived 
from taking music as a sonic drug. Sensory pleasure is not what distinguishes listeners with 
musical understanding from listeners without musical understanding. As Kivy claims in analogy, 
“the pharmacologist who is profoundly versed in the ways in which heroin affects the brain does 
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not get a different or more enjoyable ‘high’ from it than the neighborhood addict who knows 
nothing at all about how the substance works.”81 Kivy postulates a “reciprocal relation” between 
understanding and enjoyment,82 whereby “the degree of musical enjoyment increases as the detail 
and extent of the musical object perceived and (thus) available for appreciation.”83 
For Kivy, music must have a formal structure in order to be an object for cognition. If 
musical cognition is not directed at a formal structure, musical appreciation would degenerate into 
undifferentiated sensation of the indefinite, which amounts to sensory pleasure. The formal 
structure is not characterized by the length of musical materials, but by a sense of life in the 
dynamics of music. 
 
When someone plays a note musically, whether on a violin, piano, woodwind 
instrument, or even a drum, the note is given a “life”: it begins, and it ends, and 
something happens to it in between, both dynamically and with regard to its tone-
quality.84 
 
Accordingly, a formal structure can be instantiated even in a single note, which can serve as an 
object for musical cognition and provide musical enjoyment. Kivy says, “even in so minimal a 
musical object as a half note played with musicality on the G-string, there is formal structure to be 
consciously perceived and enjoyed.”85  The musical understanding of formal structures is not 
esoteric. Musical understanding is available to experts and amateurs alike. To cognize music, 
 
81 Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), 40. 
82 Kivy, Music Alone, 99. 
83 Kivy, Music Alone, 98. 
84 Kivy, Music Alone, 87. 
85 Kivy, Music Alone, 87. 
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listeners need to pay attention to inner movements within the music. To illustrate, Kivy takes 
listening to fugue as a model for musical understanding. 
 
One of the things I do when I listen to a fugue, of course, is to listen for the entrances 
of the theme. Sometimes I get it right, sometimes I miss an entrance because it is 
in an “inner voice” or otherwise disguised, sometimes I am fooled into thinking 
there is an entrance when, in fact, it is only a scrap of the theme in an “episode.” 
That is something I enjoy when I listen to fugues. I presume others enjoy it too. 
Certainly, “finding the theme” is one of the musical enjoyments the fugue is meant 
to afford … This special case of musical enjoyment can be generalized for all 
musical enjoyment.86 
 
For Kivy, “finding the theme” is central to all musical experiences. It keeps listeners attentive with 
a cognitive challenge. Musical enjoyment may grow as musical cognition expands. In Kivy’s 
discussion of Josquin’s setting of “Ave Maria,” musical cognition expands in several stages. 
 
[M]y single belief that these sounds are very, very beautiful has now begun to 
expand into a system of beliefs about the features of that sound: the freedom of the 
part-writing, the wonderful voice-leading, the masterful preparation of cadences, 
the building up of musical climaxes … [P]art of this seemingly effortless, freely 
moving combination of melodic lines has been achieved under … a canon at the 
 
86 Kivy, Music Alone, 73. 
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fifth with the voices only one beat apart … As perception, understanding, the extent 
of the musical object, and enjoyment of it increase … so too does emotion.87 
 
Kivy holds that “understanding … is the only game in town.” 88 Musical enjoyment is 
strictly in proportion with what Kivy perceives and understands about the music. 
 
The more I understand a work, the more I hear in it; and the more I hear in it, the 
more opportunities do I have for liking or disliking it, being bored by or fascinated 
with it, enjoying or not enjoying it.89 
 
Formal structures can be conceived as general objects for musical cognition. The ultimate object 
of musical cognition is what Kivy calls “musical profundity.” Musical profundity is the utmost 
embodiment of the inherent possibilities within musical structures. According to Kivy, music is 
profound just in case it exhibits exemplary craftsmanship, which lies in contrapuntal composition. 
Counterpoint refers to a compositional strategy where two melodic lines independent of each other 
are brought into interdependent harmony. For Kivy, counterpoint is profound as it anchors musical 
cognition to music itself. The profundity is manifested in the sonic possibilities inherent in a 
musical structure. Finding the theme would be the best way to approach and enjoy musical 
profundity. The following argument can be constructed from Kivy’s writing: 
 
(P1) Finding the theme yields enjoyment of musical profundity. 
 
87 Kivy, Music Alone, 160. 
88 Kivy, Music Alone, 117. 
89 Kivy, Music Alone, 115. 
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(P2) If finding the theme yields enjoyment of musical profundity, music is 
emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
P1 is questionable. It is by no means obvious that finding the theme is a universal feature 
of all musical cognition. Hearing the same sounds, listeners with various degrees of cognitive 
sophistication regarding music will be cognizing different objects, all of which derive from the 
music. To address this worry, we need to see if all listeners are cognizing music more or less 
similarly. Kivy suggests that musical enjoyment is based on musical cognition that can be 
described. “When someone is enjoying music, he or she is … enjoying some sonic quality of a 
piece of music perceived under a certain description as doing something the listener enjoys.”90 For 
Kivy, the ability to describe music is an accurate measure of musical cognition. Importantly, all 
musical descriptions converge such that different musical cognitions can be compared and 
assessed. “We customarily take a person’s musical understanding to be evidenced by, to be 
constituted, really, by, his or her ability to describe the musical happenings perceived, thought 
about, enjoyed.”91 For an average listener, “she can enjoy the way a theme appears, and she can 
enjoy a stretto. She just does not enjoy them under music-theoretical descriptions.”92 
Kivy holds that the most advanced cognition is the best model to assess all musical 
enjoyment regarding a musical work. An amateur’s cognition can be assessed in terms of how 
closely it stands to the most advanced cognition. Whether listeners can describe their musical 
cognition in a way that aligns with the activity of finding the theme will be the test we need to see 
 
90 Kivy, Music Alone, 78. 
91 Kivy, Music Alone, 98. 
92 Kivy, Music Alone, 78. 
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if all listeners cognize music similarly. As Mrs. Munt, an average listener imagined by Kivy, listens 
to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, “she does possess some concepts under which she perceives and 
enjoys the return of the themes, or, I submit, she would not able to perceive the return of themes 
and enjoy the symphony at all.”93 Mrs. Munt will be denied the ability to enjoy the symphony, if 
she fails to follow the cognitive process of perceiving the return of the themes. 
 
If you ask Mrs. Munt what she enjoys just now, in the symphony, when she starts 
beating her foot, perhaps she will say: “I love that place where that other tune, not 
the one in the beginning, comes back again, sort of different, comfortably – like 
coming home to tea.”94 
 
For Kivy, the likelihood that Mrs. Munt can give such a description suggests that Mrs. Munt would 
not find the “return of themes” too mysterious a concept if the concept is fully clarified. Mrs. Munt 
would find her descriptions map onto some advanced descriptions of the music. Even if different 
listeners enjoy different musical objects, the musical objects might still correlate with each other 
in a hierarchy. 
But this correlation sounds mysterious. It is a mystery for every musical object enjoyed by 
the ordinary listener to map onto some musical object enjoyed by the sophisticated listener. In Mrs. 
Munt’s possible description about the Fifth Symphony, Kivy’s interpretation has shaped how we 
are supposed to read the description. Recall Mrs. Munt’s description: “I love that place where that 
other tune, not the one in the beginning, comes back again, sort of different, comfortably – like 
 
93 Kivy, Music Alone, 79. 
94 Kivy, Music Alone, 79. 
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coming home to tea.”95 It is unclear from this description itself how much emphasis Mrs. Munt is 
placing on the “coming back” of the tone. Mrs. Munt’s description might be non-selective 
regarding “back again,” “comfortably,” “home,” “coming home to tea.” The music might call to 
Mrs. Munt’s mind a faint memory of her childhood when her grandparents came home to tea. 
There is no way to rule out these alternative interpretations beforehand. Given the many options 
to interpret what brings Mrs. Munt musical enjoyment, it would be question-begging to pick out 
“coming back” of the tone as the singularly important component in Mrs. Munt’s description. To 
make that interpretation, we would assume that finding the theme is something all listeners do. 
The central problem is how to interpret Mrs. Munt’s description. If Mrs. Munt’s description 
can be read as a variation of “finding the theme,” Kivy would be justified to claim “finding the 
theme” as the quintessential musical enjoyment. But if Mrs. Munt’s description has a meaning 
independent of “finding the theme,” there would be no way to prioritize Kivy’s musical cognition 
over Mrs. Munt’s cognition. Kivy might protest by trying to establish “finding the theme” as the 
standard source of musical enjoyment. We need to examine more carefully the thought that Mrs. 
Munt’s description might be drawn out by Kivy. 
Kivy echoes the Platonic thought that the philosopher serves as an intellectual midwife by 
posing questions and drawing out innate ideas that are already in other people. Kivy attributes 
innate musical concepts to average listeners. Musical concepts are innate ideas “to be actualized 
under the appropriate conditions” 96  by a “midwifery Socrates” in every listener. 97  Kivy 
distinguishes two senses of innateness, one where I can make whatever concepts plain to myself 
but have trouble making them plain to others, the other where I cannot make it plain even to myself. 
 
95 Kivy, Music Alone, 79. 
96 Kivy, Music Alone, 106. 
97 Kivy, Music Alone, 108. 
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To illustrate, Kivy differentiates two scenarios where someone cannot come up with a detailed 
description. 
In the Navigating scenario, 
 
You are standing on West 4th Street and 7th Avenue and are asked, “How do I get 
to Carnegie Hall from here?” Well, you know perfectly well how to do it. You have 
done it a hundred times ... But now try to describe that to a tourist … You have it 
on the tip of your tongue, but your tongue just won’t cooperate. 98 
 
In the Walking scenario, 
 
Suppose someone were to ask you to describe walking. Well, you have been doing 
it every day of most of your life … Your problem here, unlike in the previous case, 
is that you don’t have an “innate” description in your head at all, because walking 
is … second nature to you.99 
 
Kivy suggests that an average listener “is like the person who has trouble telling you how to get to 
Carnegie Hall, not the person who has trouble giving you a description of walking.”100 The average 
listener faces a problem of sharing what she knows only vaguely, not a problem of describing what 
she feels so natural as to be a second nature. The average listener is not someone who has been 
listening to music most of her life. Her knowledge of musical objects and enjoyment is not the 
 
98 Kivy, Music Alone, 106. 
99 Kivy, Music Alone, 106. 
100 Kivy, Music Alone, 107. 
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kind of knowledge based on familiarity. Kivy suggests that we ask Mrs. Munt, “you know what 
the music was like: now just relax, think back on it, and describe it in your own words. What was 
happening in Beethoven’s Fifth when you started tapping your foot?”101 Kivy maintains that “she 
is able to describe the music, only haltingly.”102 Mrs. Munt might answer “the place where the 
theme goes dum-dum-diddle.”103 That description from Mrs. Munt, for Kivy, would suffice to 
align her musical cognition to the more advanced cognition under the description “the place where 
the theme descends in seconds and thirds.”104 Given that listeners are open to take suggestions 
from an advanced listener, it is likely that listeners might come up with what the advanced listener 
understands about the music. 
Nevertheless, Mrs. Munt may not be able to provide something as simple as “the place 
where the theme goes dum-dum-diddle.” Kivy’s midwifery Socrates cannot put words into Mrs. 
Munt’s mouth. The midwifery Socrates has to remain informationally neutral by posing open-
ended questions. A question like “Have you noticed that that’s when the melody goes dim-dim-
diddle?” is not allowed in the questioning period, if the questions are supposed to draw out 
knowledge already in Mrs. Munt. Kivy might reply that we should always encourage Mrs. Munt 
to say more than a mere mood. If she cannot provide something concrete to draw out technical 
descriptions, we might discard her responses to the music as not having a cognitive object at all. 
If Mrs. Munt does not know what she is feeling about, she might feel that way towards any other 
object, not necessarily Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. 
This reply does not do justice to the subjectivity involved in Socratic questioning. Ideally, 
the midwifery Socrates would focus on the similarities between Mrs. Munt’s descriptions and more 
 
101 Kivy, Music Alone, 108. 
102 Kivy, Music Alone, 108-109. 
103 Kivy, Music Alone, 121. 
104 Kivy, Music Alone, 121. 
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technically advanced descriptions. But the act of drawing out descriptions out of Mrs. Munt is 
pedagogical and interpretive. It involves interpreting Mrs. Munt in the direction of technical 
sophistication. The interpretive direction depends on the questioner. Mrs. Munt can insist that only 
Beethoven’s Fifth can make her feel that way without describing it in any way that sounds as if 
she were trying to “find the theme.” Mrs. Munt can refuse to let the meaning of her bodily reaction 
be located and interpreted within a specific musical phrase. Even if Mrs. Munt has the relevant 
understanding, she might not feel the cognitivist enjoyment such as wonder and awe at musical 
profundity. It is also possible for one to have all the technical understanding of the music without 
the feeling of awe. The profundity itself is not inherently awe-inspiring. The emotions such as awe 
and excitement towards musical profundity are not universal. They are likely emotional responses 
felt by advanced listeners with the level of musical cognition described by Kivy. 
Let us take a look at the second premise in the argument. P2 aims to establish an emotional 
nature of music upon an intellectual pleasure. All forms of musical cognition, according to Kivy, 
are directed at one subject matter, which is the profundity of music. The emotional nature of music 
derives solely from the enjoyment of musical profundity. This seems odd. 
One might defend P2 by expanding the conception of musical profundity to include more 
emotions proper for the enjoyment of musical profundity. One might suggest that musical 
profundity can be manifested in a myriad of ways. The creativity in musical profundity deserves 
certain emotional responses such as awe and wonder. For example, Stephen Davies compares 
musical profundity to a profound move in the game of Chess. Davies holds that a profound move 
in chess reveals ingenuity, creativity, and understanding about what the game could be. 105 
 
105 Stephen Davies, “Profundity in Instrumental Music,” British Journal of Aesthetics 42, No. 4 (2002): 351. For 
Kivy’s response, see Peter Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 158-
163. 
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Similarly, if performers are able to show ingenuity, creativity, and understanding of music, 
listeners develop emotions in response to that profundity. 
Nonetheless, P2 makes emotional responses a matter of responding to an exemplary object 
in cognition. If this could establish an emotional nature of music, it would also establish an 
emotional nature of chess, for both have profound subject matter to evoke intellectual enjoyment 
that requires cognitive labor. But that would prove too much. Even if there is an emotional nature 
of chess, P2 makes it unclear what the difference between the emotional nature of music and the 
emotional nature of chess would be. 
The argument from profundity enjoyment cannot refute the illusion view. It restricts 
emotional evocation to amazement at musical profundity. Although musical enjoyment as 
amazement is a kind of evocation, it is far from the concerns that drive the debate between the 
Guest and the Host in Ji Kang’s dialogue. Moreover, the argument shows at most that music is 
enjoyable in an intellectual way. Even if all listeners feel the enjoyment by following Kivy’s 
method of finding the theme, this unanimity will not resolve emotional underdetermination in less 
cognitive modes of listening. Kivy’s account gives the appearance that musical enjoyment can be 
determined by musical profundity. But this would be unhelpful, for sadness and happiness 
supposedly in music cannot be simply categorized as enjoyment, let alone enjoyment at profundity. 
Kivy’s account does not establish an emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Turbulence Enaction 
The difficulty of establishing the emotional nature of music through evocation partly 
consists in specifying the level of emotions. It seems that music is particularly equipped to evoke 
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fine-grained emotions. One might think, for example, that there is a particular shade of happiness 
that can be aroused only by Mozart’s Piano Concerto No. 21 in C major, K. 467 - Andante. Robert 
Jourdain, in Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, observes an infinite specificity of music that allows for 
“great precision” in evoking “interior feelings.”106 Interior feelings are less characterizable in 
language, as they are “structured differently” from events that happen in the external world.107 The 
main difference between interior feelings and exterior events is this. The world of exterior events 
consists of objects “arrayed in particular positions in space and time,” whereas the world of interior 
feelings consists of “turbulent flows” of “diverse intentions” in our neurological systems.108 For 
example, a car is racing towards me as I cross the road. To describe this event as an exterior event, 
we need to locate where the car is coming from, where I am in relation to the car, how long it 
might take for the car to hit me. Since the objects such as the car, my body, and the road are 
trackable in space and time, we can use language to describe the exterior world. It is more difficult 
to describe what happens in my mind with language. When I realize that a car is racing towards 
me, I feel a sudden shock and cannot believe that a car can be racing towards me. I feel confused 
because the traffic light indicates my turn to cross the road. I hesitate whether to stand still and 
wait for the car to avoid me or to run aside to avoid the car. I remember an omen about cars trying 
to hit pedestrians. I worry that how my family will be informed if I get hit and become unconscious. 
These feelings, like turbulence, arise in me in a second and make me unable to think clearly. Even 
if I have just described some of the components in my interior world, it is hard to locate them in 
space and time. Their coexistence and interaction are hard to capture in language. 
 
106 Robert Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy: How Music Captures Our Imagination (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2002), 295. 
107 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 296. 
108 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 296. 
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The term “turbulence” may suggest an agitated state of arousal, yet the concept of 
turbulence is not limited to agitated emotions alone, for the interior turbulence is characterized by 
the specific way it feels. There can be a “turbulence” of serenity, if the serenity is aroused in a 
concrete way in the neurological system. For example, one may be calmed by a cup of coffee 
roasted from a particular type of coffee beans at a definite temperature. The cup of coffee would 
calm the nerves in a specific way. Presumably this calmness would count as “turbulent” on 
Jourdain’s account. 
 
Because turbulent systems lack stable subdivisions, we can’t point and say “that is 
a blah,” for a moment later the blah will become bleh, and then a pleh. We’re able 
to reduce interior experience only to broad categories that are stable enough to 
deserve a name like “wrath” or “whimsy.”109 
 
In a similar vein, German composer Felix Mendelssohn notes the specificity of emotion: 
 
People often complain that music is too ambiguous, that what they should think 
when they hear it is so unclear, whereas everybody understands words. With me it 
is exactly the opposite … The thoughts that are expressed to me by music I love are 
not too indefinite to be put into words, but on the contrary too definite.110 
 
 
109 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 296. 
110 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 295. For an empirically informed proposal, see Nathaniel F. Barrett et al., 
“Emotional Granularity and the Musical Enjoyment of Sadness Itself,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40, November 
29, 2017. The proposal sounds promising, but needs experiments to be corroborated. 
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Jourdain claims that the inadequacy of linguistic representation can be observed not only regarding 
interior turbulence, but also regarding exterior turbulence. It is next to impossible to describe, for 
example, “the swirling patterns of water in a stream … when someone asks us to describe the 
stream, we would explain that verbal description isn’t up to the job, and instead would simply 
show the animation.”111 
The way music evokes emotion, according to Jourdain, is through “enaction.” Enaction is 
a direct and immediate manner of evocation by instilling emotional effects in the perceptual organs 
of listeners. This instillation involves an emotional reproduction that “replicates the temporal 
patterns of interior feeling, surging in pitch or volume as they surge, ebbing as they ebb.”112 
Jourdain conceives enaction as a kind of “muscular representation” in the neural system 
responsible for motion. Despite the term “representation,” enaction is a concept in arousal theory, 
because the representation happens precisely in the body of listeners. Enaction provides a “notation 
system in which we momentarily inscribe features of music” to “amplify our experience of 
music.”113 “We use our bodies as resonators for auditory experience. The listener becomes a 
musical instrument, places himself in the hands of the music, allows himself to be played.”114 The 
muscular representation preserves the immediacy of arousal. Specifically, the muscular 
representation transforms listeners momentarily by “possessing” them through the musical 
patterns that move to bear emotion. “Such possession is most evident when a piece seems to take 
hold of our bodies and make us move. We ‘get into’ the music’s rhythms and harmonic cadences 
and feel compelled to see them through.” 115  Muscular representation achieves this kind of 
 
111 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 296. 
112 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 296. 
113 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 326. 
114 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 326. 
115 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 328. 
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possession within the framework of experiential anticipation. “Music arrives in our nervous 
systems and causes our brains to generate a flood of anticipations by which we make sense of 
melody and harmony and rhythm and form by eliciting these anticipations, music entrains the 
deepest levels of intention, and so takes us over.”116 
Music enacts turbulent experiences through temporal and tonal tensions.117 Music can 
present a world of movements that bodily movements in the external world hardly match. Ennio 
Morricone’s Enduring Movement, for example, enacts such a turbulent interior world of feelings 
that hardly corresponds to bodily movement in the external world. 
 
Physically, we fumble through a world of inelegant, discontinuous activity. For 
instance, it would be all but impossible to turn the act of cooking dinner into an 
artful dance. The motions are too varied and discontinuous. But well-crafted music 
creates the very world it travels through, meeting every anticipation with a graceful 
resolution, and raising new anticipations at every turn. While physical movement 
is choked with starts and stops and stumbles, music establishes a continuous flux, 
and does it in perfect proportions.118 
 
It is noteworthy that “well-crafted music creates the very world it travels through.” The way music 
revives interior feelings does not involve a distance from the feelings. Rather, it seems that music 
itself is the world of those feelings. One might write a novel to create a world of interior feelings. 
But words hardly have the same level of intensity as sounds do. Even if they are just as intense, 
 
116 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 329. 
117 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 302-3. 
118 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 302-3. 
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the reception on the part of audience is not guaranteed to replicate that intensity. Rainer Maria 
Rilke’s Elegies might be intense and present a turbulent world of feelings, but as a reader, I am 
limited by my reading speed and understanding to keep up with that turbulence. Music can almost 
force a reliving of interior feelings through its “continuous flux … in perfect proportions.” The 
turbulence, prior to cognitive evaluation, is implanted in listeners.119 Music apparently carries 
listeners into emotional worlds regardless of their wishes. Even if listeners are involuntary to 
experience the music, as long as they pay attention, they will be apparently led to feel the emotional 
turbulence in music. The following argument can be constructed from Jourdain’s writing: 
 
(P1) Music enacts emotional turbulence. 
(P2) If music enacts emotional turbulence, music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
In support of P1, Jourdain discusses Henry Mancini’s “The Pink Panther”:120 
 
Mancini directs melody, harmony, and rhythm toward a point of high tension at the 
start of the third bar as the tune plateau on a long, accentuated dissonance. This note 
violates several kinds of anticipation. Melody suddenly stops accelerating and 
freezes. Melodic contour ends its overall rise. Harmony veers from the prevailing 
 
119 Oscar Wilde makes this observation: “After playing Chopin, I feel as if I had been weeping over sins that I had 
never committed, and mourning over tragedies that were not my own. Music always seems to me to produce that 
effect. It creates for one a past of which one has been ignorant, and fills one with a sense of sorrows that have been 
hidden from one’s tears. I can fancy a man who had led a perfect commonplace life, hearing by chance some curious 
piece of music, and suddenly discovering that his soul, without his being conscious of it, had passed through terrible 
experiences, and known fearful joys, or wild romantic loves, or great renunciations.” Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and 
Ecstasy, 322. 
120 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 322. 
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tonal center. Meter pounces on a strong accentuation. And phrasing that is formed 
largely by melodic contour ends its accelerating pattern of stealthy footsteps, first 
in twos and then in fours. For a moment the music becomes motionless, much as a 
stalking cat might.121 
 
The movement of music enacts stealth by “a rising sense of apprehension.”122 This sense of stealth 
cannot be reduced to linguistic terms. “None of the usual monikers from our inventory of emotions 
– joy, grief, triumph, whatever – make a good match for what we feel when we listen to this 
passage.”123 Jourdain holds that something like stealth “overlays” the movements and calls “stealth” 
an “emotion” in light of the resonance listeners have with the music. 124  For Jourdain, the 
justification of naming “stealth” an “emotion” comes from our bodily resonance through sounds. 
 
It makes perfect sense to call the experience of stealth “emotion” even though we 
don’t normally think of it that way. We’re quite accustomed to feeling the 
emotional content of stealth when we have occasion to sneak around. We make 
motions that alternate between jarring restraint and sudden overreaching, all the 
while violating the normal pacing of physical movement. And so we experience 
little bouts of the pain of constriction and the pleasure of leaping. Notice that we 
feel stealth by moving in certain ways with certain timings; when music follows 
 
121 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 322-3. 
122 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 323. 
123 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 323. 
124 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 324. 
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similar patterns, it sounds stealthy, just as the pink panther’s slinking around looks 
stealthy.125 
 
The problem with P1 is that the emotions enacted come from projections based on the aim 
of “The Pink Panther” to accompany images on the screen. Although the music might fit with the 
images aesthetically, the feeling of stealth can come from observing the panther’s movement and 
be projected back into the music. An emotional label can be assigned to the musical piece and the 
panther’s movements can be invoked to make sense of that label. Nevertheless, the experience of 
stealth does not reveal an emotional nature of the music. To characterize the feelings aroused by 
this musical piece as an emotion of stealth involves an interpretative act that focuses on certain 
features of the music. While music enacts bodily turbulence, it does not enact emotional turbulence. 
P2 is also problematic. Emotions can be enacted even if music is not emotional. The 
concept of enaction suggests that the muscularly represented emotion is not in the music, but in 
the bodies of listeners. Consider an analogy. Suppose I wake up to a heavy snow after a month’s 
sunshine. I may feel that it is a cold world and there are cold feelings in my chest. But the snow 
does not contribute to the formation of an emotion yet. Even if I emotionally resonate with coldness 
of the snow, it is implausible to think of the snow’s coldness as emotional. One might contend that 
in this analogy the snow is a natural phenomenon. The snow does not bear traces of intentional 
orchestration. But it is unclear if adding intentional orchestration would break the analogy. 
Suppose that instead of seeing a heavy snow, I get to enjoy a firework show that is carefully 
orchestrated. The fireworks instantly get me into an emotion of hope through its patterns and 
sounds. But it is hardly plausible to think of the fireworks as hopeful. My emotional responses, 
 
125 Jourdain, Music, the Brain, and Ecstasy, 323. 
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even in the form of muscular representation with all the anticipations of patterns in the sky, do not 
show that the fireworks are emotional. 
The argument from turbulence enaction does not refute the illusion view. In the example 
used to illustrate how enaction works, the piece of music chosen does not rule out the possibility 
that emotions are projected into the music. Moreover, the enaction of emotion does not reveal an 
emotional nature of music. Emotional terms may be convenient to label an aesthetic experience 
for listeners, but that does not make the music itself emotional. 
 
The Argument from Brain Simulation 
In the article “A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity,” Tom Cochrane develops a 
causal theory for emotions to be attributed to music. The theory itself is a synthesis of various 
theories about music and emotion. Cochrane draws from perceptual theories of emotion, according 
to which emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily changes and their experiences are 
characterized by the feelings of those bodily changes. 126  Bodily changes in the respiratory, 
circulatory, digestive, musculoskeletal, endocrine systems and the neuro-transmitters released in 
the process report to us perceptions of the world. “Bodily changes such as increased heart rate, or 
even overt behavior, like running away, can represent danger because they are set up by evolution 
or learning to be causally initiated by dangerous situations.”127 On this view, emotion is impossible 
without bodily changes reporting our perceptions to us. Emotions are just “bodily changes that feel 
 
126 Tom Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88, No. 2 
(2010): 201. 
127 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 192. 
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a certain way.”128 Consequently, the regulation of bodily changes and their neurological bases will 
in effect regulate emotions. 
Cochrane draws on Antonio Damasio’s concept of the “as-if” loop. On this view, we would 
be able to react faster to the environment if we could act as if we have felt bodily changes. Felt 
bodily changes can be “anticipated or simulated in the absence of physiological changes.”129 For 
example, just as my hand is reaching into a fire, I can anticipate the burning feeling. I feel bodily 
changes even before the bodily changes happen. My bodily changes are felt as if my hands were 
burned. This enables me to draw back my hands faster than drawing back after experiencing the 
burning pain. The simulation mechanism in our brains makes it possible for emotional evocation 
to happen in the absence of physiological changes. 
One might wonder what is necessary for an emotion to be evoked in the absence of bodily 
changes. To address this, Cochrane draws on Derek Matravers’ arousal theory.130 According to 
Matravers, the arousal of an emotion does not need the full-fledged bodily changes that 
“overwhelm the listener,”131 but need only be built on “an immediate impression, sometimes of an 
extremely vivid nature, of an occurrent emotional state.”132 Cochrane proposes that this immediate 
impression, which serves to arouse an emotion, needs only exist minimally to initiate a causal 
chain in the brain to arouse emotions. The initiating event needs only be a simulation of felt bodily 
changes in the brain. According to Cochrane, music simulates what it is like to be in an emotional 
state and emotions can be aroused just by that simulation. To recognize the emotion, listeners need 
 
128 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 193. 
129 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 193. 
130 Derek Matravers, Art and Emotion, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 155. 
131 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 194. 
132 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 191. 
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only “be aroused by either attenuated bodily changes or, which is more primary, a neural 
simulation of such changes.”133 
Cochrane illustrates the simulation mechanism with the human capacity for empathy. 
When we empathize with others, we do not go through a whole process of inference from their 
outward expressions to their inner feelings. Rather, we can “get a direct impression of the feeling 
in their face or body.” We get this impression by feeling the same thing in ourselves. The 
immediacy in our ability to perceive emotions outside suggests an activation of our simulation 
mechanism. Cochrane suggests that the simulation mechanism is similarly activated in musical 
experiences. Music “hijacks” the simulation mechanism to arouse listeners into certain emotional 
states. Once we get an immediate impression of the feeling in the music, we can anticipate and 
form bodily changes based on the initially felt bodily changes. Insofar as music can simulate felt 
bodily changes to generate emotions, there seems to be an emotional nature of music. The 
following argument can be constructed from Cochrane’s writing: 
 
(P1) Music simulates felt bodily changes in the brain. 
(P2) If music simulates felt bodily changes in the brain, music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
P2 is problematic. Felt bodily changes are not robust enough to generate determinate 
emotions, because bodily changes can be interpreted differently. Higher-pitched sounds are heard 
as spatially higher, but we also hear “deep booming sounds from the sky.”134 There is no reason to 
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rule out the association of high positions and low sounds. A deeper explanation is needed to deliver 
emotions from simulation. 
One might suggest that a deeper explanation can be achieved in a “double-safety” way. If 
an emotion is generated by two perceptual systems, the emotion would pass the test of double-
safety. On this suggestion, emotional underdetermination arises only in cases where emotions have 
not been subject to the double-safety check. Cochrane calls attention to intermodal connections 
across different perceptual pathways. Specifically, the auditory perception and the tactile 
perception are intermodally connected. “Physical movements, as well as the textures of surfaces, 
are often presented to us visually, audibly and in tactile form.”135 According to Cochrane, auditory 
perception makes sounds resonate with the body in a way different from visual perception. To hear 
sounds, ears have to physically experience the vibration of air. The intermodal connections 
between hearing and touching can be invoked to solve the problem of emotional 
underdetermination. Music can simulate felt bodily changes in two perceptual modes, thereby 
double-hijacking our simulation mechanism. 
Nevertheless, the double-safety strategy offers little assurance that music is emotional. The 
intermodal connection can be used for an intermodal projection of emotion into music. The fact 
that the auditory pathway and the tactile pathway in the brain cross and feed each other does not 
explain the origin of emotional arousal. The two perceptual systems can coordinate with each other 
to confirm a projected emotion. What appears doubly safe would be doubly illusory. 
The argument from brain simulation does not refute the illusion view. It might look 
promising with an objective appeal at first glance, as it draws on the neurological systems in the 
brain. But it has not moved beyond individual listeners’ brains to the nature of music. The fact that 
 
135 Cochrane, “A Simulation Theory,” 199. 
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I have constructed three arguments from arousal theories in contemporary Western musical 
aesthetics. The argument from profundity enjoyment is too restrictive. Musical profundity can only 
arouse an intellectual wonder. The argument from turbulence enaction is too permissive. The 
enacted emotions do not come from music, but from interpretations of music. The argument from 
brain simulation is too wishful. The intermodal simulation of felt bodily changes does not yield 
determinate emotions, but reinforces emotional projections. While I have defended the illusion 
view against these specific arguments, I will consider broader challenges from the perspective of 
evocation in a later chapter.  
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Chapter Five. Expression 
In this chapter I will examine expression theories. Various accounts have been given to 
explain how music expresses emotion. To express something means to press out something that is 
within. As Mozart comments on Belmonte’s aria in A major: 
 
“O wie ängstlich, O wie feurig” – do you know how it is expressed (ausgedrückt)? 
– even the throbbing of his loving heart is indicated (angezeigt) – the two violins in 
octaves … One sees the trembling – the wavering – one sees how his swelling breast 
heaves – this is expressed (exprimirt) by a crescendo – one hears the whispering 
and the sighing – which is expressed (ausgedrückt) by the first violins, muted, and 
a flute in unison.136 
 
Mozart calls attention to the means that press out the emotion. This sense of pressing out is clear 
in German. The verb “express” is “ausdrücken,” which means “to press out.” 137  Expression 
theories aim to illuminate how music presses out emotions. 
The Host has raised the problem of expressive incapability, according to which expressive 
means are not capable of pressing out expressive content. In this chapter I will construct three 
 
136 This is from Mozart’s letter to his father, Vienna, September 26, 1781, concerning The Seraglio. Cooke, The 
Language of Music, 13. 
137 Thomas Teufel has offered an analogy which at once illustrates the sense of pressing out and opens a new path for 
the illusion view. Consider the lemon juicer. It presses out lemonade, but the lemonade is not in the nature of the 
machine. Still, there seems to be a non-accidental connection between the lemonade and the lemon juicer, which might 
be seen as corresponding to John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Consequently, the 
emotional qualities of music might be conceived as secondary (or even tertiary) qualities of music. Thomas Teufel, 
personal communication, March 5, 2021. 
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arguments from three expression theories. Let us see if expression theories might establish an 
emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Judicious Arrangement 
In Themes in the Philosophy of Music, Stephen Davies differentiates two ways emotions 
get expressed. Emotions can be expressed “through” music or “in” music.138 To give a visual 
analogy of this distinction, queer pride can be expressed in a rainbow flag, as the color diversity 
in the rainbow directly reflects a core value in the pride. Queer pride can be expressed through 
making a thousand tweets about gender politics in a day. But the act of twittering is not inherently 
expressive of queer pride. Likewise, emotions might be expressed through all kinds of music in a 
way that does not establish an emotional nature of music. 
Davies holds that emotions can be expressed in music, not just through music. Emotional 
expression in music is achieved, according to Davies, by composers’ deliberate arrangement of 
musical appearances with emotion characteristics in composition. Emotion characteristics are seen 
in everyday life. The depression of a forlorn figure at a bus stop can be seen in the way the person 
dresses, stands, walks, and talks. Davies holds that emotion characteristics can also be heard in 
music when carefully arranged into an order. Emotion characteristics are not able to express 
emotions until composers carefully arrange them. According to Davies, carefully arranged emotion 
characteristics will give rise to emotional appearances. An emotional appearance of music offers 
the impression of an emotion rather than fragments of emotion characteristics. Note how 
arrangement is set at a remove from the expressed emotion. It is indirect, as the focus is not on 
 
138 Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music, 144. 
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how music expresses emotion, but how musicians express emotion by doing something about 
musical appearances. The expression is not as much an outflow of emotion as a commentary on 
emotion characteristics “worn” by musical appearances.139 
One might wonder if only emotions directly wearable on the appearances can be expressed 
in music. But Davies thinks that the range of emotions possible for musical expression is broader. 
For example, it is possible to express the emotion of hope, although it is hard to find a musical 
appearance that directly wears the characteristics of hope. The expression of hope involves putting 
together emotion characteristics that combine a sense of longing to move out of misery, a sense of 
optimism that things are looking up, and a sense of patience to wait for the fulfillment. By 
arranging tonal tensions in specific tempos, composers can “judiciously order” the musical 
appearances in sufficient length and complexity to express a sense of hope, even if it is not as 
straightforward as an expression of sadness.140 The following argument can be constructed from 
Davies’ writing: 
 
(P1) Musicians express emotions by arranging emotional appearances. 
(P2) If musicians express emotions by arranging emotional appearances, music is 
emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
P1 can be challenged, for it reincarnates the problem of expressive incapability on the level 
of arrangement. We might question how certain arrangements are capable of turning musical 
appearances with emotion characteristics into emotional appearances. The idea of judicious 
 
139 Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music, 141-5. 
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arrangement is no panacea for expression. Positioning the problem into the mind of composers 
does not solve the problem. Susanne Langer observes, “as long as a work of art is viewed primarily 
as an ‘arrangement’ of sensuous elements for the sake of some inexplicable aesthetic satisfaction, 
the problem of expressiveness is really an alien issue.”141 
P2 might sound plausible with simple musical structures. For example, Martin Peralta’s 
album “Aurora” contains many 30-second short soundtracks. Each piece may be conceived as 
having emotion characteristics. The piece “Eternity” might be heard as expressing relief from or 
triumph over the past. Its simple patterns are easily recognizable, which delivers the impression 
that the composer has carefully arranged the musical appearances to achieve that effect. Even the 
second movement in Joseph Haydn’s Symphony No. 94, “Surprise” might confirm P2, for it has a 
smooth and relaxing melody occasioned by sudden bursts of energy to shock the audience. 
A problem with P2 is its implication of a calculated picture of musical expression. If the 
emotional nature of music is supported by careful arrangement of emotional appearances, one 
might wonder if the judicious calculatedness in arrangement installs an emotional illusion of its 
own kind. The more deliberate the arrangement is, the farther away the composers are situated 
from spontaneous and primordial emotions. If expressing an emotion is like playing with a 
marionette, all the care that goes into this play is not enough to make the marionette emotional. 
The marionette appears emotional at best. But the emotional appearance is not in the nature of the 
marionette. This problem with P2 can be seen clearly with music with complex structures where 
it is unreasonable to trace all emotional appearances to composers’ premeditated control. The 
feeling of dreamy calmness in Gymnopédies: No. 1 Lent et douloureux cannot be reduced to Erik 
Satie’s judicious arrangement. Although composers make use of musical appearances in artistic 
 
141 Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1953), 58. 
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production, to conceive emotional expression as a judicious arrangement of musical appearances 
presupposes an emotionality in the order of appearances. 
Davies might reply that emotional spontaneity and primordiality can be accommodated 
into arrangement. For the arrangement to be judiciously ordered, not all aspects of the arrangement 
have to be completely controlled. The materials for arrangement can come from long forgotten 
melodies in composers’ memory. Events in a composer’s personal life can also pump physical 
energy that cries for outlet in a way that directs the arrangement. The composers, in searching for 
the expressive means within their minds, find it suitable to put this physical energy into certain 
musical forms. These musical forms might as well arrive as inspirations such that composers have 
little control over when and how they get these forms. 
Even if the composition is not thoroughly controlled, composers cannot evade the search 
for the suitable expressive means. The problem with P2 is that it grounds the emotional nature of 
music in this search, while the nature of this search remains inexplicable. Suppose a composer 
aims to express an emotion like “the enlightened cheerfulness perceived as arrogance based on the 
possession of secret knowledge as a result of going through hell.” Although there are easy ways 
of conveying cheerfulness in musical forms, it is difficult to convey the kind of cheerfulness that 
comes from knowing something no one else knows. It is even more difficult to convey that this 
secret knowledge is learned by going through maximally terrible things. On top of everything, it 
is difficult for the arrangement of appearances to convey the sense that although this cheerfulness 
is perceived as arrogance, it is still cheerfulness. It would be almost impossible for composers to 
find the suitable expressive means by judiciously arranging emotional appearances. 
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Davies might reply that there must be a reason why composers use a low register to express 
a brooding grief and a high register to express a transcendent grief.142 A sense of order would be 
“arising naturally from” the arrangement of appearances. That natural order should make any 
expressive task intelligible. But this sense of naturalness is vague. Natural order would not be 
enough for emotional expression, if the “natural” sense of order refers to a collection of 
appearances without abrupt shifts. When a melody flows without sudden changes, the melody can 
feel natural to us. That cannot be enough to express the depth of emotions. Everyday musical 
experiences suggest that a musical movement holds emotional coherence, which cannot simply 
come from careful juxtaposition of emotional appearances, even if the appearances are close to 
each other. The dependence on naturalness would reduce emotional expression to auditory pastiche. 
To establish an adequate sense of naturalness, we still need to examine the expressive potentials 
of musical appearances themselves. 
The argument from judicious arrangement does not refute the illusion view. It maintains a 
distance from the emotional appearances with the idea of arrangement. But judicious arrangement 
makes expression a form of emotional commentary, which organizes rather than illuminates the 
emotional appearances of music. To better understand what expression theory can do, let us take 
a step closer to the appearances. 
 
 
142 Cooke, The Language of Music, 111-2. 
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The Argument from Quality Recognition 
In Music Alone, Kivy argues that musical experience involves a kind of cognition which 
includes the “appreciation, understanding, enjoyment” of music.143  This characterization may 
sound too intellectual. For many people, musical experience is all about enjoyment of a physical 
kind without any concern for cognitive understanding. People treat their favorite music as a 
powerful stimulation to incite senses and auditory systems in order to feel comfortable or healthy. 
Music can hype up moods to boost one’s immune system.144 Robinson claims that music is “very 
much like a drug” in that “it affects people directly in their physiology.”145 
Although there is nothing wrong in using music to feel good or healthy, Kivy dismisses 
physical enjoyment, even for the purpose of physical and mental health, as “utterly hopeless” for 
understanding musical expression.146 For Kivy, musical enjoyment can be based on and restrained 
by musical understanding. Pure music has an “aesthetically significant property … that must be 
cognized to be enjoyed.”147 As the physical pleasure obscures a cognitive pleasure one can get out 
of pure music, musical cognition that combines enjoyment, appreciation and understanding allows 
listeners to recognize expressive qualities in music. This recognition can happen from musical 
understanding without listeners being physically aroused. 
 
143 Kivy, Music Alone, 27. Kivy restricts the discussion on musical expression of emotion to what he calls “music 
alone” or pure music. Pure music is not to be conceived simply as music without lyrics. This conception is not precise 
for Kivy, because musical pieces can be without words yet experienced for practical purposes. For example, an 
instrumental piece without words used for the celebration of a wedding and experienced as such will not count as pure 
music to enter the discussion. The practical function makes it unclear whether happiness is due to the music or the 
wedding, as the happiness of a wedding can infiltrate the experience of the music. The concept of “music alone” is 
not meant to pick out music without words, but to pick out a pure experience of music for the purpose of examining 
musical expression of emotion. 
144 Hanslick has expressed skepticism towards the therapeutic effects of music. See Hanslick, On the Musically 
Beautiful, 71-4. 
145 Robinson, Deeper than Reason, 397. 
146 Kivy, Music Alone, 31. 
147 Kivy, Music Alone, 39. 
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We must keep apart the claim that music is expressive (anger, fear, and the like) 
and the claim that music is arousing in the sense of moving … a piece of music 
might move us (in part) because it is expressive of sadness, but it does not move us 
by making us sad.148 
 
Kivy proposes that the expressive qualities of emotion in music can be recognized in the same way 
that expressive qualities of emotion in anything else can be recognized. This recognition happens 
naturally because whatever containing the expressive qualities appear to us in a certain way. For 
example, a Saint Bernard has a droopy face that resembles a sad look. Even if the Saint Bernard is 
not sad or expressing sadness, we see its droopy face with the expressive quality of sadness. 
Likewise, we can recognize expressive qualities of emotion in one’s voice, even if the person does 
not feel the emotion or try to express the emotion. The recognition of expressive qualities can still 
happen as a result of our understanding of how the voice appears. The following argument can be 
constructed from Kivy’s writing: 
 
(P1) Expressive qualities of emotion can be recognized in music. 
(P2) If expressive qualities of emotion can be recognized in music, music is 
emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
 
148 Kivy, Music Alone, 153. 
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One can object to P1 by noting a crucial difference between doggy sadness and musical 
sadness. With doggy sadness, the sadness is transparent in that there is no translation between the 
droopy face and the act of expression. When the dog shows its face in certain way, the face is 
immediately expressive of sadness. The expressiveness of music involves translation, however 
brief it is, because the expressive qualities are not experienced as transparent in music. Since 
translation involves much cognitive labor, it is a mystery why composers would want to use music 
instead of more straightforward means for the purpose of emotional expression, given that more 
straightforward ways of expression are available. 
P2 is more problematic, because it evades the question of how expressive qualities get into 
music in the first place. To assume music has expressive qualities is question-begging. Kivy 
anticipates the challenge and sees it as calling for an explanation of “why music alone should 
possess expressive properties at all.” 149  To address this issue, Kivy aims at an account of 
expressive qualities “in their general form.”150 This sets a reasonable expectation, for emotions in 
general forms are not limited to intentional objects. It is difficult enough for music to be expressive 
of joy even in a general form. If this cannot even be established, emotional expression in more 
specific forms would be out of the question. For example, if music cannot be expressive of joy 
generally, music cannot be expressive of my joy at seeing two squirrels in the early morning. 
Emotions like pride or respect involve intentional objects. It is not possible to have pride without 
being proud of something. Music can at best be expressive of what Kivy calls “garden-variety” 
emotions such as anger, fear, joy, and sadness. Although it is not normal for us to be sad without 
 
149 Kivy, Music Alone, 172. 
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feeling sad about anything, Kivy holds that it is possible for garden-variety emotions to emerge in 
the absence of intentional objects.151 
The scope of musical expression might be questioned at this point. Since there are no 
intentional objects to define the scope of garden-variety emotions, one might wonder how specific 
garden-variety emotions can be. It seems that without particular intentional objects, garden-variety 
emotions can still be specific enough to capture different shades of an emotion. For example, it 
might be possible for music to be expressive of not only sadness, but also quiet sadness rather than 
violent sadness. Since emotional categories can be further divided, it might be possible for music 
to be expressive of different kinds of quiet sadness. 
Kivy resists this tendency to qualify emotions, as it can bring in extra-musical content for 
possible musical expression. To illustrate, Kivy considers whether music can be expressive of the 
“neurotically mournful.” “If music can be expressive of the neurotic, then, where it is also 
mournful, why not neurotically mournful?”152 The neurotically mournful is one step further than 
the mournful. For example, a piece of mournful music might exhibit sudden shifts or compression 
of short nervous phrases that sound neurotic. To address this question, Kivy makes a distinction 
between music being expressive of something and music being symptomatic of something. For 
example, the last movement of Mahler Symphony 6 is symptomatic rather than expressive of 
Mahler’s neurosis, given what is known about Mahler’s neurosis confirmed by extra-musical 
sources.153 On the level of emotional expression, there can only be mournfulness, as mournfulness 
is the only relevant expressive quality. For each emotion qualified by an adverb like “neurotically,” 
a story might be told to show that the specific qualification is a symptom. Kivy cautions against 
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infinitely particularizing garden-variety emotions, lest extra-musical content is introduced to the 
analysis of musical expression. The distinction between expression and symptom can reach beyond 
mere pathology to ideology. Kivy thinks that a musical piece like Edward Elgar’s Symphony No. 
1 would be symptomatic of “pride of an imperial race at the apex of its power” as evidenced by 
sociological findings.154 Even if the distinction between being expressive and being symptomatic 
can be difficult to make in practice, Kivy insists that it should be maintained in theory.155 
To account for musical expressivity, Kivy proposes that garden-variety emotions without 
intentional objects have standard bodily manifestations.156 The standard bodily manifestations of 
garden-variety emotions are “identifiable behavioral and linguistic routines and gestures.”157 For 
example, people in happiness talk fast and loudly, keep eyes forward, and have big smiles. These 
are standard bodily manifestations of happiness. I might have idiosyncratic manifestations when I 
am happy. I might freeze when I am happy. But in that case, my personal tendency is not standard 
for others. The standard manifestations are supposed to be universal across different people. 
Kivy suggests that standard bodily manifestations can take on sonic forms. Music can move 
slowly in a way that resembles the standard bodily manifestations of grief. My grief can be echoed 
by the slow movement of music in that the music shares the standard bodily manifestations with 
those of grief. In this case, music is expressive of grief for me as well as for all listeners, insofar 
as slow movement is taken to be a standard bodily manifestation of grief. Kivy holds that evolution 
has hardwired people to “read ambiguous patterns as animate whenever possible.”158 Just as we 
tend to see facial expressions in the clouds, we tend to hear patterns in music as if those patterns 
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are animate and contain standard bodily manifestations. For example, music can be expressive of 
pomposity by having “pomposity struts and postures.”159 By recognizing the standard bodily 
manifestations in music, we can understand what emotions music is expressive of. 
This idea of standard bodily manifestation is empirically dubious. Bodily manifestations 
of the same emotion can take different directions and forms. In How Emotions are Made, Lisa F. 
Barrett argues that emotions can be manifested in a plethora of ways depending on people’s 
predictions of what will happen in a given situation. Fear, for example, can manifest as keeping 
one’s head low, but it can also manifest as talking loudly, running fast, laughing uncontrollably, 
etc. No bodily manifestation is standard, because no prediction of a given situation is standard.160 
To look utterly solemn can be a proper manifestation of happiness, if looking solemn wins out 
among competing predictions about what goes well in a situation. For example, in a trade talk, 
when one’s business rival makes a huge concession, one would want to laugh, but this 
manifestation will not be well received. All things considered, it may be best to express that 
happiness in a solemn look to save face for one’s business opponent. 
The argument from quality recognition does not refute the illusion view. It is a mystery 
how expressive qualities get into music. Even if expressive qualities inhere in music, it is unclear 
how to standardize the recognition of them. It remains a question as to whether expressive means 
can “press out” expressive content. 
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The Argument from Dramatic Persona 
In Deeper than Reason, Robinson offers a theory of musical expression that incorporates 
the idea of arousal.161 To start with arousal, Robinson observes that physiological changes caused 
by music can arise without cognitive evaluation of the music. Music makes listeners feel in a 
contagious way. Listeners can apparently catch the emotion in the music without wanting to be 
impacted. If I walk through a neighborhood where polka is played in the air, I can apparently catch 
the emotion in the music before I realize that I feel something and what I am feeling is bouncy 
cheerfulness. Robinson names the effect of catching an emotion without cognitive evaluation the 
“Jazzercise effect.” 
 
There is lots of evidence that happy music does cheer people up and sad music 
saddens them, that restless music makes people restless and calm music calms them 
down without there being any prior ‘cognitive evaluation’ (or even any prior 
affective evaluation) of the music. I call this the ‘Jazzercise effect’. In the Jazzercise 
effect, a happy response to happy music is not based on an evaluation of the music 
or of anything else.162 
 
 
161 Different theoretical approaches are not mutually exclusive, even if each theory prioritizes an aspect of an allegedly 
emotional nature of music. This section examines a hybrid account. We will see how an account of emotional 
expression may be indispensable for an adequate account of arousal. We will also see how an account of arousal might 
inform an account of expression. 
162 Robinson, Deeper than Reason, 392. 
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The Jazzercise effect has physiological support. Research has shown that exciting music increases 
the heart rate and lowers resistance in skin conductivity, whereas relaxing music decreases the 
heart rate and raises resistance in skin conductivity.163 
While “the Jazzercise effect operates below the level of conscious awareness and outside 
our control,”164 it carries evaluative implications that invite conscious monitoring. Music “induces 
bodily changes which … in turn lead to a disposition to evaluate the world positively or 
negatively.”165 When listeners are aroused into physiological states where they evaluate the world, 
they experience the states as emotional. Such emotional experiences may be inexplicable at first, 
yet they are open to interpretation and categorization, which reinforces the musical experiences. 
 
Labelling the experience is part of cognitive monitoring, and cognitive monitoring 
itself alters the nature of the experience, feeding back upon bodily changes, action 
tendencies, and affective appraisals.166 
 
In the polka example, once I realize and label my feeling “bouncy cheerfulness,” I become 
conscious of my emotion as aroused by the music. My experience of the music is not passive 
without appraisal. I may walk faster to feel with the rhythm and think about everything in a more 
positive light. 
It is unclear if listeners always prefer to have appraisal-laden bodily changes settled into 
labels and interpretations. Listeners might prefer to remain in the states of arousal where 
physiological changes remain inexplicable. The level of tolerance for emotional ambiguity in 
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listeners may be higher than Robinson envisions. One may even listen to music for the sake of 
being baffled by something beyond one’s interpretive framework. The musical experience can be 
valuable because it offers a way to get out of our interpretive frameworks instead of reinforcing 
what we have already known to feel. Consequently, listeners can miss the musical experience, if 
their emotional responses are determined by interpretations. Labelling and interpreting bodily 
changes may ease the potential discomfort that arises in arousal. But the willingness to label and 
interpret bodily changes is not common to all listeners. 
Robinson can reply that the emotional engagement with music happens with phases. At 
first, music induces bodily changes like a drug, then these changes dispose listeners to appraise 
the world in some way. This state in which listeners begin to appraise the world with bodily 
changes invites labelling in emotional terms because listeners want to make sense of it. The 
labelling is part of the cognitive monitoring which conceptualizes the appraisal-laden arousal. This 
cognitive monitoring, by its conceptualization of the musical experience, alters the experience into 
something intelligible and feeds back into bodily changes caused by the music. Strictly speaking, 
it is at the last stage that emotional content in concrete forms arises. But all the steps before the 
last stage play some role in bringing out the emotions. If we merely focus on the last stage, we will 
not be able to say that it is music that arouses the emotions. But if expand our horizon, we can see 
that music is responsible for our emotions, because it causes listeners to appraise the world in a 
certain way. This complete circle is like a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: 
 
[W]hen we listen to music a state of arousal is induced and how we label that state 
of arousal affects how we feel to some degree … I also attribute emotions to myself 
even though my feeling state may not be the result of any affective appraisal. 
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Strictly speaking, I should not attribute any emotions to myself unless and until I 
start to make appropriate affective appraisals. But once I’ve interpreted my feelings 
as being of a particular emotional state, this tends to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: I start to view the world in the appropriate way and I begin to make the 
corresponding affective appraisals … We can describe this process as 
‘confabulation’ but what starts out as a fable may end up coming true.167 
 
By calling the process of forming emotional responses to music “confabulation,” Robinson is by 
no means discrediting emotional responses. To say emotional responses are fables is not to say 
they are false. Rather, Robinson attempts to show the complex dynamics involved in emotional 
responses to music. From music to emotion, it is not a one-stop trip. 
Confabulation suffers from what might be called “interpretive narcissism” whereby one 
hears only the emotions one reads into the music. In psychology, narcissism refers to a personality 
disorder in which one has excessive admiration for one’s self-worth or physical appearance. 
Narcissists are unable to view the world from the perspective of others. Real or imagined insults 
to a narcissistic ego can threaten personal self-esteem, thereby inflicting narcissistic injury and 
triggering narcissistic rage.168 Psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut uses “narcissism” in a mundane, non-
pathological sense. On Kohut’s usage, narcissism refers to not an extraordinary self-love or 
excessive feeling of self-worth, but rather a ubiquitous and ongoing need to cope with 
fragmentation anxiety deriving from deficit in self-love.169 For a child to develop a coherent rather 
 
167 Robinson, Deeper than Reason, 403. 
168 Narcissists are characterized by their resistance to being subject to the claims of others, especially claims of fidelity 
and enduring commitment; the manipulation of the impressions they make on other persons; a shallow emotional life, 
or a protective incapacity to feel deeply; and a resistance to acknowledging their finitude. See Christopher Lasch, The 
Culture of Narcissism: American life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: Norton, 1991), 31-50. 
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than scattered ego, people around the child (especially parents) must be empathic to understand 
the child’s “anger at being thwarted.”170 Non-empathic parents cause a failure in the child to 
change from narcissism to object-love. Consequently, children create “self-objects” experienced 
as part of the self to cope with fragmentation anxiety.171 
The interpretation of musically induced bodily changes can be likened to an infantile 
“anger at being thwarted.” The arousal does not present itself as straightforwardly digestible. To 
deal with interpretive ambiguities, listeners need a way to absorb uninterpreted bodily changes, 
turning the musical experience into a “self-object.” The listening, feeling, labelling, and 
interpreting can happen within a listener’s own mental world. But listeners are able to interpret the 
bodily changes only to the extent that they can experience the bodily changes as part of themselves. 
This self-fulfilling prophecy places a significant limit on listeners’ openness towards the music. 
To address this problem, there must be some way to acknowledge the sense of otherness 
in musical experiences. Some music is powerful because the bodily changes caused by them cannot 
be interpreted adequately. Such musical experiences cannot be fully absorbed as self-objects. To 
reply, Robinson draws on the model of maternal caregiving. “Maternal singing is an expression of 
love, and the infant’s emotional response is a reciprocal loving response.”172 Listeners might 
respond to music in the way infants respond to motherese singing. Robinson draws from Bunt and 
Pavlicevic’s research to illustrate the mother-infant mechanism: 
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[N]ewborn infants are neurologically predisposed to identifying, and responding to, 
contours and rhythms of movements, gestures, and vocalizations in their mothers’ 
gestures, vocal sounds, and facial expression. … In addition, they ‘tune in’ to subtle 
shifts in vocal timbre, and volume variations, and with their mothers negotiate and 
share a flexible musical pulse between them, constantly adapting their [sic] tempo, 
intensity, motion, shape, and contour of their sounds, movements and gestures in 
order to ‘fit’ and to communicate with one another. … Mother and infant develop 
and share a rich musical ‘code’ that has interactive significance.173 
 
On the maternal caregiving model, musical listening involves a process of negotiating and sharing. 
Listeners align their aesthetic activities with what the composers may be communicating through 
the sounds. This attentive alignment requires attention and adaptation throughout the music. 
Listeners are able to interpret the bodily changes based on their engagement with the music. The 
caregiving model provides insight into the communicative aspect of musical listening and 
interpretation. As long as “the listener’s experience is not what determines what’s expressed by 
the music,”174 the narcissistic challenge seems to fade away. 
The idea of expression becomes prominent in Robinson’s account, as Robinson applies the 
model of maternal caregiving to explain the otherness in emotional interpretation. According to 
Robinson, when we are moved by music, we are moved partly by what the music expresses. To 
interpret listeners’ bodily responses to music is largely to interpret what the music expresses. 
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Although Robinson’s account starts with the Jazzercise effects, it now depends on an expression 
theory to make sense of arousal. 
 
When we are moved by particular harmonic modulation or change in rhythm, or 
the reiterated fragment of an earlier melody, we are in fact being moved partly by 
what the music expresses.175 
 
Robinson suggests that musicians express emotions by clarifying them in the creative 
process. The creative process and the expressive process are one, because “an artwork that 
expresses an emotion is a reflection upon the emotion process as a whole.” 176  Emotional 
expression in art is an intentional articulation and elucidation of an emotional state.177 Expression 
is not “an all-or-nothing affair.”178 Emotions can be “more or less successfully ‘individuated’” 
according to the degree of vividness it is articulated. Since expression is a process through which 
musicians clarify the emotions, emotional expression would allow for uncertainty and possibly 
confusion. 
It is normal for the emotions clarified through expression to be different from feelings 
composers undergo themselves. “Expression involves not the spontaneous betrayal of the artist’s 
very own emotion but reflection upon an emotion that may or may not have been personally 
experienced by the artist.”179 Composers achieve the clarification of emotion through “cognitive 
monitoring,”180 which is “a reflective way that is rare in ordinary life.”181 Although what music 
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expresses cannot be directly identified with the composers’ emotions, it can be traced to a “persona” 
imagined in the music, whereby the otherness to mitigate the problem of interpretive narcissism 
can apparently be found. Listeners can have two kinds of feelings about this imagined persona. 
They may feel for the persona or feel with the persona. 
 
In listening to the Brahms Intermezzo Opus 117 No. 2, I may feel with the conflict 
between the two points of view I pointed out, identifying now with one and now 
with the other, but I may also feel heavy-hearted and compassionate as I 
contemplate the musical conflict in the persona: I may feel for him rather than with 
him.182 
 
For Robinson, feeling for the persona and feeling with the persona can come apart, “a piece of 
music may … express nostalgia although the emotion it evokes in me is melancholy; a piece may 
express fear while evoking in me only anxiety.”183 The following argument can be constructed 
from Robinson’s writing: 
 
(P1) Music expresses a persona’s emotional world. 
(P2) If music expresses a persona’s emotional world, music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
One might worry that P1 entails too limited a view of musical expression. Music may not 
be about any persona’s emotional world, but about the world in general. Yet this is not a serious 
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problem. Robinson holds that there are two interrelated ways of expression, which are “interactions 
or transactions between the person (persona) and his or her environment.”184 This highlights the 
impersonal and personal creative strategies with respect to the emotional world. Musicians can 
express an emotion either by “articulating the way the world appears to a person in that emotional 
state,” or by “articulating the thoughts, beliefs, points of view, desires, etc. of the person who 
seems to be expressing the emotion.”185 Musical works that are apparently about the world can be 
indirectly about a persona’s emotional world. 
Nevertheless, one might charge P2 of a circularity that reads emotion into the persona. One 
may interpret the music as having an emotion, project that emotion to a persona, and then be 
aroused by what this persona is believed to express. This interpretive process would be circular in 
that it contradicts Robinson’s concept of the Jazzercise effect whereby listeners catch an emotion 
in a contagious way prior to cognitive evaluation. The interpretive circularity cannot accommodate 
the sense of otherness that is necessary to get listeners out of interpretive narcissism. This is not to 
say that interpretation should be forbidden in the imagination of a persona. Robinson maintains 
that interpretation is indispensable because it “will foreground aspects of the piece that may receive 
less emphasis in a purely formal analysis.”186 But the objection makes interpretation open to 
circularity by questioning how a persona is imagined and how an emotion is attributed to the 
persona. To see whether Robinson can meet this challenge, I will examine Robinson’s musical 
examples. 
Robinson suggests that Shostakovich’s Tenth Symphony expresses a persona’s hope: “the 
incremental changes in the hopeful theme that finally produce the cheerful main theme of the final 
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movement convey a sense of effort and purposefulness as the persona strives to realize the hopeful 
future he envisages.”187 Robinson holds that in this case, the persona is not just anyone in the 
composer’s imagination, but a persona of the composer himself. Such an attribution is justified by 
Shostakovich’s “signature motif,” which consists of notes D-E flat-C-B, corresponding to ‘D. Sch.’ 
in German transliteration for ‘Dmitri Schostakowitsch’. 188 Yet one might contend that a signature 
motif can be merely one way for composers to identify their works. It would be too wild to believe 
that whenever I sign on something I write, I am leaving behind a persona of me. To corroborate 
the persona attribution, Robinson cites biographical anecdotes to argue that the composer 
acknowledges the Tenth Symphony to be “a musical portrait of Stalin” and that “it seems 
reasonable … to interpret the symphony as expressing Shostakovich’s reaction to the Stalin years 
and their aftermath.”189 Robinson suggests that without listening to the music thus interpreted, we 
will miss important aspects of “the work’s expressive structure.”190 Robinson maintains that it is 
not only reasonable but also necessary to listen with this interpretation to understand what the 
music expresses. 
Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of the Tenth Symphony to be a “musical portrait” does 
not guarantee that the music expresses the composer’s “reaction to the Stalin years.” A musical 
portrait can be objective in the sense that it concerns only the object of the portrait, which in this 
case is allegedly Stalin. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the music as a portrait of 
Stalin makes it more probable to interpret the music along the lines of Shostakovich’s reactions to 
Stalin. Consequently, it is more reasonable to claim that the Tenth Symphony expresses a persona 
of Shostakovich. Still, this does not mean that there is a single interpretation most appropriate to a 
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musical work. Robinson acknowledges the possibility of multiple interpretations. “There can be 
multiple incompatible interpretations of the same work, which are all in some way appropriate to 
it.”191 Nonetheless, Robinson’s interpretation of Shostakovich’s Tenth symphony is skewed by the 
extra-musical knowledge about the composer. It is one thing to find that the music contains the 
composer’s reactions to Stalin years. It is another to interpret the music as expressing a persona’s 
hope. To bring biographical details into the interpretation may not be flawed by itself, but it 
introduces many ways to project the interpreter’s emotional understanding into the interpretation. 
One has to have an emotional understanding of what it is like to live in Stalin years, or even what 
it is like to live with hope in Stalin years, in order to formulate the proper emotional interpretation 
of the persona’s hope. But the emotional understanding of that sort would make the imagination 
of a persona redundant. 
To save the argument, Robinson must show a persona’s emotional world can be interpreted 
without relying on unnecessary extra-musical knowledge. Robinson’s interpretation of Brahms’ 
Intermezzo in B flat minor, Opus 117 No. 2 might serve this purpose. “The major interpretative 
question … concerns the conclusion and the way in which the two themes and the modes of major 
and minor are ultimately reconciled.” 192  Proposing “just one possible interpretation that is 
consistent with the expressive potential of the music,”193 Robinson notes that “the B theme grows 
out of the A theme, and the A theme is in B flat minor while the B theme is in the relative major 
of that key.”194 The “A-B-A’ structure” is better construed not as “a conflict between two different 
characters in the music,” but “as a single character, responding in two different ways to the same 
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material.”195 Robinson interprets the intermezzo as a “psychological drama.”196 In this drama, the 
interactions between musical movements allow listeners to experience the emotional significance 
of the entire work. The experience of that character is “bittersweet because the music goes back 
and forth between the two themes and between the major and minor modalities.”197 In particular, 
while it sounds like the B theme will “predominate with both its rhythm and its major tonality,” 
the dark minor tonality in the A theme takes on the calm rhythm of the B theme at bar 81, which 
suggests that the minor tonality will predominate in the end.198 
I will argue that Robinson’s interpretation of Brahms’ Intermezzo does not get out of the 
problem of circularity. Let us take a closer look at the structure of Robinson’s interpretation. 
 
The emotional state of the protagonist unfolds as the music unfolds, and the music 
mirrors the psychological development of the protagonist ... music also mirrors the 
way the protagonist’s emotion processes develop and change over time. It expresses 
continuous yearning (the A theme) in conflict with calmer proclivities (in the B 
theme), but a calm that is itself undermined by a certain restlessness (since the B 
theme sounds calm but also has some restlessness in its inner voices), and that only 
partly succeeds in calming the striving and yearning (by bringing it into its own 
calmer rhythm) but that does not succeed turning the yearning into acceptance 
(since the tonic minor key wins out in the end).199 
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The interpretation, based on a persona’s drama, is made specific by technical observations about 
how the two themes change and interact in time. The entire musical piece can then be interpreted 
on the model of this drama. “What is expressed in the piu adagio section is … a reluctant 
acceptance that the character’s yearning will never be satisfied.”200 Nonetheless, the interpretation 
begs the question of what emotions are involved in the drama. If we approach the music with 
conceptions of what emotions are involved, it is reasonable to doubt whether the persona’s drama 
is a product of our imagination that is not in the nature of music. This problem becomes 
conspicuous as Robinson remarks on the emotional clarification in music. 
 
If we hear the Intermezzo as a psychological mini-drama, then we can detect 
qualities in the music that otherwise we might miss, such as the conflict between 
restless striving and calm acceptance in the coda, the ambiguity in the concluding 
arpeggio, and the intimate yet troubled relationship between the A and B themes 
throughout the piece and especially at the end.201 
 
Robinson’s musical analysis appears to derive from the interpretation of a persona’s psychological 
drama. But the problem is that Robinson’s description and analysis show exactly the opposite. 
There is a mismatch between the theoretical motivation and the interpretive practice. The argument 
originates from the thought that musical expression is a clarificatory process. On the listeners’ side, 
grasping the musical expression involves interpreting a persona’s drama. As we arrive at the mini-
drama, we are told that technical knowledge is necessary to recognize the relevant emotions in the 
drama. We have to understand the music technically in order to get the drama right. Without 
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technical knowledge, it is questionable whether one can encounter the dramatic persona at all. One 
might as well wonder why we would not start with technical analysis in the first place. Since the 
psychological drama follows from technical knowledge, the dramatic persona does not have 
explanatory priority in making sense of musical expression. Our bodily responses interpreted in 
terms of a persona’s drama cannot establish an emotional nature of music. 
Robinson might reply that the dramatic persona initiates and guides the musical analysis, 
even for those with the technical knowledge. Experts can analyze music along the lines of drama 
for inspirations to understand what the music expresses. The psychological dramas imagined of a 
persona may help listeners engage with the music psychologically. People who listen with 
psychological dramas in mind can appreciate the emotional potency in the music. It is easier to 
miss important expressive features without attending to music as a persona’s psychological drama. 
Expression does not come with mere expressive structures. “It is … the ‘metaphorical resonances’ 
of the music, in particular what it means psychologically,” that makes the music expressive.202 In 
order to catch the expressive magnitude, it is helpful to try listening to music as expressing a 
persona’s emotional world. 
This reply seems innocuous, for it characterizes listening to music with imagined persona 
as an interpretive inspiration. But once we break down the process, it becomes clear that the 
function of persona in the interpretive practice is not so much inspirational as justificatory. Experts 
with formal knowledge might interpret the music technically, only to construct a drama later on to 
illustrate the technical analysis. Psychological dramas can be constructed to fit with the formal 
analysis. This renders the drama itself less indispensable than it appears. It is even questionable if 
listeners without formal training are in a cognitive position to imagine the right kind of persona. 
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The lack of technical knowledge may well restrict the listeners’ imagination in fundamental ways. 
A layperson might try to imagine a persona to better appreciate the emotional nature of a piano 
sonata by Mozart, but ultimately fail to do so adequately. For example, a persona might be 
imagined to be carefree at the start of a piece, but soon found to be lacking in different ways that 
render the imagined emotional world of a persona dispersed, disorienting, or distracting. The 
technical knowledge in formal training may be necessary to imagine a compelling persona. 
The argument from dramatic persona does not refute the illusion view. It takes more than 
imagination and interpretation to postulate a dramatic persona. Technical analysis and knowledge 
seem indispensable for the persona to be convincing. The persona does not serve to match 
expressive means with emotional content. 
 
Reflection 
I have constructed three arguments from expression theories in contemporary Western 
musical aesthetics. The argument from judicious arrangement is too detached. Emotional 
expression from arrangement presupposes the expressive capability of the musical materials. The 
argument from quality recognition is too wishful. The presence of emotional qualities inherent in 
music presupposes an emotional nature of music. The argument from dramatic persona is too self-
fulfilling. The psychological drama is a rational reconstruction of technical analysis and 
interpretation of music. While I have defended the illusion view against these specific arguments, 
I will consider broader challenges from the perspective of expression in a later chapter.  
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Chapter Six. Representation 
In this chapter I will examine representation theories. Some historical background is 
helpful. The idea of representation in art goes back to Plato. The word for representation in Plato’s 
writings was “mimesis” which is alternatively translated as “imitation.” In Republic III 392d-399a, 
Plato distinguishes mimetic poets from narrative poets. The narrative poet “never hid himself”203 
and “doesn’t attempt to get us to think that the speaker is someone other than himself.”204 Mimetic 
poets “make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance.”205 In other words, mimesis is 
different from narrative in that mimesis has a first-person vividness. When I narrate something for 
you, I am a reporter describing something from a third-person perspective. When I imitate 
something for you, I am presenting it as if I am that thing. Thus a mimesis can act like a substitute. 
Specifically, music is believed to imitate emotions in a direct and vivid way.206 In Republic X, 
Plato further claims that mimetic poetry “imitates human beings acting voluntarily or under 
compulsion, who believe that, as a result of these actions, they are doing either well or badly and 
who experience either pleasure or pain in all this.”207 Mimesis is able to represent not only people, 
but also events that happen to people and the emotions people go through. In mimetic poetry, the 
performer hides himself to emulate various characters. If the mimesis goes well, the audience 
would not see the performer’s own persona, but the characters which the performer imitates.208 In 
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this way, one might think of musical representation as hiding what music is. Music consists of a 
series of physical sounds. But as imitation, music gives an emotional appearance for the audience 
to appreciate. If the imitation goes well, listeners will not mind the reality of music as a series of 
sounds, but pay attention to the emotional appearance. Plato thinks that a mimetic painting “could 
make [things] appear, but … couldn’t make the things themselves as they truly are.” 209 
Analogously, it might be thought that music can make emotions appear, but do not thereby 
constitute emotions. Mimetic poetry, which encompasses literature, music and dance, is a strongly 
emotional art form. Mimesis is moving as a “magnetic stone moves iron rings”210 such that the 
spectators are “possessed and held.”211 
Various accounts have been given to explain how music represents emotion. The Host has 
raised the problem of representational inconstancy. One piece of music can represent different 
emotions. I will examine how representation theories account for constancy. If constancy does not 
derive from music, representation will not help to establish an emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Expressive Resemblance 
In Critique of Pure Music, James O. Young offers a hybrid account of expression theory 
and representation theory. I will focus on the representational component, according to which 
music resembles human behaviors.212 The resemblance theory “will be confirmed to the extent that 
features of the human voice and human behaviors expressive of some emotion are found to 
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resemble features of music expressive of the same emotion.”213 According to Young, the typical 
human behaviors expressive of emotion are speech acts. Expressive speech and music resemble 
each other in several ways: pitch contours (rising or falling), tempo (fast or slow), volume (loud 
or soft), dynamics (varying or constant), pauses, timbre, and attack.214 
It is worth noting that among the different dimensions of resemblance, one may prioritize 
certain dimensions as more important. Kris Goffin observes that the crescendo, tension, and release 
in music exhibit dynamism that can be found in moods. 215  Both moods and music can be 
experienced as “surging, fading-away, fleeting, explosive, tentative, effortful, accelerating, 
decelerating, climaxing, bursting, and drawn out.”216 Young takes a more eclectic stance towards 
expressive resemblance without prioritizing any dimension as central. Slow tempi are expressive 
of sadness or tenderness, whereas quick tempi are expressive of anger or happiness. Similar 
features such as volume, timbre, pitch, variation in dynamic levels function similarly to be 
expressive of certain emotions.217 Young reasons that since these characteristics are expressive of 
emotions in speech, they would also be expressive of the same emotions in music. The following 
argument can be constructed from Young’s writing: 
 
(P1) Music resembles expressive behaviors. 
(P2) If music resembles expressive behaviors, music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
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P1 might be supported by Young’s discussion of an experiment by Manfred Clynes and 
Nigel Nettheim. In the experiment, the researchers measured emotions subjects associated with 
patterns of finger pressures. The emotions include anger, hate, grief, love, sexual attraction, joy, 
and reverence. These emotions can be behaviorally expressed in various ways. The researchers 
transcribed these emotions physiologically into the amount and rhythm of pressure applied to the 
subjects’ fingers. This physiological transcription was based on the resemblance between the 
contours of finger pressure and the contours of musical recordings. “Anger, for example, was 
characterized by a strong, abrupt spike in pressure followed by an equally abrupt release of 
pressure.”218 For each of the emotions, there was a behavioral transcription in the form of finger 
pressure. Then researchers presented participants with musical recordings that shared the same 
formal patterns with the finger pressure. These recordings were “simple melodies with abrupt leaps, 
gradually falling pitch, and so on.”219 The researchers found that participants were able to discern 
the correct emotions these recordings expressed.220 Apparently, participants relied on their sense 
of shared contours between music and finger pressure to distinguish emotions as expressed by the 
musical recordings. 
Nevertheless, P1 evidenced as such is symptomatic of reading emotion into the music. 
What the music recordings were taken to express was decided by the researchers. The participants 
were not required to identify emotions, but merely required to recognize emotions they had 
associated with patterns of finger pressure. The experiment establishes at most a reliable 
association between the emotions and the expressiveness of bodily motions. It has not been shown 
that this resemblance grounds the emotions in music. 
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There is a more solid way to support P1. If participants made decisions based on their sense 
of shared contour, the order of the two events in the experiment should not matter. Suppose the 
researchers reverse the order of events in the experiment. The participants would first be asked to 
decide which emotions were expressed by which musical recordings, and would then be asked to 
indicate which emotions were associated with which patterns of finger pressure. The same 
discoveries should have been made. That finding, if made, would have been remarkable. It would 
have shown that without the priming of associations between emotions and finger pressures, 
participants would still be able to discern emotions out of the musical recordings. Nonetheless, 
even that more remarkable finding would just show that the participants’ decisions on which music 
expresses which emotions are coherent with their associations between music and finger pressure. 
That coherence could be accidental in that subjects could rely on mere guesswork or some extra-
musical associations to make decisions on which music expresses which emotion. It would be still 
hasty to derive representational constancy from the coherence. 
One might contend that the researchers’ assignment of emotions to the musical recordings 
are not arbitrary. Rather, resemblance justifies the assignment of emotions. Here we get into the 
terrain of P2, where resemblance is meant to establish an emotional nature of music. To support 
P2, another experiment is needed to show that our recognition of resemblance is universal. One 
hypothesis is that people from different musical cultures should be able to tell the emotional 
expressiveness of music simply based on the psychophysical features of music. Young draws on 
Balkwill et al.’s study “Recognition of emotion in Japanese, Western, and Hindustani music by 
Japanese listeners.” In this study, classical Hindustani music excerpts were associated with 
different emotional states (rasa). It was found that participants from different musical cultures 
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could determine the emotional states expressed by the music. They did especially well on basic 
emotions such as joy, sadness, and anger. Let us look at this experiment in more detail. 
Balkwill et al.’s study contains two consecutive experiments. In “Experiment 1: Judgment 
of emotion within and across cultures,” researchers asked musicians to create the musical excerpts 
to be used in the experiments. “Each musician was asked to play music they would normally play 
in order to evoke each of the three intended emotions.”221 These are joy, sadness, and anger. The 
researchers obtained the music excerpts by means of “intended emotion.” The intention is 
“musicians’ stated intention to evoke a specific emotion in their performance.” 222  Yet the 
researchers also claim that “intended emotion is defined by the performer’s own indication of the 
emotion that was expressed.”223 This betrays a conflation between evoking and expressing an 
emotion. For the sake argument, let us assume that the difference does not matter for musicians to 
make the relevant recordings. The Japanese participants were asked to give ratings of joy, anger, 
and sadness for each music excerpt. The result shows that Japanese listeners could decode anger, 
joy, and sadness in Japanese, Western, and Hindustani music, even if they were unfamiliar with 
Hindustani music. 
Nevertheless, there is a methodological worry. Since joy, anger, and sadness are three 
ready-made categories, the participants did not arrive at the emotional categories themselves. They 
were told that one of the excerpts had to express one of the three emotions. Moreover, the contrast 
within the three categories would introduce an additional clue for the listeners to use when 
determining what emotion a musical excerpt expresses. Although participants rated “anger” 
highest for music intended to express anger, this may show at most that they believe the “angry” 
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music expresses something different from sadness or joy, without necessarily taking anger as the 
precise emotion. Given the range of choices within three categories, that would leave anger as the 
only choice to be rated highest. In effect, the listeners may have followed a method of elimination 
and picked the least implausible category. 
The same listeners participated in both Experiment I and Experiment II, though “no listener 
was presented the same music in the two experiments … avoiding carry-over effects.”224  In 
“Experiment 2: Sensitivity to acoustic cues within and across cultures,” participants gave ratings 
of complexity, loudness, and tempo for musical excerpts. The researchers hypothesize that “ratings 
of complexity, loudness, and tempo should be significantly different for music intended to be angry, 
joyful, or sad.”225They find that “across conditions, mean ratings of acoustic cues accounted for 
approximately three-quarters of the variance in mean emotion ratings.”226 Yet the researchers note 
a complication: 
 
Acoustic cues did not always signify emotional meaning in the same way across 
the three music sets, suggesting a complex mapping between acoustic cues and 
emotional meaning. For example, whereas anger in Western music was associated 
with increases in tempo, anger in Japanese and Hindustani music was associated 
with decreases in tempo. More generally, acoustic cues often provided ambiguous 
information when considered on their own. For example, increases in perceived 
complexity were associated with increases in perceived anger as well as increases 
in perceived sadness.227 
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This noted ambiguity of psychophysical properties of music puts into question Young’s 
aim to establish within-culture universality for the recognition of resemblance. The researchers 
particularly caution that musical interpretation should be “probabilistic” in that “each cue is 
associated with expression of different emotions to varying degrees.”228 Young’s interpretation of 
the experiment assumes the emotions expressed by the music excerpts. Although a resemblance 
between musical properties and emotions can be found, Young has not shown that the emotional 
detection is based on psychophysical properties of music. 
One might try to defend P2 with Young’s discussion of Manfred Clynes and Nigel 
Nettheim’s study “The Living Quality of Music: Neurobiologic Patterns of Communicating 
Feeling.” This study contains a series of experiments aimed to test the “essentic form” of music 
derived from tactile, visual, and auditory channels. Clynes and Nettheim used “the dynamic form 
of the finger pressure expression previously identified as corresponding to anger, hate, grief, love, 
sex, joy, reverence.”229 Having conducted two experiments used to confirm their earlier work on 
how tactile forms could communicate intended emotional qualities, the researchers proposed to 
examine in the third experiment the crucial hypothesis that “expressive forms in touch and in sound 
share a common dynamic form.”230 Let us take a closer look at that experiment. 
The researchers used computer technology to transform touch into sound, then used 
“frequency envelope scaling” -- initial frequency, polarity modulation, and depth scaling 
(modulation depth)231 -- to get stimuli into a clearer format. The technical decisions about the three 
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factors of frequency envelope scaling vary across emotions. For example, the choices on the 
starting frequency of anger are not crucial. Anger can be identified with whatever frequency to 
start with. Choices on polarity are highly sensitive. The sound for love, for example, must involve 
a decreasing frequency with increasing (downward) finger pressure. The choices on modulation 
depth are also sensitive in each case and have to be precise. For example, “for joy it was especially 
important to have an octave range, neither more nor less, for it to have a joyful character, even 
with the appropriate dynamic form.”232 Having transformed touch into expressive sounds, the 
researchers presented subjects with “ten expressions of each sound played through a single speaker” 
and instructed them to make “a forced choice of the seven emotions together with a confidence 
level for each choice.”233 
Nevertheless, the methodological worry lingers. If participants were instructed to score 
themselves, they would have known the emotional categories -- “ten expressions of each of the 
seven emotions” -- before the experiment began.234 It is open to doubt whether the experiment 
measured participants’ learning or recognition. While Young interprets the experiment as testing 
the participants’ ability to recognize emotionally expressive sounds, the researchers measured at 
best the participants’ learning ability to recall which sounds were associated with which emotional 
category. Furthermore, the forced choices can limit the magnitude by which participants could 
have experienced and characterized the emotional appearances of the sounds. In short, it is unclear 
that emotional detection has happened at all based on psychophysical properties of the music. 
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The argument from expressive resemblance does not refute the illusion view. Music may 
resemble expressive behaviors in certain aspects. But what properties of music are salient for 
resemblance is relative to listeners. There is no universality in the recognition of resemblance. 
Resemblance is not enough to establish an emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Linguistic Metaphor 
British musician Deryck Cooke, in The Language of Music, observes that a phrase of 1-3-
5-6-5 in the major scale is thought to represent a “simple, innocent, blessed joy” as attested by 
“countless plainsong themes and Christmas carols.”235 No one ever set the Crucifixus to “quick, 
loud, major strains,”236 for there is a “musical vocabulary” being used by musicians.237 Cooke 
suggests that a rising pitch is used to represent an outgoing emotion. 
 
We know that, purely technically speaking, the tonic is the point of repose, from 
which one sets out, and to which one returns; that the dominant is the note of 
intermediacy, towards which one sets out, and from which one returns; and we have 
established that the major third is the note which ‘looks on the bright side of things’, 
the note of pleasure, of joy.238 
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Let us grant that these basic musical terms have a fixed use in the practice of musical composition. 
When we combine all these elements together, we have a complex musical vocabulary whereby a 
melodic ascent 1-3-5 can represent an “outgoing, active, assertive emotion of joy.”239 This basic 
phrase allows for further variations like 1-2-3-5, 1-3-4-5, or 1-2-3-4-5. To show how this musical 
vocabulary is used to represent joy, Cooke draws from many examples, some of which have the 
basic patterns and some of which have the variant patterns.240 
Nonetheless, one might question if the connection between 1-3-5 in a musical work and 
joy derives from convention rather than the nature of that musical phrase. Cooke may object that 
it is not a mere coincidence that many composers find the 1-3-5 ascent adequate to represent joy. 
Yet once a convention takes root in musical practice and makes sense to our ears, it is no longer 
straightforward whether the association between emotions and musical vocabulary is based on the 
nature of music. It is not enough to show that music can have what Cooke calls “emotional 
connotations.”241 Representational constancy is stronger than conventional stability. 
Philosophers have explored whether there is a metaphorical usage of everyday emotional 
terms to describe music. To say that music is sad is not literally saying that music is sad in the way 
people are sad. Roger Scruton, in The Aesthetics of Music, claims that “someone could be an expert 
at noticing the property we describe as musical sadness, even though he vehemently denies that 
music can be sad.”242  The metaphorical usage of emotional terms implies that music is not 
emotional in the way literally denoted by those terms. Rather, the word “sad” in the description 
“music is sad” is metaphorical in that it picks out some property of music. 
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Emotional terms may be given metaphorical usages to fulfill this linguistic function. If 
emotional terms are metaphorical, the attribution of them to music will not be meant to capture all 
dimensions of music. This does not mean that the metaphorical usage is ambiguous or 
impoverished. Rather, it suffices that everyday emotional terms are used to suggest the presence 
of something aesthetically significant in the music. Let us call whatever is aesthetically significant 
in the music an “aesthetic property.” The metaphorical usage of emotional terms seems 
indispensable for the appreciation of certain aesthetic properties that carry emotional content. 
Should it become obvious that the term “sadness” falls short of picking out a certain aesthetic 
property and a better word is found, people would opt for that better term and do away with the 
metaphorical use of the word “sadness.” The fact that an emotional term like “sadness” is still in 
use to describe music shows that this term is uniquely useful. In other words, the metaphorical 
usage of everyday emotional terms is resilient enough to anchor certain aesthetic properties. We 
do not feel compelled to do away with these emotional terms in search for more accurate 
descriptions. One might wonder if the aesthetic properties metaphorically described by everyday 
emotional terms may establish an emotional nature of music. 
The structure of metaphor is crucial to understand how metaphor is supposed to work in 
music. In The Metaphysics of Beauty, Nick Zangwill claims that two concepts are involved in a 
metaphor: the concept of an aesthetic property and the concept of a non-aesthetic property. Both 
concepts are expressed by the same emotional term. For example, the same term “sadness” has 
two concepts in it, one used to describe an aesthetic property in music and the other used to 
describe an everyday emotion. Crucially, the metaphor is impossible to exhaust the meaning of the 
aesthetic property it describes. Since the meaning of an aesthetic property cannot be exhausted by 
anything in language, the aesthetic property cannot be known unless we approach it through the 
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relevant metaphor. We can know the aesthetic concept only through the metaphorical usage of an 
everyday emotional term. Malcolm Budd, in “Aesthetic Realism and Emotional Qualities of 
Music,” summarizes Zangwill’s view as follows: 
 
[T]he view maintains that it is necessary to distinguish two concepts, one of the 
aesthetic property, the other of the non-aesthetic property; it claims that the thought 
expressed by the aesthetic metaphor employs the first concept, the thought 
expressed by the non-metaphorical sentence employs the second; it asserts that the 
acquisition of the aesthetic concept is causally dependent on the possession of the 
non-aesthetic concept; and it maintains that the only way that the content of the 
thought can be expressed in language is by the use of language metaphorically.243 
 
The aesthetic property corresponds to the metaphorical usage, whereas the non-aesthetic property 
corresponds to the non-metaphorical usage. Budd calls attention to the “exceptional strength of the 
modal claim” in this view.244 It is not just that we cannot express concepts of aesthetic properties 
because we lack the practical means to do so. The claim is that “aesthetic concepts (or properties) 
are such that it is impossible that they should be expressed (or described) non-metaphorically.”245 
Nevertheless, Budd contends that the distinction between a non-metaphorical usage and a 
metaphorical usage eludes the necessity of metaphor. According to Budd, for a metaphor to pick 
out an aesthetic property, the non-metaphorical usage must inform the metaphorical usage. 
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An understanding of the metaphorical use must be guided by an understanding of 
the literal use of the sentence: the meaning of ‘sad’ used literally informs the correct 
interpretation of its aesthetic metaphorical use, for the point of using the term ‘sad’ 
is precisely to indicate or express a connection between the music and sadness.246 
 
Since the non-aesthetic non-metaphorical usage should inform and guide our understanding of the 
aesthetic metaphorical usage, we cannot leave out the non-aesthetic usage from the aesthetic 
experiences. According to Budd, the non-aesthetic non-metaphorical usage of emotional terms 
should be incorporated into aesthetic experiences. If there is nothing like everyday sadness in “sad” 
music, the metaphorical usage of “sadness” would not be adequate to pick out the relevant aesthetic 
property in the music. One might as well use an altogether different metaphor. 
With this observation in mind, Budd argues that without the guidance of non-aesthetic non-
metaphorical usage of emotional terms, it is impossible to have certain aesthetic experiences, 
which are the “canonical basis” for the aesthetic metaphorical usage of emotional terms.247 Budd 
proposes that the way to incorporate the non-aesthetic non-metaphorical usage of emotional terms 
into aesthetic experiences is to embed it in an “unasserted” thought in aesthetic experiences: 
 
The concept expressed by the non-aesthetic use of the emotion term is a constituent 
of the intentional content of the experience of perceiving an item as possessing the 
aesthetic emotional property -- a constituent that figures in an “unasserted” 
thought ... It is for this reason that only the non-aesthetic concept can serve as the 
 
246 Budd, “Aesthetic Realism,” 117. 
247 Budd, “Aesthetic Realism,” 111. 
115 
right metaphor to characterize the item and why metaphor, that particular metaphor, 
is indispensable.248 
 
An unasserted thought might be taken as a supposition. For example, I can suppose that 
extraterrestrial intelligence exists, that is, I can entertain the propositional content of 
“extraterrestrial intelligence exists” without believing it to be true of reality.249 Although Budd 
does not specify exactly what it is for a thought to be “unasserted,” the theoretical work Budd 
wants an “unasserted” thought to do seems clear: an unasserted thought ensures the absence of a 
mental representation of the world. 
 
The concept expressed by the non-aesthetic use of the term occurs in the content of 
a thought that is unasserted: the world is not represented as containing an item that 
falls under the concept—that is not how, in his or her experience, the world actually 
seems to the subject to be.250 
 
According to Budd, the thought must remain unasserted to avoid exhausting the metaphor. Insofar 
as the thought embedding the non-metaphorical concept is “unasserted,” the music would not be 
represented as fulfilling a definite concept. Take Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s The Seasons, Op. 37a: 
VI. June – Barcarolle. The aesthetic experience of this music involves intentional content that is 
hard to put into words. Suppose that there is an aesthetic property in the music and one may sense 
its presence in an emotional way. One experiences this aesthetic property emotionally without 
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being able to conceptualize fully what the experience is like. It would be helpful to describe the 
music as “sad.” This term informs the aesthetic experience of this music by pointing towards some 
aesthetic property. Nevertheless, the non-aesthetic non-metaphorical usage of “sadness” does not 
exhaust the experience of the relevant aesthetic property. This seems to be Budd’s proposal. 
Budd’s proposal does not hold a metaphor to be “through and through representational.”251 
The non-aesthetic non-metaphorical usage must not reduce the aesthetic property into something 
mundane represented by everyday emotional terms. Otherwise, the aesthetic experience would 
collapse into a conceptual experience of “sadness” in its everyday meaning. Whatever aesthetic 
property the music has, it cannot be reduced to everyday sadness, but the term “sadness” is a 
helpful metaphor for listeners to recognize the aesthetic property, whatever that is. The following 
argument can be constructed from Budd’s writing: 
 
(P1) Aesthetic properties in music can be described by emotional metaphors. 
(P2) If aesthetic properties in music can be described by emotional metaphors, 
music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
One way to challenge P1 is to observe that it seems to postulate a deep layer in music 
beneath the surface. The deep layer contains aesthetic properties that are not directly accessible. 
We can only approach them through linguistic approximations of emotional metaphors. The deep 
layer is not universally accessible, but only open to listeners who know the relevant metaphors and 
have the aesthetic sensibility to uncover the aesthetic properties through the metaphors. It has been 
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pointed out that a deep layer of aesthetic properties in music is “metaphysically bizarre.”252 
According to Kivy, this idea has no empirical purchase on musical experiences. “If there is such 
an entity, we are in no position to tell, in the ordinary way, whether or not music accurately 
represents it, or represents it at all, since it is not, as Kant would say, an object of possible 
experience for us.”253 The aesthetic properties are not transparent to listeners. “Representation 
unperceived gives no satisfaction at all.”254 For Kivy, the philosophical challenge is to explain the 
musical phenomenon that “the listener has been getting deep satisfaction, no less than the 
connoisseur’s pleasure in van Gogh, prior to having the representationality of the music 
‘revealed’.”255 Kivy argues that the only way out is for the representational theorist to “appeal to 
an ‘unconscious’ appreciation of musical representation.” But Kivy cautions that “we have no 
idea … why it is or even if it is pleasurable to unconsciously perceive representations.”256 
Budd might reply that P1 makes the deep layer less mysterious. The structure of metaphor 
in music contains an unasserted thought. This unasserted thought might seem “unconscious” from 
Kivy’s perspective, but it needs not be. The non-metaphorical usage of emotional terms can guide 
us to find the relevant aesthetic properties. There is nothing mysterious about the non-metaphorical 
usages. The fact that emotional terms have two usages, one metaphorical and the other non-
metaphorical, makes the mystery of deep layer evaporate. The emotional descriptions serve as 
helpful pointers to inform our aesthetic experiences. This guidance demystifies emotional 
attributions to music. Our guided experience of the aesthetic properties can certainly be pleasurable. 
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The success of the argument then hinges upon P2. According to P2, emotional metaphors 
are sufficient to establish an emotional nature of music. But this depends on how well the 
emotional terms can capture aesthetic properties in music. If an everyday emotional term such as 
“sadness” misses a significant part of the relevant aesthetic property in music, it is questionable 
whether the emotional meaning in the non-metaphorical usage carries over into the relevant 
aesthetic property. The emotional terms attributed to the tip of an iceberg may not apply to the 
iceberg itself. The guidance that emotional terms, as metaphors, may offer for our experiences of 
some aesthetic properties in music would be irrelevant for determining the nature of those aesthetic 
properties in music. For example, when Bob Dylan metaphorically claims chaos as his friend, he 
directs our attention to certain unpredictable features of his friendship, but that does not yet 
establish a chaotic nature of his friendship, which may contain order as well. If these metaphors 
are ultimately a “window” through which we can glimpse into music, it would be too hasty to 
claim that the landscape we see shares the properties of the window. 
The argument from linguistic metaphor does not refute the illusion view. Emotional 
metaphors are insufficient to deliver representational constancy. Even if emotional terms may 
metaphorically describe aesthetic properties in music, the meaning of emotional metaphors does 
not establish an emotional nature of music. 
 
The Argument from Temporal Semblance 
In Feeling and Form, Susanne Langer argues that music symbolizes emotion. Langer’s 
account starts with an observation that most appearances in the world have practical functions. A 
bottle of hot chocolate may have a decorative shape, but the primary function of that shape is to 
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hold the hot chocolate. The appearances in art are different. To illustrate, Langer borrows the 
concept of semblance from psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung. Semblance refers to the appearance of 
things that affords a consideration of the appearance as appearance. Suppose I see a painting and 
it appears that someone is crying in the painting. If I consider the painting as an object to which I 
relate practically, I may think that there is no crying person in the painting, because what I see as 
a crying person is made of pigments. I may further think about practical matters such as where the 
pigments come from, how much the painting can cost at an auction, whether it will be a good 
decoration for a lounge. In thinking practically about the painting, I have not treated the appearance 
of the painting as meaningful in itself. The way I engage with the painting is not different from the 
way I engage with everyday objects. According to Langer, if I were to engage with the painting as 
art, I need to focus on the appearance of the painting as such without thinking about its place in 
the practical world and how it relates to other objects. I may know that the crying person is made 
up by materials in the world. But I would have to immerse myself in the appearance if I were to 
appreciate the painting as art. In this sense, semblance gives art “some aura of illusion.”257 Even if 
there is something beneath the appearance, an aesthetic interest in the appearances makes those 
aspects fade from our consciousness. Langer also characterizes the illusory quality of semblance 
as “strangeness,” “transparency,” “otherness,” “autonomy,” or “self-sufficiency.”258 Semblance 
refers to the self-sufficient illusory appearance. 
Semblance is significant for art. The status of semblance makes the appearance “more 
freely and wholly apparent than they could be if they were exemplified in a context of real 
circumstance and anxious interest.”259 In the practical world, objects are held and conceived within 
 
257 Langer, Feeling and Form, 46. 
258 Langer, Feeling and Form, 46. 
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a causal nexus. The appearance of an object in the practical world can hardly be separated from 
the practical function of the object. Semblance abstracts away from the practical world and offers 
a “detachment from actuality.”260 “The semblance of a thing, thus thrown into relief, is its direct 
aesthetic quality.”261 The semblance “liberates perception” out of practical meanings.262 While 
people tend to engage with art in a make-believe mentality, Langer characterizes art as offering 
“disengagement from belief.”263 
This disengagement from practical belief is not an end in itself. The semblance, through an 
abstraction from the actual world, can take on the status of a symbol for subjective experiences.264 
An artistic symbol “conveys the idea of vital reality and the emotive import belongs to the form 
itself.”265 For Langer, the task of artists is partly “to produce and sustain the essential illusion, set 
it off clearly from the surrounding world of actuality” 266 and to make it “perceptible in formal 
creation.”267 
Langer holds that abstract forms in semblance are similar to the forms of emotions. This 
similarity gives emotional import to artistic symbols. Langer illustrates this point with various art 
forms. I will focus on how Langer applies the idea of emotional import to music: 
 
The tonal structures we call “music” bear a close logical similarity to the forms of 
human feeling—forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict 
and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and 
 
260 Langer, Feeling and Form, 46. 
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dreamy lapses—not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both—
the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the 
pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form 
worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. Music is a tonal analogue of 
emotive life.268 
 
Langer suggests that music “conforms” with human feelings. By “logical similarity” 
Langer does not mean that music and emotion follow the same principles of reasoning. Abstract 
forms in music can be symbolic of emotions, because the abstract forms of emotions are “the same” 
as abstract forms in music. The symbolic relation between music and emotion is more intimate 
than the sense of symbol used in everyday life. It is commonly thought that a dove is symbolic of 
peace. But such symbols are more conventional than natural. There is not much similarity between 
the abstract form of a dove and the abstract form of peace. Langer holds that music and emotion 
have a more intimate symbolic relationship. Music symbolizes emotion because the two share 
abstract forms. This makes artistic symbols “charged with reality.”269If there is an emotional nature 
of music, it might be seen as a symbol of emotion within the musical appearance. Let us take a 
closer look at the abstract forms of music. 
The abstract forms of music unfold in time. The next note cannot begin if the previous note 
does not end. Abstract forms in music are presented as a succession of changes. This sets music 
apart from many art forms. The abstract forms of paintings and sculptures are predominantly 
spatial. The abstract forms of Claude Monet’s water lilies can be spatially located within the visual 
illusion of the paintings. But the abstract forms of Antonio Vivaldi’s Four Seasons are not spatially 
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locatable. They must be perceived and presented in time. Even if the way musical notes move may 
suggest a virtual space, that follows upon the abstract forms unfolding in time. Hence the space in 
music is what Langer calls a “secondary illusion.”270  
The temporal unfolding of music is not a duration devoid of structure. For Langer, the 
musical structure is characterized by permanence and change. Permanence and change are 
fundamental to life. For a biological organism, to live is to strive for retaining some level of 
permanence of its form amid changes. Complete destruction of the formal permanence would 
mean the end of life. Permanence is realized precisely through progressive changes. The abstract 
forms “disintegrate” once the music “stands still.”271 In analogy, Langer observes that “living 
organisms maintain themselves, resist change, strive to restore their structure when it has been 
forcibly interfered with.”272 Constant changes are the way to ensure the continuity of the “life” in 
music. Music directly presents the movement whose forms contain a sense of permanence and 
change. The temporal dynamics between permanence and change bring “life” to music. 
 
Permanence of form, then, is the constant aim of living matter; not the final goal 
(for it is what finally fails), but the thing that is perpetually being achieved, and that 
is always, at every moment, an achievement, because it depends entirely on the 
activity of “living.” But “living” itself is a process, a continuous change; if it stands 
still the form disintegrates - for the permanence is a pattern of changes.273 
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If this account could put life into music, we would not be far from finding emotions in music. 
Emotion is part of the living process for human beings. According to Langer, the sense of 
permanence and change is the most fundamental aspect of emotion. If music delivers the sense of 
permanence and change, music seems to have everything needed to present emotions, even more 
acutely than real-life scenarios. The following argument can be constructed from Langer’s writing: 
 
(P1) Music symbolizes emotion. 
(P2) If music symbolizes emotion, music is emotional. 
(C) Music is emotional. 
 
Since an artistic symbol of emotion carries emotional import, P2 follows from Langer’s 
definition of symbol. The weight with this argument lies in P1. Here is one way to challenge P1. 
Although the abstract forms of music contain a sense of permanence and change, this sense of 
permanence and change is not enough to deliver emotional import. The dynamics of permanence 
and change does not seem sufficient to pinpoint an emotion. Happiness and sadness can both be 
experienced as either ephemeral or everlasting. Although the sense of permanence and change 
might be fundamental to emotions, the dynamics needs to be expanded to generate emotions in 
abstract forms. It is impossible to distinguish emotions based on such a restricted pair of concepts 
as permanence and change. 
One might defend P1 by drawing more dimensions into the sense of permanence and 
change specific to music. According to Langer, music is suitable to symbolize the 
multidimensional passage of time. Change in music is not a mechanical succession of events as 
measured by the clock. The passage of time has what Langer calls “volume.” “Subjectively, a unit 
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of time may be great or small as well as long or short; the slang phrase ‘a big time’ is 
psychologically more accurate than a ‘busy,’ ‘pleasant,’ or ‘exciting’ time.”274 The dimension of 
volume can be added to the temporality of music to expand the symbolic base. According to Langer, 
the volume of music is filled with “tensions” that are “physical, emotional, or intellectual.”275 The 
musical experience of these tensions unfolding in time can “fall apart into incommensurate 
elements.”276 
 
When one is taken as parameter, others become “irrational,” out of logical focus, 
ineffable. Some tensions, therefore, always sink into the background; some drive 
and some drag, but for perception they give quality rather than form to the passage 
of time.277 
 
These incommensurate elements enter into relations with each other. The intricate interactions may 
serve as the expanded base to generate emotions. 
One might wonder if this makes the representation theory collapse into an arousal theory 
that revolves around physiological tensions. We have seen how mere bodily changes are not 
enough to generate emotions. But let us stick with the representational aspiration in Langer’s 
account. The odd thing with this reply is that the new symbolic power from “volume” is gained at 
the expense of abstract form. Although time can be experienced differently, it is almost a category 
mistake to think of abstract forms as having volumes. The volume erodes the abstract forms. With 
the enriched experience of multidimensional time, it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive 
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musical time as anything other than a “formless flow” imbued with tensions “whereby we let 
ourselves be cradled.”278 The experience might be pleasurable, exciting, and full of life. But this 
move towards enrichment puts abstract forms at stake. It is problematic as Langer claims in the 
above passage that voluminous tensions provide “quality rather than form to the passage of time.” 
The abstract forms are what give musical symbols its emotional import. If music derives its 
emotional import from elsewhere, music would no longer be a symbol of emotion in a 
representation theory. In other words, once we extend the sense of permanence and change to 
something as resourceful as a concept of time passing with voluminous tensions, we are no longer 
in a position to characterize the emotional import of music as coming from a symbol. Rather, we 
would concede that abstract forms are not enough to deliver emotional import. 
The problem with P1, in short, is that music cannot symbolize emotion. This can be put 
into a dilemma. If mere permanence and change are attributed to the temporality of music, we do 
not get a solid enough symbol for emotion. If something beyond permanence and change is 
attributed to the temporality of music, we may get emotion by drawing on “life” borrowed from 
experience, but not by drawing on abstract forms of music. 
The argument from temporal semblance does not refute the illusion view. The temporal 
features of music are not enough to symbolize emotions. We may read emotion into music by 
experiencing the temporal features emotionally. But that would be an act of emotional projection. 
Music might serve as a symbol for temporal movement or even temporally sensitive life. But that 
does not give music an emotional nature. 
 
 
278 Langer, Feeling and Form, 116. 
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Reflection 
I have constructed three arguments from representation theories in contemporary Western 
musical aesthetics. The argument from expressive resemblance is too weak. The similarities salient 
for resemblance are decided by researchers rather than discovered by participants. The argument 
from linguistic metaphor is too hasty. Metaphorical usages of emotional terms may not capture 
aesthetic properties in music. The argument from temporal semblance is too deficient. The features 
of permanence and change are insufficient to import emotions into music. While I have defended 
the illusion view against these specific arguments, I will consider broader challenges from the 
perspective of representation in a later chapter.  
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Chapter Seven. Illusion 
In this chapter I will consider potential objections to the illusion view more broadly. I will 
revisit certain points in the discussion and explore them further to see if the illusion view can 
withstand potential challenges from the perspectives of evocation, expression, and representation. 
Objections can be motivated by the enjoyment from listening to music emotionally, the 
communication that happens through music, and the language that is used to describe music in 
commercial or educational contexts. 
 
The Objection from Emotional Pleasure 
I will consider a series of challenges from the perspective of evocation. In particular, these 
challenges revolve around the emotional enjoyment in music. To start, one might worry if it could 
be difficult to enjoy music without treating emotional appearances of music as real. It seems that 
the illusion view makes enjoying music harder. 
The distinction between emotions and sensations can be used to address this worry. The 
restful or restless sensations without emotional input can be rooted in music. But emotional 
appearances are illusory. Whenever emotional appearances are treated as real, there is a conflation 
between sensations and emotions. This conflation is understandable, because the emotional 
appearances can be compelling. Commercial music is often made to encourage a kind of enjoyment 
with emotional projection. To emotionalize music this way is to use music as an emotional drug. 
The illusion view resists the tendency to emotionalize music for the sake of enjoyment. As a result, 
the illusion view paves the way for a more authentic encounter with music. 
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The awareness of illusion makes a difference in musical enjoyment. One can distinguish 
the post-awareness enjoyment from the pre-awareness enjoyment. In analogy, to enter the post-
awareness enjoyment is like taking off glasses to see ocean waves. The vision is clearer with the 
glasses on, as the waves are segmented into different parts by the sunlight. Even if the movement 
of the waves makes it impractical to track the ever-changing parts, there is an impression that the 
waves are orderly arranged. But taking off glasses would allow the eyes to perceive the waves 
without much reflection of the sunlight. A visceral encounter with the “life” of the waves in their 
rise and fall as a whole is only possible when we let go of external factors (light and glasses) that 
may control the impression and make it intelligible to us. But the illuminated segments are not in 
the waves, but in our visual perception. Listening to music through the lens of emotions is like 
putting on glasses to see ocean waves under the sunlight. The more manageable the visual 
impression is, the less we experience the inner force of the waves. 
The illusion view does not offer specific guidance for getting rid of the illusion. Presumably 
one has to get immersed in the emotional illusion for a long time before an escape is possible. It is 
hard to pretend that the emotional appearance is absent.279 Still, the illusion view might seem too 
demanding, if it takes emotionalizing music for enjoyment to be wrong. But the illusion view 
simply stands against enjoyment without awareness of the emotional illusion. In analogy, the 
awareness that dream is illusory does not make it less enjoyable to dream. The awareness of the 
illusion can liberate perception from tendencies of emotionalizing music rigidly. To illustrate, 
consider the Disney experience. Disneyland is an artificial space where fantastical characters do 
magical things in dreamlike buildings. The magic that happens in Disneyland is illusory compared 
 
279 In the Müller-Lyer illusion, it appears that the lines with arrows pointing to different directions at the end are of 
different length. This appearance lingers even after the realization that the lines are equal in length. Likewise, the 
emotional appearances of music may not go away even after one endorses the illusion view. 
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to everyday life. To enjoy the illusion, one must not mistake the illusion for reality. According to 
an online community board, when the performer of Piglet offered a lady a kiss on the hand at the 
Crystal Palace, the lady’s boyfriend became jealous and punched Piglet. The kiss offer was part of 
Piglet’s program. Piglet might have offered a kiss with the intention of presenting an appearance 
of affection. The boyfriend fails to play along because he takes Piglet’s emotional appearance too 
seriously. The boyfriend mistakenly treats the Disney context as equal to an everyday situation 
without the awareness that the emotional appearances of events inside the Disneyland are illusory. 
His perception, as a result, becomes distorted. The awareness of the illusion is a precondition for 
enjoyment such that the awareness protects the fun from degenerating into another everyday event 
where unexpected initiations from fantastical characters may reasonably cause anxiety. 
Something similar happens in musical enjoyment. Our perception of music can be loaded 
with emotions we project into music in a way that diminishes musical experiences. Musical works 
with compositional complexity can appear unnecessarily baffling, if musical appearances are taken 
to instantiate the order expected from emotional events. Each shift in emotional tone will likely 
clog the musical experience. This is not to say that emotional appearances of music lack coherence. 
But hearing musical appearances as emotional propels listeners to seek a projected coherence, 
which often turns out to be a wild-goose chase.280 Listeners with this mentality would probably be 
anxious about losing track of the emotional trajectory. If a piece of music is apparently tragic, by 
taking the tragic appearance as real I might get distracted with following it through and observing 
its possible reappearance. The musical experience would become exhausting. A piece of music 
might sound tragic for a while and shift to a different emotional appearance. If I am stuck with the 
tragic emotion, I would struggle with searching emotional labels for the shifts and enjoying them. 
 
280 Jesse Prinz, personal communication, July 9, 2020. 
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I might be chasing an emotionalized theme with a motivation to keep my experience connected by 
devising a mini-drama. 
Now we arrive at the deeper significance of the illusion view. There is a sense of liberation 
that comes from claiming complete ownership of the emotion in musical experiences. By insisting 
on the reality of emotional nature in music, listeners miss the chance to claim that full ownership 
of their emotions in musical experiences. By realizing emotional appearances as illusory, listeners 
can claim full ownership of their emotions in musical experiences. It allows listeners to 
acknowledge emotions as their own. Prior to this acknowledgment, apparently it is music that 
makes listeners feel certain emotions. Given the full ownership, I would enjoy more freedom in 
terms of choosing the music that will facilitate my projection the best. I stop being a passive listener 
waiting to be stimulated in various ways. I would realize that I have emotional dispositions to be 
awakened by music. In other words, the music makes me more me, instead of making me long for 
something out there. With the aid of the music, I realize more clearly than before who I am and 
what emotional states I appreciate. Thus music becomes a way of self-discovery. It truly reveals 
something about us. It is only through realizing the illusion that this self-discovery is possible. So, 
one can claim that the illusion makes the experience fuller in that music makes the listeners more 
aware of their own emotions. 
To illustrate, Beethoven’s Quartet in A minor for Strings, Op. 132 may be open for full 
emotional exploration. Listeners can expect to find some echo of their emotions in it. Melvin 
Berger eulogizes this piece: 
 
Beethoven leaves the realm of personal self-expression and enters the domain of 
the universal -- plumbing the full depths of the human soul and psyche ... It is music 
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that transcends music, that even transcends human feelings and thoughts, to achieve 
a spiritual level above all worldly concerns.281 
 
Great musical works hold up a structure for our emotions to find a place in it. But they do not 
contain the emotions in it, nor does it command a certain emotional response from us. Different 
listeners are allowed to project different emotions into this piece and enjoy it in individual ways. 
 
The Objection from Emotional Communication 
I will consider a series of challenges from the perspective of expression. In particular, these 
challenges revolve around the emotional communication through music. To start, it is undeniable 
that people form emotional connections through music. Performing a piece of music together gets 
musicians emotionally connected. Listeners also experience a sense of togetherness in a concert. 
But emotional connections through music do not refute the illusion view, as the fact that people 
form emotional connections by watching sports or the sunset does not mean that sports or the 
sunset are emotional. What may be problematic is the emotional communication that can happen 
through music. Composers can make music with the goal of communicating emotions in mind and 
listeners are able to grasp those emotions. 
A proponent of the illusion view may conceive emotional communication as a trade of 
emotional meanings attributed to music. Emotional meanings can be exchanged like currency to 
facilitate communication. Still, the trade does not make emotional meanings part of the nature of 
music, just like the properties of goods in trade are not part of the nature of currency. To illustrate, 
 
281 Melvin Berger, Guide to Chamber Music (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2001), 169. 
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the exchange of emotional meanings through emotional communication can be modeled on 
accounts of meaning in philosophy of language. Paul Grice proposed a theory of meaning, 
according to which a speaker means p by uttering something when three conditions are met: 
 
(i1) that the audience should believe that p. 
(i2) that the audience should recognize the speaker’s intention (i1). 
(i3) that it be by means of the recognition of (i1) that the audience comes to believe 
that p.282 
 
It is possible to construct a similar set of conditions for the communication of emotional meanings 
between composers and listeners. A musician means an emotional meaning p by making musical 
phrases when three conditions are met: 
 
(i1) that the audience should believe that the music is emotional in p way. 
(i2) that the audience should recognize the musician’s intention to bring about (i1). 
(i3) that it be by means of the recognition of (i1) that the audience comes to believe 
that the music is emotional in p way. 
 
(i1) requires that the musician succeeds in generating a belief about the emotional content 
of music. This is necessary for communication to work. For example, imagine a composer makes 
a piece of instrumental music with the purpose of communicating a jubilant emotion for a festival. 
If the audience does not believe so, the composition would fail to achieve its communicative 
 
282 H. P. Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intention,” The Philosophical Review 78, No. 2 (April 1969): 151. 
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purpose for the festival. Notice that (i1) does not require the audience to respond to music in exactly 
the way as p. To believe that the music is emotional in p way is to think of p as the emotional 
content of music. The audience may believe that music has an emotional content of p without 
responding to the music in the same way. It is possible to believe that a piece of music is happy 
and respond to it with serenity, or to believe that a piece of music is sad and respond to it with 
admiration. The emotional response does not necessarily align with the emotional content. Still, 
emotional responses may be helpful in terms of alerting to us that something emotionally 
communicative could happen. The attentiveness fostered by emotional responses can lead us to 
form beliefs about emotional content by paying attention to emotional meanings in the music. 
For communication to happen, it is important for (i2) to hold. If the audience cannot 
recognize the musician’s intention to bring about (i1), the mere belief that a piece of music is 
emotional in p way may originate from the audience’s own interpretation. Only when the 
musician’s intention to convey an emotional meaning gets recognized can the audience’s belief 
count as a result of emotional communication. 
It is worth clarifying how (i3) is needed for communication to happen. Sometimes it 
suffices that the audience believes that a piece of music is emotional in p way and recognizes the 
musician’s intention to bring about this belief, yet the belief may come from sources other than 
the recognition of this intention. The musical experience itself may serve as sufficient evidence 
that the music is emotional in p way. The composer’ intention might serve as a confirmation of the 
audience’s belief. Consider Beethoven’s String Quartet No. 7 in F major, Op. 59, No. 1, 
“Razumovsky.” A sense of happiness brightens as the music proceeds. Yet the mood recognizably 
shifts to pensiveness or sadness in the third movement, Adagio molto e mesto (mesto -- “sadly”). 
One can believe then that grief takes over the melody. This presence of grief is huge such that in 
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the end it sounds like whimpering. American musicologist and critic Joseph Kerman describes the 
third movement as “profoundly tragic in intensity, an essay in misery scarcely relieved by any 
response of sobriety or solace.”283 The belief is not reached by means of recognizing Beethoven’s 
intention, although the recognition of Beethoven’s intention is necessary for the belief to count as 
an element of emotional communication, if any, between Beethoven and the audience. In this case, 
Beethoven’s cryptic inscription was found above the manuscript: “A Weeping Willow or Acacia 
Tree over my Brother’s Grave.” It looks like the composer has the intention to express grief in this 
part. This intention confirms the earlier belief to make communication possible. Even if the 
audience might have projected grief into the music merely based on the music alone, emotional 
communication is fulfilled once Beethoven’s intention is recognized. 
Nevertheless, in certain difficult cases, there is no other way to believe that a piece of music 
is emotional in p way without relying on the recognition of the musician’s intention. This is more 
obvious in minimalist works where the musical materials by themselves do not provide enough 
credence for a belief. For example, Anton Webern was a radical minimalist in musical composition. 
Some of his works -- such as the Bagatelles and the Four Pieces for Violin and Piano -- last only 
seconds, but critics find these brief moments packed with meanings and ideas well compressed 
and self-contained. As Schoenberg put it, “each glance can be extended into a poem, each sigh into 
a novel.” French composer Pierre Boulez comments on the Six Pieces, 
 
Webern had never been so seductive before and perhaps never would again ... The 
individual lines are excessively supple; their curve, their unexpectedness, their 
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grace, and their complete lack of heaviness are captivating ... The use of 
instrumental color is of so direct a beauty that the listener has no difficulty enjoying 
it, although at first it may be so strange to him as to seem a rarefaction of the musical 
atmosphere.284 
 
The brevity of Webern’s Six Pieces for Orchestra is thought to be poetical. The music is not 
entirely moderate. At certain points it sounds like jarring or shrieking. Generally, it is easy to get 
a sense of pensiveness. But it is almost impossible for listeners to believe that the music contains 
tenderness or anguish until they recognize that Webern intentionally associated these pieces with 
the death of his mother in 1906. “No motif is developed; at most, a brief progression is immediately 
repeated. Once stated, the theme expresses all it has to say; it must be followed by something 
fresh.”285 The lack of development in this music may become more intelligible with the recognition 
of that death-related intention, for Webern may conceive of life and death as a succession of 
underdeveloped themes. 
The Gricean model has received criticisms from philosophers of language. I am not 
suggesting that it is the best model of meaning, but only pointing out that it can be used to account 
for emotional communication through music. Stephen Davies, in Themes in the Philosophy of 
Music, draws on Grice’s distinction between natural meaning (meaningN) and non-natural meaning 
(meaningNN), and argues that the emotional meaning of music is natural meaning. Davies’ 
argument not only challenges the applicability of the Gricean model to emotional communication 
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through music, but also threatens the illusion view. Let us examine Davies’ argument in more 
detail. 
Grice distinguishes natural meaning from non-natural meaning. Grice’s example for 
natural meaning is the sentence “Those spots mean measles.” Grice’s example for non-natural 
meaning is the sentence “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that ‘the bus is full’.”286 
Specifically, there are five criteria that sets the two kinds of meanings apart. Davies goes through 
the five conditions and argues that a sentence like “this music means sadness” has a natural 
meaning. Let us take a look at the five conditions one by one. 
Grice’s first condition is about factual entailment. For natural meanings, “x means p” 
entails that p. I cannot have the spots without having measles. But the bus may not be full even if 
the bell rings three times. Davies asserts that a sentence like “this music means sadness” is more 
like the measle case than the bell case. But Davies has not explained why the emotional meaning 
of music entails a fact about the music. I have the opposite intuition because of the illusion view. 
It seems to me that “this music means sadness” is more like the bell case than the measle case. 
Grice’s second and third conditions are both about intentional use. For natural meanings, 
we are not entitled to argue from “x means p” to any statement about “somebody meant so-and-so 
by p.” We are not entitled to say, according to Grice, that “He meant by those spots that he had 
measles.” In contrast, for non-natural meanings, we are entitled to argue from “x means p” to some 
statement about “somebody meant so-and-so by p.” We are entitled to argue from the statement 
about rings on the bell to some statement about what is meant by rings on the bell such as “the bus 
conductor meant that the bus is full by the rings on the bell.” Nonetheless, Grice cautions that these 
 
286 H. P. Grice, “Meaning,” The Philosophical Review 66, No. 3 (July 1957): 377-8. 
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two conditions involve complications, for utterances and gestures with natural meanings can 
sometimes be given an intentional use. 
Consider Grice’s example of a frown. A spontaneous, unintended frown has a natural 
meaning of displeasure. But someone can frown intentionally to indicate displeasure. If we 
recognize the person’s frown as intentional, we would normally regard its meaning as non-natural. 
Davies notes that the fact the composers intentionally present emotional appearances might give 
the impression that emotional appearances are non-naturally meaningful. Yet Davies resists this 
impression by observing a difference in the practical interests we have for a frown and for the 
emotional appearances of music. Davies says, “the expressiveness of music does not interest us as 
indicating how any person feels; our concern is with the appearance of emotion rather than with 
a particular feeling as indicated in such an appearance.”287 As Davies argues, the composers’ 
intentions are irrelevant to the meaning of emotional appearances in music, for the emotional 
appearances have natural meanings. 
I disagree with Davies’ observation that the emotional appearances of music do not 
“interest us as indicating how any person feels.” Rather, the emotional appearances of music 
interest us as indicating how we feel. Our discussion from the previous section on claiming full 
emotional ownership can help illustrate this interest. When I listen to music, I am primarily 
interested in observing how I emotionally react to music and form beliefs about the emotional 
appearances. The person whose feeling in which I am interested is closest to me, for it is me. Yet 
my interest in self-discovery may lead me to care about a composer’s intention to communicate 
emotional meanings. I may not start off by caring for what the composer intends. But that does not 
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deprive me of the interest in the composer’s potentially recognizable intention to make me form 
beliefs about the music in certain ways. 
Grice’s fourth and fifth conditions are both about restatement. For natural meanings, a 
sentence like “Those spots mean measles” cannot be restated as “Those spots mean ‘measles’” or 
“Those spots mean ‘he has measles’.” But “Those spots mean measles” can be restated as “The 
fact that he has those spots means that he has measles.” In contrast, for non-natural meanings, 
whether putting the part after the verb “mean” in inverted commas does not change the meaning 
of the sentence. It means the same to say “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that ‘the 
bus is full’” and to say “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full.” But 
the sentence cannot be restated with the phrase “The fact that…” at the beginning as “The fact that 
the bell rings three times means that the bus is full.” Grice notes that although the two sentences 
may be true, they are not equivalent in meanings. Davies claims that a sentence like “this music 
means sadness” is more like the measle case than the bell case. But as we have seen with the first 
condition, I have the opposite intuition because of the illusion view. It seems to me that “this music 
means sadness” is more like the bell case than the measle case. 
If Davies showed that emotional appearances of music have natural meanings, the Gricean 
model would not work to account for the communication of emotional meanings. As Davies points 
out, if emotional appearances are naturally meaningful, “the composer’s intentions as regards the 
expressiveness of his work drop out at the second level of Grice’s account of utterer’s occasion 
meaning.”288 In other words, the composer’s intention becomes irrelevant for the audience’s belief. 
Moreover, if Davies showed that emotional appearances are naturally meaningful, the illusion 
 
288 Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music, 129. 
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view would be in trouble. Expressing emotions through music, on that view, would be as natural 
as getting spots from measles. That would directly establish an emotional nature of music. 
As we have seen, Davies has not shown that emotional appearances are naturally 
meaningful. It would be question-begging to use Davies’ intuitions to establish similarities 
between sentences describing emotional appearances and naturally meaningful sentences in the 
first, fourth, and fifth condition. The assumption, which Davies uses to establish similarities in the 
second and third condition, that emotional appearances of music do not interest us as indicating 
how anyone feels is in conflict with the intuition suggested by our first-person emotional 
ownership. The illusion view allows me to care about how I feel in response to the emotional 
appearances. Emotional communication can happen when that first-person interest leads me to 
recognize musicians’ intentions and form beliefs about the emotional appearances accordingly. 
Davies might contend that there is nothing in the music itself that allows for the recognition 
of a composer’s intention. 289  An emotion seems expressible “independently of its being 
intended.”290 It seems to Davies that intentions that are not realized in the music are not part of the 
music’s meaning.291 Hence, the claim about intention sounds gratuitous. But Davies does not seem 
to distinguish the communication of emotional meanings from the appreciation of emotional 
appearances. Admittedly, the appreciation of emotional appearances does not require the 
recognition of a composer’s intention. Even if the appreciation is about meanings, the audience 
can provide their own interpretations to form meanings that make sense to them. Even if the 
audience projects emotional meanings, it is not entirely impossible that they hit upon the intended 
meanings, in which case the audience would have emotional consonance with the musicians. Note 
 
289 Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music, 129. 
290 Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music, 128. 
291 Jesse Prinz, personal communication, August 2, 2020. 
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that this kind of emotional consonance in musical appreciation does not show that communication 
has happened. It is a little like telepathy. There are a million ways to go wrong in the projection of 
emotional meanings without relying on any extra-musical information. But at least it is 
conceivable that listeners are able to do this by chance and echo the same intended meanings from 
the composers. 
But I maintain that there is a difference between appreciation and communication. The 
recognition of intention is essential for emotional communication of meanings. The recognition 
does not have to come from the music alone. Indeed, listeners might seek emotional 
communication actively. Consider Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 in F minor, Op. 
36. Tchaikovsky’s involvement with his patron Nadezhda von Meck and composition of his Fourth 
Symphony began at the same time. In letters to von Meck, Tchaikovsky referred to this work as 
“our symphony.” By May 1877 he had completed most of this piece and wrote to her: “I should 
like to dedicate it to you, because I believe you would find in it an echo of your most intimate 
thoughts and emotions.”292 The weight of this symphony falls on the first movement, with the 
other three movements working as pleasant adornments. Yet Nadezhda von Meck seemed unsure 
whether her intimate thoughts and emotions were echoed, so she asked Tchaikovsky to explain the 
music.293 
 
292 Michael Steinberg, The Symphony: A Listener's Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 627. 
293 James M. Keller, “Notes on the Program,” program notes for Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 in F 
minor, Op. 36. New York Philharmonic, Tugan Sokhiev (conductor). New York: David Geffen Hall at Lincoln Center, 
October 27, 2018. Upon her request, Tchaikovsky revealed his secret program through a description of the opening 
movement: “The introduction is the seed of the whole symphony, undoubtedly the central theme. This is Fate, i.e., 
that fateful force which prevents the impulse toward happiness from entirely achieving its goal, forever on jealous 
guard lest peace and well-being should ever be attained in complete and unclouded form, hanging above us like the 
Sword of Damocles, constantly and unremittingly poisoning the soul. Its force is invisible, and can never be overcome. 
Our only choice is to surrender to it, and to languish fruitlessly. … When all seems lost, there appears a sweet and 
gentle daydream. Some blissful, radiant human image hurries by and beckons us away. … how good this feels! How 
distant now seems the obsessive first theme.”  
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One might object that the Gricean model, as applied to music, threatens the illusion view. 
It seems that the emotional meaning of something can be conceived as part of the representational 
content of that thing. The fact that we find emotional meanings in music suggests that music may 
have emotional meanings as its representational content. If this representational content can come 
into existence through intention, it seems that music can represent emotions after all. If the illusion 
view suggests that the emotional appearance is illusory despite the existence of emotional 
meanings, the illusion view seems to suggest, a bit too strongly, that emotional meanings in 
everyday language, or rather all meanings in language, are illusory.294 It is widely believed that 
language can latch onto reality.295 When I say “I am happy,” there seems to be a fact of the matter 
about my emotional state. The linguistic expression can be true by reporting that fact. This is not 
to say that the sentence “I am happy” is the substance of my emotional state, for the sentence is 
not my emotional reality. Still, to think of the sentence as illusory would miss the representational 
capability of language. If emotional meanings in language are not illusory, it seems odd to think 
of emotional meanings in music as illusory. 
In reply, it is worth clarifying what the illusion is. The illusion is not the emotional 
meanings in music, which can be intended to represent emotional states. This representation makes 
emotional communication possible through the use and recognition of intention. But it does not 
follow that the emotional states belong to the nature of music. Rather, the emotional states belong 
 
294 Jesse Prinz, personal communication, August 2, 2020. 
295 There are skeptical arguments about whether there is a fact of the matter regarding my mental or behavioral state, 
when I say “I am happy,” that can justify my belief that I mean “I am happy” rather than “I am schappy”. To illutrate, 
according to the skeptics, it is possible that I have always meant “I am schappy” in the past when I say “I am happy,” 
where “schappy” might be defined as a term for the emotional state “heavenly in musical contexts and happy in all 
other contexts.” Further, skeptics argue that there is no fact of the matter in my mind or in the world that can refute 
this possibility on the metalinguistic level. Skeptical challenges thus motivated by philosophy of language on truth 
and meaning are potentially important when applied to music, but are too tangential to be discussed in the present 
project. Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1982), 19. 
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to intenders. The same goes for linguistic expressions. When I utter the sentence “I am happy,” 
the sentence can be intended to represent my emotional state, but my emotional state is not in the 
sentence, but in me. The illusion, in the linguistic counterpart, is to think of the sentence “I am 
happy” as having something in its nature that grounds the representation. In fact, it is the utterer’s 
intention and the linguistic convention that give the sentence its representational capacity. We do 
not thereby treat linguistic expressions as emotional in nature. But once the emotional meanings 
are recognized in music, there is a theoretical tendency to become oblivious of their intentional 
sources and to justify the meanings as natural. Hence the illusion is not the idea that emotional 
meanings intended in music can reflect emotional states, but the idea that emotional meanings in 
music derive from the nature of music.296 Since the emotional meanings are not based on the nature 
of music, emotional communication on the Gricean model will not threaten the illusion view. 
In short, without the recognition of intention, there is no communication between the 
musicians and the audience. Intention matters for emotional communication through music. The 
Gricean model of meaning makes intelligible emotional communication between musicians and 




296 Jesse Prinz has wondered about the necessity of drawing a line between the intended emotional meanings in music 
and the nature of music apart from metaphysical conerns. Drawing the line can apparently preserve the possibility of 
musical expression unscaffolded by intention and language. Future research might develop a positive account of what 
emotional illusions can do in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz, personal communication, March 5, 2021. 
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The Objection from Emotional Language 
I will consider a series of challenges from the perspective of representation. In particular, 
these challenges revolve around the use of emotional language. To start, the emotional appearance 
of music is so intertwined into our social fabric that it is practically devastating to claim the 
appearance as nothing but an illusion. For example, it is a common practice for concert programs 
to include emotional terms to guide the audience. The guidance often asks the audience to remain 
alert to recognizably emotional parts of the music. If the illusion view is right, all this emotional 
language would be a strategy to keep the audience from wandering absent-mindedly. 
In reply, the illusion view is against instrumentalizing music for political or economic 
purposes. There are economic incentives to marketize the emotional appearances of music in the 
music industry. The illusion view guards against that tendency to treat emotional appearances as 
real for the purpose of music consumption. The widespread usage of emotional language in the 
music industry suggests that the audience has been kept in the dark. An emotionalized music is 
more relatable and marketable. A concert without an emotional ride can make consumers doubt 
the value of the experience. Listeners are generally skeptical about the value of immersing just in 
the music. The music industry encourages listeners to consume the emotions already projected into 
music. According to the illusion view, listeners can be encouraged to have a more authentic 
experience if they let go of guidance in the form of emotional language. The illusion view suggests 
that the less market-driven part of the music industry should probably minimize emotional 
language in marketing. The music can then become an occasion to facilitate self-discovery. If the 
concert goes well, the audience can discover something emotional about themselves. Otherwise, 
at least the audience is saved the anxiety of looking out for emotions and the humiliation of not 
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understanding music in emotional terms. Marketizing the emotional appearances can pressure the 
audience to blame themselves for not appreciating something that is not there in the first place. 
Whether emotional language is attributed to a piece of music may have nothing to do with 
music itself. Consider Schubert’s Symphony No. 4 in C minor, D 417, which had a tough time 
establishing its “tragic” credentials.297 Composed in 1816, it was not premiered until November 
19, 1849, in Leipzig -- more than 20 years after Schubert’s death. Critics found it hard to believe 
that 19-year-old could publish a genuinely tragic work. Sir George Grove could find no 
justification for the description, guessing that perhaps Schubert’s poverty was the inspiration; 
others guessed it was pent-up anger and frustration at being turned down for a teaching position 
and having to write for a small amateur orchestra (an outgrowth of the Schubert family string 
quartet). Still others denounced the “tragic” label as inaccurate and even pompous. True, the critics 
admitted, the symphony opened with an Adagio introduction and ensuing Allegro that breathe a 
spirit of resignation and sadness, but the rest of the symphony comprises a delicate Andante, a 
Beethoveneque scherzo, and a sonata finale that ends with a long C-major coda. These early 
commentators questioned where exactly the tragedy was.298 The emotional label for Schubert’s 
symphony is based not on the nature of music, but on a form of social recognition within the 
musical institution. 
Nevertheless, emotional language abounds not only in music consumption but also in 
music education. The education of young musicians seems to rely on the use of emotional language. 
 
297 Jack Sullivan, “Insufficiently Tragic?”, program notes for Schubert’s Symphony No. 4 in C minor, D417, “Tragic,” 
Munich Philharmonic, Valery Gergiev (conductor and director), New York: Carnegie Hall, April 5, 2017. 
298 One of the earliest defenders of the symphony in America was H. L. Mencken, whose 1928 article in The American 
Mercury illustrated the work’s “tragic” qualities: “Of Schubert’s symphonies, the orchestras play the ‘Unfinished’ 
incessantly – but never too often! – and the huge C Major now and then, but the ‘Tragic’ remains one of Schubert’s 
masterworks, and in its slow movement, at least, it rides to the full height of the ‘Unfinished.’ There are not six such 
slow movements in the whole range of music. It has an eloquence that has never been surpassed, not even by 
Beethoven, but there is no rhetoric in it, no heroics, no exhibitionism. It begins quietly and simply, and it passes out 
in a whisper, but its beauty remains overwhelming.” 
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It seems absurd to abandon emotional language in music education, as the illusion view apparently 
suggests. The emotional terms are useful to get music students to perceive the beauty of music and 
inspire them to play music beautifully. If emotional terms are useful for music education and 
production, it seems that the emotional appearances to which emotional terms refer cannot be 
entirely illusory. 
In reply, it is important to recognize the limited value emotional language has for music 
education. When emotional language is effective, it functions as an aid of technical illustration 
rather than an independent pedagogical device. Likewise, music teachers sometimes ask students 
to form mental images associated with music. This would not show that music is visual. Rather, 
the visual images serve as aids to illustrate certain technical nuances about performance or 
composition. Any excessive use of emotional language that does not yields a technical point would 
not help with music education. Indeed, excessive use of emotional language might misfire by 
overshooting a point. If I am instructed to play a cadenza with joy, the instruction would be vague 
insofar as I am not equipped with knowledge about the technical execution to back up the 
emotional language. I might, as a result, focus on joy but ruin the performance. The value of 
emotional language for music education is grounded in knowledge about musical beauty instead 
of emotion. To miss this point and uphold the emotional language absolutely would confuse 
students. In analogy, if I am instructed to make ice-cream taste sweet with a little melancholy, I 
would not understand what this means unless I am shown how this feeling can be created. 
Otherwise, left on my own to interpret such an emotional appearance, I would end up adding a lot 
of sugar and a cup of vinegar, making the ice-cream taste bad but perhaps conform to my 




I have shown that the illusion view can withstand broader objections from the perspectives 
of evocation, expression, and representation. The illusion view liberates musical perception and 
lets listeners claim full ownership of their emotions in response to music. The illusion view is 
compatible with emotional communication through music conceived as an intentional exchange 
of emotional meanings. The illusion view cautions against the overuse of emotional language in 
commercial or educational contexts.  
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Chapter Eight. Integration 
In this chapter I will consider a possible objection to the illusion view. An opponent of the 
illusion view might argue that the illusion view does not accord with musical experiences where 
the music plays a uniquely causal role in generating the affective components of an emotion. By 
being the only cause of certain affective components of an emotion, the music would be partially 
responsible for the formation of that emotion. Even if the emotion in such a musical experience is 
ultimately in the listener, this causal role of music apparently suffices to establish a partially 
emotional nature in the music. I will call this “the objection from sole cause as partial nature.” The 
illusion view can be charged of being experientially hollow, if it cannot accommodate musical 
experiences that motivate this objection. 
To account for the musical experiences in question, it would be illuminating to examine 
texts that are not restricted to academic philosophy yet hold philosophical implications. Literature, 
in this regard, is a good source to locate vivid accounts of musical experiences. Some 
philosophically illuminating descriptions of musical experiences can be found in Marcel Proust’s 
novel In Search of Lost Time.299 In particular, Charles Swann’s musical experience is significant, 
because it can be formulated in a way to motivate the objection.300 I will argue that Swann’s 
musical experience can be integrated into the illusion view, and as a result, that the illusion view 
is experientially richer than it might appear at first. 
 
299 It is no news that Proust’s In Search of Lost Time is a singular milestone in 20th century literature. It is a classic 
that not only inspires modern literature, but also embodies the practice of philosophical thinking through literature. 
That ability to philosophize through literary writing is a rare treasure for philosophers. 
300 I do not claim to have found the most philosophical interpretation of Proust’s writing. The way I read Swann’s 
musical experience is largely informed by my interest in the illusion view. This chapter is meant to open up new 
directions of research. 
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Marcel, the narrator of Proust’s novel, describes Swann’s musical experience at multiple 
places.301 The experience itself is so complex that it needs to be presented in steps.302 The number 
of steps depends on one’s interpretation.303  I will present Swann’s musical experience in 12 
steps.304 This presentation has two aims. First, I aim to give a detailed account of the musical 
experience, letting the musical experience guide our philosophical thinking. Second, I aim to 
foreground the emotional agency in each step: whether something related to the formation of 
emotion is in Swann or in the music. As I present Swann’s musical experience, I will explain what 
emotional agency is and examine its philosophical implications for the illusion view. 
 
Swann’s Musical Experience in Twelve Steps 
Let me tell the story in a synopsis. Swann has an emotion that he does not know. The 
emotion is love for Odette. The reason Swann does not know it is that it is not formed yet. This 
emotion has not emerged even once in Swann’s consciousness. Swann may never realize this 
emotion that he has. The emotion can only be awakened under a special condition. That condition 
is a particular affective state. Swann must be affected in a very particular way in order to realize 
this emotion. We can think of the conceptual element (love for Odette) as ready to be combined 
 
301 I will not debate the sincerity of the narrator, or doubt the genuine authenticity of the experience. I will take 
Marcel’s word for it, not treating it as a rhetorical device to achieve expressive purposes. This accords with Proust’s 
philosophy of composition, whereby an author should aim at a natural description of how things are. Still, I will 
differentiate Marcel the narrator from Proust the author. 
302 Swann’s musical experience will not cleanly fit into any of the three theoretical models. My priority is to reflect 
upon the experience as accurately as possible, without worrying about how to categorize the experience with existing 
terms. Elements in the three approaches seem mingled together in the story. To uphold the priority of musical 
experience, let us allow ourselves to move away from existing paradigms a bit. The real life of musical experience 
may not be that clean-cut, and the three approaches may cooperate in complicated ways that defy easy delineation. 
303 For the purpose of this discussion, I will neither attempt to do a formal analysis of Proust’s style, nor attempt to 
trace Marcel’s ideas to philosophical undercurrents at the time. 
304 A twelve-step program is a project used to help people recover from addiction. The pun is intended, for Swann 
realizes in the end that his emotion for Odette is illusory. 
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with certain affective states. Now, that condition can only be generated by a musical phrase. That 
musical phrase is the only thing in the world that can put Swann into that affective state, which 
may awaken the awareness of an otherwise unformed and unknown emotion. 
 
Step 1: impression 
The initial set-up Marcel has for Swann’s musical experience is crucial and contains the 
seed for later developments. Let us start with the place in the story where Swann discerns the 
existence of the musical phrase that will later cast a spell on him. 
 
This time he had distinguished quite clearly a phrase which emerged for a few 
moments above the waves of sound. It had at once suggested to him a world of 
inexpressible delights, of whose existence, before hearing it, he had never dreamed, 
into which he felt that nothing else could initiate him; and he had been filled with 
love for it, as with a new and strange desire.305 
 
The musical phrase “emerged” out of a sonic background. It has the power to immediately suggest 
“inexpressible delights.” Swann is drawn to the music, which alone has that almost otherworldly 
power: “nothing else could initiate him” into that world. Swann’s impression of this musical phrase 
is so strong that it feels out of control. 
 
With a slow and rhythmical movement it led him first this way, then that, towards 
a state of happiness that was noble, unintelligible, and yet precise. And then 
 
305 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time: The Complete Masterpiece, Vol. I: Swann’s Way, trans. C. K. Scott 
Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 253. 
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suddenly, having reached a certain point from which he was preparing to follow it, 
after a momentary pause, abruptly it changed direction, and in a fresh movement, 
more rapid, fragile, melancholy, incessant, sweet, it bore him off with it towards 
new vistas.306 
 
It is unclear whether “a state of happiness” is a full-fledged emotion. It is better to not read too 
much into that phrase for now, lest we attribute too much conceptual content into the state. The 
music “bore him off,” which can be read as implying that Swann could not help but feel with the 
music.307 In that sense, to be “led … towards a state of happiness” is not Swann’s choice. It seems 
that the music contains more agency in deciding whether Swann finds himself in that state of 
happiness. Swann started to feel a yearning for this musical phrase. 
 
But when he returned home he felt the need of it: he was like a man into whose life 
a woman he has seen for a moment passing by has brought the image of a new 
beauty which deepens his own sensibility, although he does not even know her 
name or whether he will ever see her again.308 
 
Swann’s need of the music consists partly in the fear that something potent might have been lost. 
From Swann’s perspective, the music is uniquely powerful and potentially uniquely meaningful. 
Swann does not believe that he could muster his own mental strength to put himself in the state 
which that musical phrase “of a new beauty” can put him in. Swann’s need of the music suggests 
 
306 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 253. 
307 One episode from Tom and Jerry illustrates in a funny way how Jerry could not help but feel with Tom’s music, 
“You’re Still My Baby,” accessed March 1, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZcHR_zMRgU. 
308 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 253. 
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that some emotional agency does not lie in him, but in the music. Otherwise, Swann would not 
have worried about not hearing the music again. 
To characterize the power of this musical phrase, Marcel calls attention to a “re-creative 
influence” it has on Swann. The musical phrase is missed because it suggests a different life for 
Swann. 
 
[H]e begins to envisage the possibility, hitherto beyond all hope, of starting to lead 
belatedly a wholly different life, Swann found in himself, in the memory of the 
phrase that he had heard, in certain other sonatas which he had made people play 
to him to see whether he might not perhaps discover his phrase therein, the presence 
of one of those invisible realities in which he had ceased to believe and to which, 
as though the music had had upon the moral barrenness from which he was 
suffering a sort of re-creative influence, he was conscious once again of the desire 
and almost the strength to consecrate his life.309 
 
The musical phrase suggests to Swann the possibility of living “a wholly different life.” Swann is 
unclear on what it is about the music that suggests that possibility. The music is unintelligible yet 
powerful. Swann’s lack of agency is prominent in the first step. 
 
Step 2: recognition 
Swann anticipates the reappearance of the musical phrase, as it shows up on another 
occasion. 
 
309 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 254. 
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But that night, at Mme Verdurin’s, scarcely had the young pianist begun to play 
than suddenly, after a high note sustained through two whole bars, Swann sensed 
its approach, stealing forth from beneath that long-drawn sonority, stretched like a 
curtain of sound to veil the mystery of its incubation, and recognized, secret, 
murmuring, detached, the airy and perfumed phrase that he had loved. And it was 
so peculiarly itself, it had so individual, so irreplaceable a charm, that Swann felt 
as though he had met, in a friend’s drawing-room, a woman whom he had seen and 
admired in the street and had despaired of ever seeing again. 
 
This musical phrase has taken on a singular importance for Swann. Swann “despaired” of hearing 
it again. It is unnecessary to despair over things within one’s control. Swann’s emotion, regardless 
of its content, is not within Swann’s control, even if it resides in Swann. The music holds a singular 
charm for Swann. Now that the charm is recognized, Swann wants to know more about it. 
 
Finally the phrase receded, diligently guiding its successors through the 
ramifications of its fragrance, leaving on Swann’s features the reflection of its smile. 
But now, at last, he could ask the name of his fair unknown (and was told that it 
was the andante of Vinteuil’s sonata for piano and violin); he held it safe, could 
have it again to himself, at home, as often as he wished, could study its language 
and acquire its secret.310 
 
 
310 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 255. 
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Knowledge offers a sense of security. Swann “held it safe” so that there is no more of the despair 
that he may not hear it again. By knowing more about the music, Swann attempts to arrest the 
charm. 
 
Then he asked for information about this Vinteuil: what else he had done, at what 
period in his life he had composed the sonata, and what meaning the little phrase 
could have had for him—that was what Swann wanted most to know.311 
 
The quest for knowledge is a natural reaction to the presence of charm. Swann is interested in the 
“meaning the little phrase could have had for him.” Swann is seeking self-understanding by trying 
to know what it is that charms him. Swann begins to display some emotional agency, but insofar 
as the music remains powerfully enigmatic, it holds an irreplaceable charm. 
 
Step 3: association 
As Swann listens more, he affirms the power of the musical phrase deeper and begins to 
hear it in conceptual ways. The conceptual associations are manifest in Marcel’s descriptions. 
 
[T]he little phrase appeared, dancing, pastoral, interpolated, episodic, belonging to 
another world. It rippled past, simple and immortal, scattering on every side the 
bounties of its grace, with the same ineffable smile; but Swann thought that he could 
now discern in it some disenchantment. It seemed to be aware how vain, how 
hollow was the happiness to which it showed the way. In its airy grace there was 
 
311 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 256. 
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the sense of something over and done with, like the mood of philosophic 
detachment which follows an outburst of vain regret.312 
 
The state of happiness is complicated by the observation that a “mood of philosophic detachment” 
is in the feel of happiness. What the music must sound like to merit such a description is unclear 
yet not important for our discussion. Swann does not try to interpret the music in a certain direction 
by projecting a persona or constructing a psychological mini-drama. Apparently, the conceptual 
associations are unforced in response to the musical charm. Nonetheless, Swann associates the 
charm in the music with the idea of happiness, even if that is somewhat “hollow.” The conceptual 
association manifests Swann’s emotional agency. 
 
Step 4: objectification 
As Swann listens more, he pays attention to what the musical phrase means for himself 
rather than in itself. Swann associates the music with Odette, whom he loves. Swann knows that 
his love for Odette lies outside the intention of the composer. Still, Swann hears the music as 
perfectly capturing how that love feels to him. 
 
[H]e contemplated the little phrase less in its own light—in what it might express 
to a musician who knew nothing of the existence of him and Odette when he had 
composed it, and to all those who would hear it in centuries to come—than as a 
pledge, a token of his love, which made even the Verdurins and their young pianist 
think of Odette at the same time as himself—which bound her to him by a lasting 
 
312 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 262. 
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tie; so much so that (whimsically entreated by Odette) he had abandoned the idea 
of getting some professional to play over to him the whole sonata, of which he still 
knew no more than this one passage. 
 
The objectified association gives Swann an emotional focus. This focus, once it becomes obvious, 
does not have to remain private to Swann, but can be shared between Swann and Odette.313 
Swann’s emotional object structures his attention in such a way that Swann values most the part 
that is associated with his love for Odette. 
 
“Why do you want the rest?” she had asked him. “Our little bit; that’s all we need.” 
Indeed, agonized by the reflection, as it floated by, so near and yet so infinitely 
remote, that while it was addressed to them it did not know them, he almost 
regretted that it had a meaning of its own, an intrinsic and unalterable beauty, 
extraneous to themselves, just as in the jewels given to us, or even in the letters 
written to us by a woman we love, we find fault with the water of the stone, or with 
the words of the message, because they are not fashioned exclusively from the 
essence of a transient liaison and a particular person.314 
 
The transience of the liaison does not seem problematic for the lovers. I will go deeper into the 
philosophical implications of this later. For now, Swann’s association of the musical phrase with 
 
313 It is arguable whether for Odette, the music is associated with Swann’s love for her or her love for Swann at the 
moment. It might as well be such a general notion as “our love.” But even as “our love” it contains Swann’s love for 
Odette, of which Odette is aware at this point. At any rate, there is an agreement between the lovers on the presence 
of Swann’s love for Odette. Nevertheless, this agreement is not indispensable in our discussion. 
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his love for Odette seems to be an effort to seal his love into the music. Arguably, Swann is putting 
his emotion into the music. Despite the sense of “disenchantment” in the previous step, Swann is 
driven by his love to focalize his musical experience in objectified association. This looks like a 
willful interpretive move that exhibits Swann’s emotional agency. 
 
He would find, lying open on the piano, some of her favorite music … but he would 
ask her, instead, to give him the little phrase from Vinteuil’s sonata. It was true that 
Odette played vilely, but often the most memorable impression of a piece of music 
is one that has arisen out of a jumble of wrong notes struck by unskillful fingers 
upon a tuneless piano. The little phrase continued to be associated in Swann’s mind 
with his love for Odette. He was well aware that his love was something that did 
not correspond to anything outside itself, verifiable by others besides him; he 
realized that Odette’s qualities were not such as to justify his setting so high a value 
on the hours he spent in her company.315 
 
Swann decides to hear the music in the associated way, although this decision does not accord with 
other pieces of knowledge he has. Swann knows that the association is wishfully forced in his 
mind, for he knows that “his love was something that did not correspond to anything outside itself.” 
At this point we can identify Swann’s love for Odette as the emotion in question. Swann’s decision 
to associate the musical phrase with his love for Odette might be his way of making the emotion 
memorable. The emotional agency lies with Swann at this stage. 
 
 
315 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 282. 
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Step 5: liberation 
The continued association of the music with an emotion alters Swann’s being in the 
presence of this musical phrase. He feels liberated beyond being charmed. 
 
But the little phrase, as soon as it struck his ear, had the power to liberate in him 
the space that was needed to contain it; the proportions of Swann’s soul were altered; 
a margin was left for an enjoyment that corresponded no more than his love for 
Odette to any external object and yet was not, like his enjoyment of that love, purely 
individual, but assumed for him a sort of reality superior to that of concrete things. 
This thirst for an unknown delight was awakened in him by the little phrase, but 
without bringing him any precise gratification to assuage it.316 
 
The musical phrase liberates Swann into an alternative reality from an everyday world. It is better 
not to read Marcel as advancing a metaphysical theory. The musical phrase reveals an alternative 
reality that is “superior” to “concrete things.” The liberating power consists in making an inner 
“space” available for Swann. The inner space is necessary to “contain” the musical phrase. There 
is a magnitude of the musical phrase that requires an emptiness of mind for its appreciation. The 
appreciation would not be possible when the listener is preoccupied with everyday concerns. This 
enjoyment appears to be solitary. In that solitary space, “a margin was left” just for Swann’s love. 
This musical experience allows Swann to be alone with the music while contemplating his love 
for Odette. The music does not directly arouse the emotion of love, but makes possible a mental 
space where that emotion is awakened. 
 
316 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 282-3. 
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With the result that those parts of Swann’s soul in which the little phrase had 
obliterated all concern for material interests, those human considerations which 
affect all men alike, were left vacant by it, blank pages on which he was at liberty 
to inscribe the name of Odette.317 
 
The mental vacancy liberated by the musical phrase is essential for Swann to “inscribe the name 
of Odette.” Even if the musical phrase does not arouse Swann’s love directly, it clears Swann’s 
mind such that his love can arise. Insofar as Swann evacuates everyday concerns from his musical 
experience, he displays emotional agency in a negative way by remaining inactive for the liberation 
to work. Some emotional agency can be attributed to both Swann and the music. 
 
Step 6: transformation 
The liberation brings about a transformation in Swann’s character. To be transformed thus 
is like being taken to an alternative reality within by the power of perfume. The experience of that 
alternative reality is pleasant. 
 
And the pleasure which the music gave him, which was shortly to create in him a 
real need, was in fact akin at such moments to the pleasure which he would have 
derived from experimenting with perfumes, from entering into contact with a world 
for which we men were not made, which appears to us formless because our eyes 
cannot perceive it, meaningless because it eludes our understanding, to which we 
 
317 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 282. 
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may attain by way of one sense only. There was a deep repose, a mysterious 
refreshment for Swann—whose eyes, although delicate interpreters of painting, 
whose mind, although an acute observer of manners, must bear forever the indelible 
imprint of the barrenness of his life—in feeling himself transformed into a creature 
estranged from humanity, blinded, deprived of his logical faculty, almost fantastic 
unicorn, a chimaera-like creature conscious of the world through his hearing alone. 
And since he sought in the little phrase for a meaning to which his intelligence 
could not descend, with what a strange frenzy of intoxication did he strip bare his 
innermost soul of the whole armor of reason and make it pass unattended through 
the dark filter of sound!318 
 
Swann feels transformed into another being.319 As a transformed being, Swann gets to experience 
a “pleasure” that is perceptible through “one sense only.” In this pleasure there is a “deep repose.” 
Swann appears to be “deprived of his logical faculty.” The transformed listener is marked by a 
diminished ability to reason about things. The transformation gives Swann some existential 
distance, if not alienation, from his normal self. This state of “being a chimaera-like creature” feels 
like “intoxication.” 
The state of transformation includes a complicating factor. As a transformed being, Swann 
becomes more sensitive and notices things in the music that are disorienting. “He began to realize 
how much that was painful, perhaps even how much secret and unappeased sorrow underlay the 
sweetness of the phrase; and yet to him it brought no suffering.” 320  Despite the objectified 
 
318 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 283. 
319 Swann’s state of transformation is akin to a form of madness in music. See John T. Hamilton, Music, Madness, 
and the Unworking of Language, “Self-Representation” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 155-8. 
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association, Swann is not deaf to other impressions from the music. Some impressions may not 
cohere well with his association. The music is not merely pleasant and sweet. There is a painful 
feeling beneath the sweetness. Nevertheless, Swann ignores these impressions. 
 
What matter though the phrase repeated that love is frail and fleeting, when his love 
was so strong! He played with the melancholy which the music diffused, he felt it 
stealing over him, but like a caress which only deepened and sweetened his sense 
of his own happiness.321 
 
The strength of Swann’s love makes his willful indifference to painful impressions possible. 
Swann closed his mind somewhat to preserve his happiness. There is something closed off in the 
musical experience at this point. Despite the primordial richness of the musical experience, Swann 
chooses to enjoy the music in the way he finds comfortable. Swann might be afraid of losing Odette. 
By willfully clinging to the Odette-associated emotion, Swann might be trying to safeguard their 
relationship.322 The music transforms Swann, yet Swann insists on hearing the music in a definite 
way. Emotional agency can be attributed to both sides. 
 
Step 7: protection 
 
321 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 284. 
322 It is interesting to compare this with some sayings collected by Roland Barthes. Roland Barthes: “It was as if I 
were trying to embrace one last time, hysterically, someone about to die – someone for whom I am about to die: I was 
performing a denial of separation.” Freud: “This rebellion is sometimes so intense that the subject may reach the point 
of rejecting reality and clinging to the lost object by means of a hallucinatory psychosis of desire.” Winnicott: “Just 
before this loss is experienced, we may discern in the child, in the excessive utilization of the transitional object, the 
denial of the fear that this object may lose its signification” (Playing and Reality). Roland Barthes, A Lover’s 
Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 109. 
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In the state of transformation, Swann enters into imaginary contact with Odette, the object 
of his love. As his love is fading, Swann has buried his emotion somewhat and tries to avoid 
impressions that might remind him of Odette. Swann’s escape from the music attests the emotional 
appeal the music still holds over him. 
 
But suddenly it was as though she had entered, and this apparition was so 
agonizingly painful that his hand clutched at his heart. The violin had risen to a 
series of high notes on which it rested as though awaiting something, holding on to 
them in a prolonged expectancy, in the exaltation of already seeing the object of its 
expectation approaching, and with a desperate effort to last out until its arrival, to 
welcome it before itself expiring, to keep the way open for a moment longer, with 
all its remaining strength, so that the stranger might pass, as one holds a door open 
that would otherwise automatically close. And before Swann had had time to 
understand what was happening and to say to himself: “It’s the little phrase from 
Vinteuil’s sonata—I mustn’t listen!”, all his memories of the days when Odette had 
been in love with him, which he had succeeded until that moment in keeping 
invisible in the depths of his being, deceived by this sudden reflection of a season 
of love whose sun, they supposed, had dawned again, had awakened from their 
slumber, had taken wing and risen to sing maddeningly in his ears, without pity for 
his present desolation, the forgotten strains of happiness.323 
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Swann is caught off guard when he encounters the musical phrase, which reawakens his love and 
brings back specific memories with Odette. There is an intimacy between Swann and the music. 
The intimacy manifests itself as a kind of power that can wound Swann. Nonetheless, this intimacy 
is also experienced as “protective.” 
 
As though the musicians were not nearly so much playing the little phrase as 
performing the rites on which it insisted before it would consent to appear, and 
proceeding to utter the incantations necessary to procure, and to prolong for a few 
moments, the miracle of its apparition, Swann, who was no more able to see it than 
if it had belonged to a world of ultra-violet light, and who experienced something 
like the refreshing sense of a metamorphosis in the momentary blindness with 
which he was struck as he approached it, Swann felt its presence like that of a 
protective goddess, a confidante of his love, who, in order to be able to come to 
him through the crowd and to draw him aside to speak to him, had disguised herself 
in this sweeping cloak of sound.324 
 
The “momentary” state protected by the musical phrase feels like a “refreshing” metamorphosis. 
The music is protective of the transformed Swann who experiences his love. The music alone can 
offer that protection, since in no other place might such an emotion be allowed to come into 
awareness. This protection makes Swann feel at home in the state of transformation. “He felt that 
he was no longer in exile and alone since she, who addressed herself to him, was whispering to 
him of Odette.”325 Swann cannot lose his fading emotion for Odette insofar as he is experiencing 
 
324 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 403. 
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the music. There is a decrease of emotional agency on Swann’s part. Swann has to rely on the 
music to rekindle the emotion. 
 
Step 8: representation 
Then comes a mental effort to solidify the significance of the music. Swann moves beyond 
mere association into something more definite, which is to intentionally take the music to represent 
the charm of an emotion. In this regard, Swann’s mental act cannot be reduced to one of the three 
theoretical approaches. 
 
It was the charms of an intimate sadness that it sought to imitate, to re-create, and 
their very essence, for all that it consists in being incommunicable and in appearing 
trivial to everyone except him who experiences them, had been captured and made 
visible by the little phrase.326 
 
The music is not taken to represent an emotion directly. Rather, the music is taken to imitate 
charms of an emotion. There is a sense of arousal built into the representation. This conception 
seems to lower the stake of representation by making it more subjective. The music does not have 
to imitate a definite emotion in order to count as a successful representation. Insofar as the charms 
of an emotion are imitated, the representation can be taken to be successful. But the evaluation of 
the representation of charms can vary with how Swann is charmed by the music. Given Swann’s 
intention for the music to represent the “charms of an intimate sadness” at this point, it is possible 
that Swann is more susceptible to the charms the music has for him. Swann’s emotional readiness 
 
326 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 404. 
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can then make him project his arousal back to the music in a way that clouds whatever charms the 
music itself is capable of representing. 
We might hope to get a more precise conception of the representation. But for Marcel, the 
representation of charms does not seem amenable to precise definition. Swann tries to put the 
representation of the charm into words to no avail. “Doubtless the form in which it had codified 
those charms could not be resolved into rational discourse.”327 This may sound radical if it is read 
as proposing that the representation of charms is beyond rational discourse. But Marcel might just 
mean that rational discourse cannot “resolve” the representational form, which would be in line 
with the illusion view. 
The representation still happens within the transformed state. For Swann, the representation 
of emotional charms derives its meaning from the transformation. “Swann had regarded musical 
motifs as actual ideas, of another world, of another order, ideas veiled in shadow, unknown, 
impenetrable to the human mind.”328 Musical motifs are “actual ideas of another world,” because 
Swann himself is transformed into another world. Still, the representation is Swann’s mental act 
informed by his arousal, hence the emotional agency in this step lies with Swann. 
 
Step 9: location 
Only much later was Swann able to “face the music.” Since the music is taken to represent 
emotional charms, Swann wonders about what part of the music generates the charms. Swann 
seems to make a discovery at first. 
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When, after that first evening at the Verdurins’, he had had the little phrase played 
over to him again, and had sought to disentangle from his confused impressions 
how it was that, like a perfume or a caress, it swept over and enveloped him, he had 
observed that it was to the closeness of the intervals between the five notes which 
composed it and to the constant repetition of two of them that was due that 
impression of a frigid and withdrawn sweetness.329 
 
Swann locates the power of the musical phrase in “the intervals between the five notes” and “the 
constant repetition of two of them.” These specific features might not work without a general 
structure, but Swann holds these features to be specifically responsible for the impression of that 
“withdrawn sweetness.” 
Nonetheless, Swann does not believe that the emotional charms are locatable in this way. 
 
[B]ut in reality he knew that he was basing this conclusion not upon the phrase 
itself, but merely upon certain equivalents, substituted (for his mind’s convenience) 
for the mysterious entity of which he had become aware, before ever he knew the 
Verdurins, at that earlier party when for the first time he had heard the sonata 
played.330 
 
Emotional charms do not come from the features located in the music. The cause of emotional 
charms is not the musical phrase itself, but “certain equivalents” that are mentally “substituted” 
 
329 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 404. 
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for a “mysterious entity.” The five notes do not deliver the answer, but at most serve as pointers 
to a mysterious source that generates the emotional charms. The emotional agency lies with Swann. 
 
Step 10: distinction 
Even if specific features in the music cannot be located, the musical phrase serves to 
distinguish a specific love Swann has for Odette. The emotional distinction is made possible by 
musical distinction. The difference between this musical piece and any other musical piece is 
sufficient for Swann to distinguish his love for Odette, informed by this musical phrase, from other 
emotions he has. 
 
He knew that the very memory of the piano falsified still further the perspective in 
which he saw the elements of music, that the field open to the musician is not a 
miserable stave of seven notes, but an immeasurable keyboard (still almost entirely 
unknown) on which, here and there only, separated by the thick darkness of its 
unexplored tracts, some few among the millions of keys of tenderness, of passion, 
of courage, of serenity, which compose it, each one differing from all the rest as 
one universe differs from another, have been discovered by a few great artists who 
do us the service, when they awaken in us the emotion corresponding to the theme 
they have discovered, of showing us what richness, what variety lies hidden, 
unknown to us, in that vast, unfathomed and forbidding night of our soul which we 
take to be an impenetrable void.331 
 
 
331 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 405. 
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Each musical piece can awaken a specific emotion in our soul which appears to be an unfathomable 
“void.” Swann affirms the original power of the particular phrase that represents the charms of his 
love for Odette. 
 
In his little phrase, although it might present a clouded surface to the eye of reason, 
one sensed a content so solid, so consistent, so explicit, to which it gave so new, so 
original a force, that those who had once heard it preserved the memory of it on an 
equal footing with the ideas of the intellect. Swann referred back to it as to a 
conception of love and happiness whose distinctive character he recognized at once 
as he would that of the Princesse de Clèves, or of René, should either of those titles 
occur to him. 
 
Swann hears an original force in the music and treats the musical phrase on a par with intellectual 
ideas. The musical phrase functions in Swann’s mind as a solid reference for his love. 
 
Even when he was not thinking of the little phrase, it existed latent in his mind on 
the same footing as certain other notions without material equivalent, such as our 
notions of light, of sound, of perspective, of physical pleasure, the rich possessions 
wherewith our inner temple is diversified and adorned. Perhaps we shall lose them, 
perhaps they will be obliterated, if we return to nothingness. But so long as we are 
alive, we can no more bring ourselves to a state in which we shall not have known 
them than we can with regard to any material object, than we can, for example, 
doubt the luminosity of a lamp that has just been lit, in view of the changed aspect 
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of everything in the room, from which even the memory of the darkness has 
vanished. 
 
The musical phrase is fundamental to Swann’s perception of life. It apparently cannot be unlearned, 
once it is known. There is no “material equivalent” to this musical phrase, although it can be 
performed on a piano. The emotional agency comes partly from the uniqueness of the music and 
partly from Swann. 
 
Step 11: accretion 
Swann’s love for Odette is an emotional process. The way an emotional process feels can 
be experienced as the charms of the emotion. 
 
In that way Vinteuil’s phrase, like some theme, say, in Tristan, which represents to 
us also a certain emotional accretion, had espoused our mortal state, had endued a 
vesture of humanity that was peculiarly affecting.332 
 
The musical phrase represents an “emotional accretion” for Swann. One might think of the 
emotional accretion as a process that builds up towards a tangible target. But according to Marcel, 
that emotional accretion moves towards something akin to nothingness. 
 
Its destiny was linked to the future, to the reality of the human soul, of which it was 
one of the most special and distinctive ornaments. Perhaps it is not-being that is the 
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true state, and all our dream of life is inexistent; but, if so, we feel that these phrases 
of music, these conceptions which exist in relation to our dream, must be nothing 
either. We shall perish, but we have as hostages these divine captives who will 
follow and share our fate. And death in their company is somehow less bitter, less 
inglorious, perhaps even less probable.333 
 
The emotional destination signaled by music is one of dreamy nonexistence. But this form of 
nonexistence has a superior reality. 
 
So Swann was not mistaken in believing that the phrase of the sonata really did 
exist. Human as it was from this point of view, it yet belonged to an order of 
supernatural beings whom we have never seen, but whom, in spite of that, we 
recognize and acclaim with rapture when some explorer of the unseen contrives to 
coax one forth, to bring it down, from that divine world to which he has access, to 
shine for a brief moment in the firmament of ours.334 
 
Our enjoyment of the musical phrase is to “bring it down” from the other world. The delicate 
beauty of the musical phrase shows the otherworldly reality of nothingness. 
 
Swann felt that the composer had been content (with the musical instruments at his 
disposal) to unveil it, to make it visible, following and respecting its outlines with 
a hand so loving, so prudent, so delicate and so sure that the sound altered at every 
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moment, softening and blurring to indicate a shadow, springing back into life when 
it must follow the curve of some bolder projection. And one proof that Swann was 
not mistaken when he believed in the real existence of this phrase, was that anyone 
with the least discernment would at once have detected the imposture had Vinteuil, 
endowed with less power to see and to render its forms, sought to dissemble, by 
adding a counterfeit touch here and there, the flaws in his vision or the deficiencies 
of his hand.335 
 
The musical phrase is taken to represent an emotional accretion towards nothingness, which is 
experienced as emotional charms. This intention for representation lies with Swann, while the 
beauty that proves the otherworldly reality of the nothingness belongs to the music. The emotional 
agency is shared between Swann and the music. 
 
Step 12: appreciation 
At last Swann disentangles his love from the music. 
 
True that, as often, it had warned him of their frailty. And indeed, whereas in that 
earlier time he had divined an element of suffering in its smile, in its limpid, 
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The musical phrase gives rise to  new emotional interpretations with new conceptual content. 
Different emotional interpretations are rendered possible by the same tones. 
 
When it was the little phrase that spoke to him of the vanity of his sufferings, Swann 
found a solace in that very wisdom which, but a little while back, had seemed to 
him intolerable when he fancied he could read it on the faces of indifferent strangers 
who regarded his love as an insignificant aberration.337 
 
The shift in emotional interpretation leads Swann to reexamine his earlier emotion. The musical 
phrase now enables Swann to face the “vanity of his sufferings,” which has received unfavorable 
judgments from people in everyday life. But the musical phrase facilitates a generous kind of 
reflection that does not involve self-accusation. 
 
For the little phrase, unlike them, whatever opinion it might hold on the transience 
of these states of the soul, saw in them something not, as all these people did, less 
serious than the events of everyday life, but, on the contrary, so far superior to it as 
to be alone worth while expressing.338 
 
The musical phrase bestows value upon Swann’s emotion rather than mocks it. Hence, the 
realization of “the vanity of his suffering” as heard in the music does not feel judgmental. This 
may be partly due to the beauty of the musical phrase, which apparently enhances the perceived 
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acceptability of the realization.339 This in turn makes Swann more open-minded and willing to 
engage with all impressions from the music. 
 
There were in this passage some admirable ideas which Swann had not 
distinguished on first hearing the sonata and which he now perceived, as if, in the 
cloakroom of his memory, they had divested themselves of the uniform disguise of 
their novelty. Swann listened to all the scattered themes which would enter into the 
composition of the phrase, as its premises enter into the inevitable conclusion of a 
syllogism; he was assisting at the mystery of its birth.340 
 
To assist at the mystery of its birth suggests Swann’s emotional agency. Now Swann is able to 
appreciate the beauty of music without hearing it as a token of love for Odette. 
 
How beautiful the dialogue which Swann now heard between piano and violin, at 
the beginning of the last passage! The suppression of human speech, so far from 
letting fancy reign there uncontrolled (as one might have thought), had eliminated 
it altogether; never was spoken language so inexorably determined, never had it 
known questions so pertinent, such irrefutable replies. At first the piano complained 
alone, like a bird deserted by its mate; the violin heard and answered it, as from a 
 
339 Bruce Wilshire writes, “Music is the celebration, corroboration, enhancement, and support of the whole business 
of being human. It authorizes us to live fully. Even more deadening than obvious despair or panic—if this is possible—
is the numbing effect of mindless habit. This can be so subtly boring that it is not even recognized as boredom. For 
some of us, existence becomes so routinized that we no longer notice how precious are the daily essentials of life: 
everyday food, shelter, the air we breathe, and the water we drink and use to be cleansed. When this anesthetized state 
occurs, music can help us break the shell of encrusted habit and trance and refresh our hold on reality. For, in echoing 
us, it gives us a subtle distance from ourselves: We are no longer engulfed in ourselves numbly.” Wilshire, Bruce. The 
Much-at-Once: Music, Science, Ecstasy, the Body (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 18. 
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neighboring tree. It was as at the beginning of the world, as if there were as yet only 
the two of them on the earth, or rather in this world closed to all the rest, so 
fashioned by the logic of its creator that in it there should never be any but 
themselves: the world of this sonata. Was it a bird, was it the soul, as yet not fully 
formed, of the little phrase, was it a fairy—that being invisibly lamenting, whose 
plaint the piano heard and tenderly repeated? Its cries were so sudden that the 
violinist must snatch up his bow and race to catch them as they came. Marvelous 
bird!341 
 
The beauty forms a world of its own. It is unclear who the subject is or how many subjects there 
are in this beautiful reality. It can be a bird, a soul, or a fairy. Various parts of music can be 
experienced as a communication between subjects. 
 
The violinist seemed to wish to charm, to tame, to capture it. Already it had passed 
into his soul, already the little phrase which it evoked shook like a medium’s the 
body of the violinist, “possessed” indeed. Swann knew that the phrase was going 
to speak to him once again. And his personality was now so divided that the strain 
of waiting for the imminent moment when he would find himself face to face with 
it again shook him with one of those sobs which a beautiful line of poetry or a sad 
piece of news will wring from us, not when we are alone, but when we impart them 
to friends in whom we see ourselves reflected like a third person whose probable 
emotion affects them too.342 
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The musical beauty can shatter the subjectivity of Swann into several perspectives. It is as if Swann 
does not have the strength to meet the beauty directly. To savor this beauty, Swann needs to remain 
in a state of immobility. 
 
Swann dared not move, and would have liked to compel all the other people in the 
room to remain still also, as if the slightest movement might imperil the magic 
presence, supernatural, delicious, frail, that was so soon to vanish.343 
 
The appreciation of musical beauty brings Swann to reflect upon his love. Instead of adding 
passion into that love, the music allows Swann to see that “his hopes of happiness would not be 
realized now.”344 The emotional agency resides more in Swann and less in the music in the end. 
 
The Objection from Sole Cause as Partial Nature 
Let us define emotional agency as the source of power that is causally responsible for the 
formation of an emotion. Below is a table for how emotional agency is distributed in Swann’s 12-
step musical experience. There might be no consensus regarding how to distribute the emotional 
agency. I try to err on the side of caution by factoring in the contribution from the music as far as 
possible. The table reflects what I take to be the least favorable, yet fair, way of distributing 
emotional agency for the illusion view. 
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Emotional Agency In Swann In the Music 
Step 1: impression  X 
Step 2: recognition x- x+ 
Step 3: association X  
Step 4: objectification X  
Step 5: liberation x x 
Step 6: transformation x x 
Step 7: protection x- x+ 
Step 8: representation X  
Step 9: location X  
Step 10: distinction x x 
Step 11: accretion x x 
Step 12: appreciation x+ x- 
 
If a big letter “X” shows up, emotional agency wholly resides in one side. Here is a brief 
explanation of the assignment. For Step 1, music is powerful to create a recreative influence over 
Swann. The music initiates Swann’s emotional journey. For step 3 and 4, Swann associates the 
music with such a concept as love and such an object as Odette. For Step 8 and 9, Swann 
intentionally takes the music to represent emotional charms and attempts in vain to locate that 
representation in specific features of the music. 
If a small letter “x” shows up, emotional agency partially resides in either Swann or the 
music. I do not aim to measure precisely how emotional agency is shared between Swann and the 
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music. Nevertheless, I occasionally use “x+” and “x-” in those steps where emotional agency 
seems to reside more in one side. Whenever the small letter “x” shows up on the side of music, the 
illusion view receives a potential challenge. Let me briefly explain the assignment of each small 
letter “x”. For Step 5 and 6, the music is powerful. But music alone would not achieve the liberation 
or the transformation. Swann’s willful attention also plays a role. Hence the agency is distributed 
between the two. For Step 2 and 7, Swann is doing some emotional work by recognizing the charm 
and seeking protective intimacy, but the music is the predominant factor to make things happen. 
For Step 10, music provides a basis for emotional distinction, yet emotional distinction would not 
happen if there is no intention to distinguish emotions on Swann’s part. For Step 11, musical beauty 
is the reality of nothingness towards which Swann’s emotional accretion builds up. Both the beauty 
of music and Swann’s emotional progress contribute to the emotional formation. For Step 12, the 
music merely provides a space for Swann to actively reflect upon his emotional journey and 
appreciates different interpretations he can give to the music. For all steps involving the small 
letter “x”, it is still uncontroversial that the emotion belongs to Swann. Yet Swann’s emotional 
agency alone is inadequate to make the emotion come into being. The challenge to the illusion 
view comes collectively from the emotional agency in the music. 
Swann’s musical experience is messier than what might be imagined from the illusion view. 
I did not expect to see emotional agency reside in the music at all, let alone many times with 
varying strength. At this point, one may wonder how much emotional agency is needed on the 
musical side to undermine the illusion view. 
One cannot resolve this matter merely by counting the number of x. Although the majority 
might give a reason to consider that side more, it is not on the basis of a majority that we should 
reach a conclusion about the emotional nature of music. Here are two simple suggestions that do 
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not work. One may suggest that one “X” is sufficient to establish an emotional nature of music. 
But since the only “X” on the musical side is in Step 1 where it is uncertain whether an emotion 
will emerge, it is too early for that “X” to establish an emotional nature of music. Alternatively, 
one may suggest that only one “x” on the musical side is sufficient to establish an emotional nature 
of music. But since there is also emotional agency on Swann’s side, it is not clear that music has 
an emotional nature. 
A more stringent suggestion is that all the emotional agency is needed on the musical side 
to establish an emotional nature of music. If some agency falls on the side of Swann, it is not the 
case that music has wholly an emotional nature. But this will settle the issue too quickly and appear 
too demanding for the opponents of the illusion view. Moreover, to settle the debate this way 
would mask the plasticity of the illusion view. Let us consider the thought that even if music is not 
wholly possessive of an emotional nature, it may have one partially. The emotional nature of music, 
on this view, may need extra-musical sources like Swann’s mental activities to fully generate an 
emotion. 
The worries raised by emotional agency in the music can be grouped into three kinds 
according to their functions at different stages of Swann’s musical experience. Here is a brief 
summary. 
Initiation (Step 1-2): The music is able to initiate Swann’s emotion. Although stimulations 
surround Swann every day, not every stimulation is able to have that recreative and charming effect 
that makes him want to live differently. The music alone is able to arrest Swann’s attention. To 
the extent that the arresting power can contribute to the formation of an emotion, the music might 
be seen as having an emotional nature. At the first hearing of the music, Swann might have already 
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been unconsciously in love with Odette. But the music is apparently the only initiator of that 
emotion. 
Transformation (Step 5-7): The music is powerful enough to liberate Swann from worldly 
concerns and awaken an emotion in Swann as a transformed being. To the extent that the 
transformative power can put Swann into an alternative state of existence where Swann is 
hypersensitive to certain emotions, the music might be seen as having an emotional nature. 
Distinction (Step 10-12): The music is able, through its beauty, to provide a mental space 
for Swann to distinguish an emotion and reflect upon it. To the extent that the distinguishing power 
is significant for Swann’s emotional journey, the music might be seen as having an emotional 
nature. 
The initiative, transformative, and distinctive power of music all converge on the idea of 
causation, which is the philosophical core underlying the three groups of worries. The difference 
between these groups of worries lies only in the stages of the emotional trajectory. Instead of 
dealing with each group separately, I will try to meet the challenge at that philosophical core, 
according to which the music can be conceived as the sole cause of Swann’s emotion. Even if the 
musical phrase does not directly arouse Swann’s emotion, it arouses the affective components of 
the emotion. The conceptual components are unconsciously ready on Swann’s part. Since the 
affective components can be generated only by the musical phrase, the music is indispensable. 
Once the affective components are put in place by the music, an emotion is on its track to emerge. 
Since the music is the sole cause of an emotion, it seems to have an emotional nature albeit 
partially so. Music is not asked to take full responsibility for the formation of the emotion. The 
potential opponent recognizes that the emotion belongs to Swann and comes partially from Swann. 
But the opponent protests that Swann is not able to have this emotion without the music. Being the 
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sole cause means that there is a causal role uniquely played by the music in the formation of the 
emotion. The partial responsibility taken by music in this way seems to establish an emotional 
nature of music. 
 
Replies from Transience, Catalyst, Musicality 
I will consider three possible replies to the objection from sole cause as partial nature. The 
first reply does not work, the second brings the debate to a stalemate, and the third will refute the 
objection. 
The Reply from Transience 
One might argue that the objection proves too much. To illustrate, when I walk along the 
seashore, the ocean sound makes me feel a certain way. The affective components, combined with 
my concept about life, form an emotion akin to wonder. The way the ocean waves touch the shore 
generates a specific volume and pattern of sound, which alone can cause the affective components 
on my part. Imagine that the physical environment of this ocean is unique such that ocean sounds 
from elsewhere cannot have this effect on me. I might be willing to think that the ocean sound has 
an emotional nature.345  But in fact I would be projecting my emotional state into a natural 
phenomenon. 
The opponent may argue that what distinguishes music from natural phenomena such as 
ocean sounds is the fact that musical materials are intentionally arranged. But intentional 
 
345 A panpsychist may see everything as conscious in the universe. The ocean sound might be heard as emotional in 
that it can be heard as a message from a conscious Nature. But the objection should not require panpsychism in order 
to hold its ground. 
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arrangement does not put emotion into the object. The candles in Friends’ proposal scene between 
Chandler and Monica are carefully arranged to create an amorous atmosphere.346 The love may 
have existed for some time without certain affective components which could only be aroused by 
the candles. But that does not mean that love is in the nature of the candles. Nonetheless, the 
opponent can maintain that if Chandler had made those candles himself, we would find it 
reasonable to think of the candles as having a nature of love. The significance of intention might 
lie not in the arrangement of the candles, but in the tailor-making of the candles for a proposal. In 
that case, the candles are almost equivalent to intellectual ideas in the same way the musical phrase 
is equivalent to intellectual ideas for Swann, even if Chandler is the maker in our thought 
experiment and Swann is not the composer in the novel. In other words, the physical properties of 
the candles do not prevent them from being an icon to represent something else such as the charms 
of love. The objection does not prove too much. 
One may also wonder if the objection proves too little. In particular, there seems to be a 
problem with the fleetingness of what is caused. The emotion is fleeting even within Swann. 
Different amorous stages saw Swann experiencing subtly different emotions. Swann felt a 
refreshing happiness, a frailty in that happiness, a detached resignation, etc. These emotions are 
not the same, even if they might feel similar on some level. If the emotion cannot be identified, 
apparently it makes little sense to attribute emotional agency to the music. 
Nonetheless, the opponent can reply that the different emotions are different manifestations 
of love (or lovesickness).347 As long as all the emotions are love, they do not differ in kind. 
Hypothetically, we can even imagine a consistent Swann who sticks with one token manifestation 
 
346 Chandler and Monica, “the Proposal,” accessed March 1, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7z3ylDKFeY. 
347 I do not distinguish love from lovesickness here. They are just two perspectives of viewing the same emotion for 
the purpose of this dicussion. For more discussion on the sick side of love, see Berit Brogaard, On Romantic Love: 
Simple Truths about a Complex Emotion, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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of love. Indeed, the objection does not require a consistent Swann on the token level. The multiple 
manifestations of an emotion may strengthen the objection.  Vagueness can be seen as versatility 
in the emotional agency. A musical phrase may provide affective states which are versatile to 
mingle with different conceptual components to form different emotions. 
Therefore, the reply from transience does not refute the objection. If so, the strategy of 
underdetermination may not work, for the idea of underdetermination and the idea of transience 
point to the same thing. The force of the objection lies in that it determines the emotion at least for 
one individual at a time. An adequate reply must not sidestep the causal uniqueness of this musical 
phrase for Swann. Even if it is a private emotion, there is something so strong about the music for 
Swann that seems absent in the theoretical horizon of the illusion view. 
The Reply from Catalyst 
Let us approach the heart of the objection through three analogies. I will argue that it is 
unjustified to establish an emotional nature of the thing in each analogy. 
Improvisation. There is no time for the performer to deliberate about what to perform. I 
find in a musical improvisation something uniquely powerful, which generates an emotion for me 
in the way the little phrase does for Swann. Just because some sounds can initiate an emotion in 
me, it does not follow that I get to attribute my emotion back to the nature of that sound. The nature 
of improvisation implies that the music has its effects on me by chance. I may have missed the 
improvisation. Had the improvisation been slightly different, it would not create the same effects 
in me. It is odd to think of one improvisation as having an emotional nature, while other possible 
variations of the performance do not have one. 
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Literature. I have an emotion that is impossible to emerge unless I take 3 hours to read 
Plato’s Symposium from beginning to end intensely. Each time I read the text, I can count on 
experiencing that emotion. It is an emotion of love. This does not mean that Plato’s Symposium 
has an emotional nature. Although Plato wrote the text intentionally,348 it is absurd to think of Plato 
as writing the dialogue to generate an emotion in me. I should refrain from attributing an emotional 
nature to Plato’s text based on my emotional response. Plato’s text can be emotionally powerful 
in a general way without suiting my circumstance. Some readers may experience a strong hatred 
from it. The problem of underdetermination lingers with us. 
Speech. A professor is giving a speech in front of the class. I am in the audience. To the 
extent that the professor intentionally addresses the audience, I am an intended receiver of the 
speech. I am touched by the speech. There is nothing else in the world that can awaken an emotion 
that I have. I am the only member in the audience who feels this way. The emotional effect can be 
so strong that I think there could be no mistake that the professor intends the message to be 
experienced just in the way I experience it. The professor may agree with my emotional response 
to the speech in that the conceptual components I use to form my emotion are the relevant ones in 
the eyes of the professor. Still, by insisting on an emotional nature of the speech, I would bring the 
speech down to my level and not give it a chance to appear in its own light. A more proper attitude 
is gratitude. I am grateful to experience a great speech. But the speech does not thereby have that 
emotional nature as perceived in my experience. 
These analogies show that projecting an emotion into the nature of something fixes my 
experience of it. Once my experience becomes formulaic, it gives an illusory sense of the nature 
of the thing that awakens my emotion. But the opponent may insist that the power of music is 
 
348 Plato may have composed this dialogue with some musical structure in mind. See J. B. Kennedy, The Musical 
Structure of Plato’s Dialogues, Routledge, 2014. 
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shown in formulaic experiences. Swann is transformed into a different being, which seems more 
significant than the fact that his experience is formulaic. On the illusion view, however, the music 
serves as a mere catalyst without an emotional nature of its own. There is no emotional agency in 
the music. At least there is no way to decide whether the musical phrase is an emotional agent or 
an emotional catalyst in Swann’s experience. We are at a stalemate. 
The Reply from Musicality 
Let us focus on the causal uniqueness of music. Causal uniqueness can be construed as 
causal otherworldliness. To say that a musical phrase alone can cause certain affective components 
is to affirm an otherworldly power in the music. The causal otherworldliness of music does not 
imply that the emotion caused by the music is otherworldly. Swann might conceive his love for 
Odette sacred, but that emotion can be seen as a sign of vanity in the eyes of others. Rather, the 
causal otherworldliness of music implies that the affective components caused by the music are 
otherworldly themselves. The affective components are not achievable anywhere other than in the 
experience of the music. Swann has his conceptual components ready, but his emotion needs some 
otherworldly affective components to come into being. The musical phrase is otherworldly 
powerful in that it alone can cause the otherworldly affective states. 
One might reply that otherworldliness suggests the strength of the power, but it does not 
give the power an emotional nature. We are especially prone to projecting emotions into 
otherworldliness. But this reply is deflationary. It is only as a transformed being that Swann can 
project an emotion into that otherworldliness. Since a transformed being perceives a different 
world, the transformed Swann is otherworldly himself. Only an otherworldly Swann is capable of 
projecting his love for Odette into the music. One might worry if the objection implies too big a 
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sacrifice in the subjectivity of Swann to make sense. But Swann is willing to sacrifice this agency 
in exchange for an experience. Even if Swann allows himself to be transformed, the affective work 
is accomplished by the music. Swann’s emotional projection depends on the causal 
otherworldliness of the music. 
Nevertheless, the idea of otherworldliness may prove too much. In analogy, think of a near-
death moment when worldly concerns are obliterated from consciousness. Suppose I feel an 
emotion of regret that I have not lived bravely enough. A near-death moment, being rare, initiates 
a mental space for my realization, but the emotion I have on a rare occasion does not put my 
emotion into the nature of the moment. Suppose I live a form of life where near-death moments 
abound, though all but one of them will come true. Even if the otherworldly occasions happen 
more often, it would be mistaken to think of each occasion as having an emotional nature that 
happens to align with my regret. Substituting musical phrases for near-death moments should not 
change the answer. We can feel something particular on otherworldly occasions. But the occasions 
themselves do not take on the emotions we feel. 
The opponent may reply that the analogy does not hold between the near-death moment 
and the musical phrase. The music not only provides an occasion, but contains something that is 
able to set into motion the emergence of an emotion. There is something in and about the musical 
phrase that is uniquely powerful in awakening an emotion. Think of a perfume that is potent to 
make Swann feel a desire towards someone. The mental association belongs to Swann, but the 
affective arousal is caused by the perfume which is designed to generate such desires in people. 
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to attribute Swann’s emotion to the nature of the perfume. 
Swann’s emotion is not part of the perfume, though the perfume may be conceived as part of 
Swann’s emotion. Likewise, the musical phrase can be conceived as part of Swann’s emotion, 
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since the musical phrase participates in the formation of the emotion. The causal uniqueness of the 
music makes it constitutive of Swann’s emotion. This is a way not of putting emotion into music, 
but of putting music into emotion.349 The musicality of emotion means that emotion can take music 
as its part. It follows that emotion can be musical in its nature, not that music can be emotional in 
its nature. The objection from sole cause as partial nature conflates the idea that Swann’s emotion 
for Odette is musical with the idea that the musical phrase, which is part of Swann’s love, is 
emotional. Swann’s love has a musical nature. The illusion view can accommodate the causal 
uniqueness of music, once we acknowledge the musicality of emotion. It would be interesting to 
elaborate on the musicality of emotion, but that would be a project for another occasion. 
 
Reflection 
In this chapter I have considered a possible objection to the illusion view. Our potential 
opponent can draw on the causal uniqueness of music to formulate the objection from sole cause 
as partial nature. If a piece of music alone is able to generate affective components that are 
necessary to form an emotion, it seems that the music has some emotional agency, which may 
serve as the basis to establish an emotional nature of music. I have explored three possible replies 
to this objection. The reply from transience does not solve the problem, because emotional 
transience does not take the unique causal power away from music. The reply from catalyst 
mitigates the objection, but does not resolve the question of whether music has an emotional nature. 
The reply from musicality solves the problem by distinguishing the emotionality of music from 
 
349 One may protest that it is really the reaction to the music that is the starting point in the emotion. But let us grant 
this point and include the external stimulus, the music, into the emotional identity. 
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the musicality of emotion. A musical experience like Swann’s, where a musical phrase alone is 
able to cause the affective components of an emotion, can be integrated into the illusion view.  
187 
Chapter Nine. Conclusion 
Various accounts have been advanced to establish an emotional nature of music. Upon 
closer inspection, the emotions attributed to music in those accounts are read into music through 
projective acts of interpretation and imagination. Music does not have an emotional nature. The 
emotional appearance of music is illusory. 
I have adopted a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to investigate the emotional 
appearance of music. Comparative philosophy is helpful because it provides a starting point that 
voices the illusion view directly. Since the illusion view is out of tune with prevailing theories on 
the emotional appearance of music, it would be an almost insurmountable burden for me to carve 
out a conceptual space for the illusion view from scratch. Rather than articulating the illusion view 
myself, I uncover a compelling articulation of the illusion view from an ancient Chinese text 
written by a philosopher and musician. This has taken on more than historical significance, because 
I have reconstructed the critical arguments in the text. 
There are interpretive challenges inherent in approaching an ancient Chinese text. Most 
obviously, there is a question about the applicability of the terms. As a fundamental worry, people 
might think that the way an ancient Chinese philosopher understands “music” and “emotion” 
would be so different from the way contemporary philosophers understand such terms that a 
meaningful dialogue is impossible. I have addressed such worries by doing most of the translation 
of the text and highlighting interpretive issues to draw out philosophical problems. I believe that 
Ji Kang’s text can be used as a starting point in our discussion. To best incorporate Ji Kang’s 
thinking into our project, I have not followed exactly the same structure of Ji Kang’s text. I have 
reconstructed the thoughts in the text into three arguments for the illusion view. I unpack the main 
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ideas and present the dialectics for two sides. The challenges raised by Ji Kang center on the 
representational inconstancy, expressive incapability, and evocative underdetermination of music. 
One might wonder if these challenges could be met in Chinese philosophy such that a 
contemporary rendering of these ideas is unnecessary. To address this worry, I have explored 
possible objections to the illusion view that can be raised from the Confucian tradition. They are 
objections from representational reliability, expressive sincerity, and evocative appropriateness. 
These objections mitigate, yet ultimately fail to refute the illusion view. Representational 
reliability is not as robust as representational constancy. Expressive sincerity presupposes 
expressive capability. Evocative appropriateness does not seem to hold over time. 
There are numerous accounts in contemporary Western musical aesthetics that implicitly 
stand against the illusion view. Most prominent are such theoretical approaches as representation, 
expression, and evocation. These accounts have not been used to deal with such a foundational 
challenge as the illusion view. Normally, the debates among different theorists revolve around 
whether a theoretical approach should take explanatory priority. To challenge the illusion view, I 
have constructed arguments out of writings in contemporary approaches. These arguments should 
be thought of as expounding neither the contemporary theories nor mine, but rather contemporary 
theories as they might strike Ji Kang, as they present a problem for the illusion view. It turns out 
that none of the arguments can refute the illusion view. 
I have defended the illusion view against broader objections that can be raised from 
contemporary approaches. For evocation, the illusion view allows listeners to claim full ownership 
of emotion in musical enjoyment. For expression, a Gricean model of meaning can be used to 
explain emotional communication through music. For representation, emotional language in 
commercial or educational contexts can be useful yet should be limited. 
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I have formulated a possible objection based on Swann’s musical experience in Proust’s 
novel. I have examined the emotional agency in Swann’s musical experience and formulated the 
objection from sole cause as partial nature. As I have shown, although music might be a unique 
causal power in the formation of an emotion, music does not even partially have an emotional 
nature. Nonetheless, I have suggested that an emotion can be musical. The illusion view turns out 
to be experientially richer than it might appear at first. 
I do not claim to have exhausted all the theoretical attempts at establishing an emotional 
nature of music. Still, I take the nine arguments constructed from three philosophical approaches 
to be representative of the main conceptual paths. It is possible that some unexplored arguments 
in contemporary Western aesthetics might be mobilized to establish an emotional nature of music. 
Likewise, in the Confucian tradition, it is possible that some texts might be mobilized to formulate 
counter-arguments to the illusion view. Yet further explorations might also confirm the illusion 
view. To explore alternative arguments would enrich the discussion in the future. 
The value of the illusion view as a philosophical position lies in its revelation of the 
conceptual space opposite where theorizing normally happens today. The problems of 
representational inconstancy, expressive incapability, and evocative underdetermination have been 
buried in the philosophical pursuit of putting emotion into music. This philosophical pursuit has 
informed musical experiences in a way that misaligns with the nature of music. To think of music 
of having an emotional nature implies beliefs about representational constancy, expressive 
capability, and evocative determinacy. These beliefs have further consequences. Together they 
form a web of ideas that limit one’s musical world. 
The illusion view can reorient musical experiences informed by contemporary 
philosophical discussions. This reorientation allows us to consider whether differences in musical 
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aesthetics might originate from differences in how we understand the nature of music. Musical 
aesthetics built upon the emotional illusion of music might rest on a philosophical error. Only 
when we see through the emotional illusion of music can our disagreements on emotional 
appearances of music be substantive. The world of musical experiences, reoriented without the 
emotional baggage, becomes free.  
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